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IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
It has been stipulated among the parties that the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah may appear as amicus 
curiae for the purposes of Young Electric Sign Company's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Section 35-1-46 U.C.A. 
requires all employers in the State to secure payment of 
workers compensation benefits by purchasing private 
insurance, qualifying as a "self-insured" or by obtaining 
insurance from the Workers1 Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(Hereinafter "WCF") WCF is a "...nonprofit, self-
supporting, quasi-public corporation..." [Section 35-3-
3(1)(a) U.C.A.] whose purpose is to "...insure Utah 
employers against liability for compensation based on job-
related accidental injuries and occupational diseases; 
and...assure payment of this compensation to Utah employees 
who are entitled to it..." [Section 35-3-2(1)(b)(i) and 
(ii)]. WCF is charged by its enabling legislation to 
"...provide workers1 compensation insurance at an 
actuarially sound price..." [Section 35-3-4(1) U.C.A.] WCF 
provides workers' compensation coverage for in excess of 
24,000 Utah employers or approximately 80 percent of the 
gross number of employers in the State of Utah. Those 
24,000 employers employ approximately 260,000 Utah workers. 
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(See affidavit of Rod Smith, Vice President, Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, Appendix 1 hereto,) Because of 
the breadth of its involvement with the Workers' 
Compensation Act of Utah [Section 35-1-1 et seq.] and the 
Occupational Disease Act of Utah [Section 35-2-1 et seq.], 
WCF believes its input may be of assistance to the Court in 
determining whether to grant Young Electric Sign Company's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
WCF is very concerned about the Court of Appeals 
decision in Crosland v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) 
(Appendix 2) which it perceives to be a deviation from 
historical Utah workers' compensation administrative and 
judicial practice. Over at least the past fifteen years, 
employers and their insurance carriers have not been 
responsible to pay compensation for preexisting non-work 
related physical and mental impairments employees bring to 
the work place. WCF, having participated in the process 
leading to the passage of the 1988 amendments to Sections 
35-1-66, 35-1-67 and 35-1-69 U.C.A., is firmly of the 
opinion that the Court of Appeals has misapplied the 
standard of review, has misunderstood legislcitive intent and 
has misinterpreted the meaning of "...permanent impairment 
2 
that existed prior to an industrial accident." Section 3 5-
1-66 U.C.A. (as amended 1988). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in reviewing the 
Industrial Commission's interpretation of the medical terms 
of art in Section 35-1-66 U.C.A. (1966) for correctness and 
not deferring to the Commission's experience and expertise 
as required by Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A. as explained in 
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Commfn, 814 P.2d 581 (Appendix 3). Is the interpretation of 
the phrase "...Permanent partial disability compensation may 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior 
to an industrial accident" (Section 35-1-66 U.C.A.)(emphasis 
added), subject to more than one permissible interpretation 
thereby making the interpretation of the Industrial 
Commission a policy decision for which the appellate court 
should not substitute its judgment? Morton International, 
Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
814 P.2d 581 at 589. 
2. Did the legislature intend by its 1988 amendments 
to Sections 35-1-66 and 35-1-69 U.C.A. to make employers and 
their insurance carriers responsible to pay benefits for 
3 
preexisting, asymptomatic and undiagnosed non-work related 
phys ica1 impa irments ? 
3. See Also, "Certiorari Inquiries" and "Ultimate 
Issues on Appeal" in brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Self-
Insurers' Association and "Question Presented for Review" of 
Young Electric Sign Company in its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, each of which WCF adopts as its own. 
OPINION OP THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WCF joins as Amicus Curiae in Young Electric Sign 
Company's Petition for Writ of Certiorari of the Utah Court 
of Appeals decision in Crosland v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, attached hereto as 
Appendix 2. WCF also adopts as its own the arguments 
contained in the Amicus Curiae Brief of Utah Self-Insurers' 
Association. The Court of Appeals was reviewing the 
Industrial Commission of Utah Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order dated September 11, 1990 (Appendix 4). 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
WCF agrees with the statement of this Court's 
jurisdiction in Young Electric Sign Company's Petition for 
Writ of Review. 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provisions of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) are controlling and 
attached as appendices: 
Section 63-46b-16, U.C.A. 
(Standard of Review) Appendix 5 
Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. 
(Permanent Partial Disability) . . . . Appendix 6 
Section 35-1-69, U.C.A. (Apportionment 
with Employers' Reinsurance Fund in 
Cases of Permanent Total Disability) . Appendix 7 
The controlling Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure is: 
Rule 46 (Considerations governing 
review of certiorari) Appendix 8 
The controlling medical definition of "permanent 
impairment11 is: 
American Medical Association 
Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment Appendix 9 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
WCF adopts as its own Young Electric Sign's Statement 
of the Case in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
WCF adopts as its own Young Electric Sign's Statement 
of Facts in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT OP APPEALS USED AN IMPROPER STANDARD OF 
REVIEW BY FAILING TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TECHNICAL MEDICAL TERM OF 
ART "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT" AS IS REQUIRED BY SECTION 63-46b-
16 U.C.A. FAILURE TO GIVE SUCH DEFERENCE CONFLICTS WITH 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN MORTON INT'L INC, V, AUDITING DIV. 
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMM'N, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), 
Rule 46(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that this Court will consider reviewing a decision 
of the Court of Appeals "When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state...law in a way that 
is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court". In 
this instance, the Court of Appeals has misconstrued the 
Standard of Review required by Section 63-46b-16, U.C.A. it 
should have applied to the Industrial Commission's 
interpretation of medical terminology in a statute. The 
Court of appeals decided: 
...This case requires an interpretation 
of the 1988 amendment to the Workers' 
Compensation Act and thus presents a 
question of statutory construction and 
legislative intent which we may review 
for correctness. Under this higher 
standard, to afford relief we must find 
that the Commission erroneously 
interpreted the law to Crosland1s 
substantial prejudice. 
Crosland, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
This Court, however, stated the standard of review 
which should apply in a circumstance as presented here where 
6 
terms in a statute may be subject to more than one 
legitimate meaning and there is an absence of legislative 
intent1: 
. . .However, in the absence of a 
discernible legislative intent 
concerning the specific question in 
issue, a choice among permissible 
interpretations of a statute is largely 
a policy determination. The agency that 
has been granted authority to administer 
the statute is the appropriate body to 
make such a determination. Indeed, both 
the legislative history to section 63-
46b-16 and our prior cases suggest that 
an appellate court should not substitute 
its judgment for the agency's judgment 
concerning the wisdom of the agency's 
policy. When there is no discernible 
legislative intent concerning a specific 
issue the legislature has, in effect, 
left the issue unresolved. In such 
case, it is appropriate to conclude that 
the legislature has delegated authority 
to the agency to decide the issue... 
The crux of th i s case i s what i s meant by the 
l imitation the legis lature placed on payments of permanent 
partial d i sab i l i ty benefits in 1988 when i t added the 
language "...Permanent partial d i sabi l i ty compensation may 
WCF takes the pos i t ion hereinafter in Point 2 that the l e g i s l a t u r e 
intended the employer to be responsible for the industr ia l injury only and not 
for a nonindustrial physical or mental anomaly for which medical experts can 
determine a percentage of impairment though the anomaly was not diagnosed and 
was asymptomatic before the industr ia l injury. There i s nothing in the 
Workers' Compensation Act as amended in 1988 from which the Court of Appeals 
could have reasonably concluded to the contrary. We give the Court of Appeals 
perhaps unwarranted deference by implying in t h i s argument that i t s 
interpretat ion i s among more than one leg i t imate meaning of the terms in 
quest ion. 
7 
not be paid for any permanent impairment that e x i s t e d prior 
to an i n d u s t r i a l accident" t o s e c t i o n 35-1-66 U.C.A. (1988). 
The Court of Appeals opined that M . . . [W]e b e l i e v e the term 
permanent impairment should be interpreted to re fer to a 
ratable phys ica l condit ion exh ib i t ing some diminished 
funct ion ." Crosland, supra, at 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. 
(Emphasis added) 
Unt i l 1990, the l e g i s l a t u r e did not choose to g ive a 
d e f i n i t i o n to the medical term "permanent impairment".2 In 
that void i t i s e n t i r e l y proper for the Industr ia l 
Commission t o use the exper t i s e i t has gained in in terac t ing 
with the medical community. I t was proper for the 
Commission t o r e l y on the medical panel i t appointed in t h i s 
case and i t s own experience t o determine that "impairment" 
means " . . .what i s wrong with the heal th of an individual" 
2
. In 1990, the s tatutory d e f i n i t i o n amendments passed by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e merely codify the interpretat ion the Industr ia l Commission has 
c o n s i s t e n t l y applied over the years and did in fact use in the present case: 
35-1-44. Def in i t ion of terms. 
****** 
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically 
impaired as to function. Disability can 
be total or partial, temporary or 
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
****** 
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical 
condition reflecting any anatomical or 
functional abnormality or loss. 
Impairment may be either temporary or 
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
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(See Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. 
Chapter 1, Third Edition, 1988, pp. 1-6, Appendix 9 hereto). 
It was within the scope of its charge by the Commission for 
the medical panel to examine and report its opinions 
concerning the extent and permanency of the impairment. The 
Industrial Commission should be given deference of 
interpretation of medical terms. It was within the 
Commission's prerogatives as the finder of facts to rely on 
the opinions of the Medical Panel as to the issues of 
permanent partial impairments. (See also, Utah Self-
Insurers' Association's Amicus Brief.) 
2. UTAH CASE LAW INVOLVING APPORTIONMENT OF 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS BETWEEN THE EMPLOYERS* REINSURANCE 
FUND AND EMPLOYERS OF INDUSTRIALLY INJURED WORKERS AS WELL 
AS THE 1988 AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 35-1-66 AND 35-1-69 
U.C.A. MAKE IT CLEAR THAT EMPLOYERS ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR 
PREEXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITIONS WHICH EMPLOYEES BRING WITH 
THEM TO THE WORK PLACE. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED 
THIS IMPORTANT CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION IN A MANNER THAT 
SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS IN THE STATE. 
A. THE HOLDING IN CROSLAND IS IN CONFLICT WITH 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ESTABLISHED UTAH PUBLIC POLICY 
TO HIRE AND RETAIN AS EMPLOYEES THOSE WHO HAVE 
PREEXISTING PHYSICAL AND MENTAL LIMITATIONS. 
Interpreting the critical language in Section 35-1-66 
U.C.A. presents an issue of first impression to this Court. 
It is an issue of vital concern to all employers and all 
employees in the State of Utah. The final decision will 
9 
have a significant impact on not only the amount of 
compensation injured employees may receive, but may also 
significantly affect the premiums employers will have to pay 
to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage. The 
decision may also significantly impact the costs of 
providing compensation benefits for those employers which 
qualify as self-insureds. (See Appendix 1, Affidavit of 
Rodney C. Smith) In this instance "...the Court of Appeals 
has decided an important question of ...state...law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court." 
Rule 46(d) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Though Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation states that the maijority of 
jurisdictions have opted to not attempt to apportion payment 
for permanent partial disability compensation between 
preexisting nonindustrial injuries and subsequent industrial 
injuries, he acknowledges that a certain number of states do 
apportion, id., Section 59, Successive Disabilities, Vol. 
2, P. 10-492.329, 1992. It is clear from the language 
"Permanent partial disability compensation may not be paid 
for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident" of Section 35-1-66 U.C.A., Utah falls 
10 
in l i n e with those s t a t e s which do apportion. Section 3 5 - 1 -
66 U.C.A. (1988).3 
The 1988 amendment to Section 35-1-66 U.C.A. was 
designed by the Legis lature to perpetuate a concept c l e a r l y 
pronounced in the l i n e of cases beginning with Intermountain 
Health Care. Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977). That 
i s , in Utah the employer i s not responsible to pay permanent 
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation e i ther for manifested or 
quiescent preex i s t ing condi t ions . That rule of law arose in 
the context of apportionment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for payment 
of compensation between employers and the Second Injury Fund 
(now Employers1 Reinsurance Fund) of Sect ions 35-1-68 and 
35-1-69 U.C.A.4 See a l s o , Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980); Northwest Carriers v. 
Industr ia l Com'n, e t c . . 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981); American 
Coal v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984); Second Injury 
Fund v. Perry's Mi l l , 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984). "...Where 
I t i s important to note that the l e g i s l a t u r e did not choose to put 
s imilar l imi ta t ions on the payment of temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation 
(Section 35-1-65 U.C.A.), temporary part ia l d i s a b i l i t y compensation (Section 
35-1-65.1 U.C.A.) or medical benef i t s (Section 35-1-45 U.C.A.). Accordingly, 
in t h i s case not involving a permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , Young E lec tr i c Sign 
Company quite appropriately paid a l l such benef i t s without apportioning 
between the preex i s t ing condition and the industr ia l i n j u r i e s . 
4
. The l e g i s l a t u r e a l so amended Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. in 1988 to 
l imi t apportionment consideration between employers and the Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund to permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y cases (Section 35-1-67 U.C.A,) 
and to se t a s p e c i f i c a l l oca t ion of cos t s between the Employer's Reinsurance 
Fund and the employer. 
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the disability is the result of pre-existing conditions and 
not an industrial accident, a claimant is not entitled to 
disability benefits." Large v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) at 957. 
B. THE DRAFTERS OF THE 1988 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 
35-1-66 U.C.A. DID NOT INTEND TO SHIFT THE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYING COMPENSATION FOR ANY 
PREEXISTING NON-WORK RELATED CONDITION TO EMPLOYERS. 
THE CROSLAND COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY VERIFYING THAT INTENT. 
It was the intent of those recommending the 1988 
amendment to Section 35-1-66 to the legislature to insure 
that employers would only be responsible to pay permanent 
partial disability for the industrially caused impairment, 
not that attributable to preexisting conditions. The 
Crosland Court did not discuss legislative history which 
verifies that intent. The heading of House Bill 218 
(attached as Exhibit A to Appendix 10, Affidavit of Stuart 
L. Poelman) states the purpose of the bill: 
AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION; 
CHANGING THE NAME OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND; 
CLARIFYING THAT PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION ENTITLEMENTS ARE BASED ON 
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT CAUSED BY AN INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT: ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ON PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
CLAIMS AND PROVIDING AN OFFSET BASED ON 
CERTAIN OTHER INCOME; MODIFYING PROVISIONS 
REGARDING AWARDS FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND; 
MODIFYING PROVISIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION AS IT RELATES 
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TO STATUTES OF LIMITATION; CLARIFYING THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AUTHORITY TO CONTROL 
MEDICAL CARE OF INJURED EMPLOYEES; AMENDING 
THE PREMIUM TAX IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND 
INJURY FUND; PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD 
FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL ASPECTS OF ACCIDENTS; 
AMENDING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS; MAKING 
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose of House Bill 218 was to amend the Workers1 
Compensation Act of Utah to insure the fiscal integrity of 
the Second Injury Fund (now Employers' Reinsurance Fund) 
That Fund had been facing insolvency because it had been 
paying a proportionate share of medical expenses, temporary 
total disability compensation and permanent partial 
disability compensation in addition to permanent total 
compensation on cases involving preexisting permanent 
partial disability claims since the Ortega, supra, decision 
in 1978. The Fund had more money being paid out in claims 
than it was taking in through the means provided it by state 
law. House Bill 218 alleviated that threatened insolvency 
by increasing the Fund's income while decreasing the claims 
obligations placed on it by the Ortega interpretation of 
Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. House Bill 218 increased the premium 
tax paid by employers or their insurance carriers, reduced 
apportioned reimbursement to employers of benefits in non-
permanent total cases, eliminated benefits paid to injured 
employees for preexisting conditions not involving permanent 
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total disability and established a precise schedule of 
apportionment between the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
employers in permanent total disability cases. 
House Bill 218 was not intended to transfer any of the 
prior apportionment liabilities of the Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund for permanent partial disability 
compensation benefits to employers. The intent was instead 
to "...eliminate permanent partial disability benefits...to 
the extent that [they] relate...to permanent partial 
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions.... It was 
never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer 
liable for compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting 
conditions. All preexisting conditions related to 
asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial 
impairment were to go uncompensated." (Affidavit of Stuart 
L. Poelman, Appendix 10) 
WCF viewed House Bill 218 as not in any way increasing 
its responsibility to pay compensation benefits for 
preexisting conditions of its insureds' injured employees. 
"Rather, WCF understood workers would no longer be 
compensated for any permanent partial disability related to 
pre-existing medical problems...." (Appendix 1, Affidavit 
of Rodney C. Smith) That understanding is supported by the 
Fiscal Note to House Bill 218 prepared by the Legislative 
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Fiscal Analyst which is silent as to any effect on 
employers1 responsibilities for preexisting conditions. To 
the contrary, the Fiscal Note states, "In addition, pre-
existing injuries which are aggravated by an industrial 
accident will no longer be eligible for compensation from 
the Second Injury Fund." (See Exhibit A to Appendix 1, 
Affidavit of Rodney C. Smith) 
Professor Arthur Larson states very succinctly the 
controlling humanitarian public policy adopted by the Utah 
Legislature and acknowledged by this Court in prior 
decisions cited hereinbefore: 
While at first glance it might appear 
that the apportionment rule favors the 
employer and non-apportionment the 
employee, in practice the non-
apportionment rule proved the worse of 
the two evils from the standpoint of the 
handicapped worker. As soon as it 
became clear that a particular state had 
adopted a rule reguiringr an employer to 
bear the full cost of total disability 
for loss of the crippled worker's 
remaining leg or arm, employers had a 
strong financial incentive to discharge 
all handicapped workers who might bring 
upon them this kind of aggravated 
liability. When loss of a single eye 
might mean a compensation liability of 
$5,000 for a man with two good eyes but 
$26,000 for a man with only one, the 
compensation insurance premium on the 
latter would naturally be markedly 
greater. It has been said, for example, 
that within the thirty days following 
the announcement of the non-
apportionment rule in Nease v. Hughes 
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Stone Company (citation omitted), 
between seven and eight thousand one-
eyed, one-legged, one-armed, and one-
handed men were displaced in Oklahoma. 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Arthur Larson, Vol. 2, 
Sec. 59.13, pp. 10-492.397 through 10-492.398, 1992. It is 
the public policy in Utah to encourage and not discourage 
employers to initially hire and thereafter retain in 
employment those who may bring physical or mental impairment 
to the work place. See eg. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Capitano. supra. In exchange for that policy, employers are 
relieved of the responsibility to pay compensation for those 
non-work related conditions the employee brings to the 
employment. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize the 
significance of that public policy in making its 
determination. 
3. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-1-66 U.C.A. BY THE 
COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENES THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE IN THE 
STATUTE AND THE GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY. 
WCF defers to and adopts as its own the argument set 
forth in Young Electric Sign Company's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. WCF will not elaborate further on this point 
though other argument points may overlap Young Electric Sign 
Company's arguments. 
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4. A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO 
RULE 46(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE BECAUSE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN CROSLAND V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, supra. AND NYREHN V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 800 
P.2d 330 (UTAH APP. 1990) (APPENDIX 11) CONFLICT ON THE 
ISSUE OF APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN INDUSTRIALLY CAUSED PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT AND THE IMPAIRMENT ARISING FROM AN ASYMPTOMATIC 
PREEXISTING CONDITION. 
Regarding the above argument point, WCF adopts as its 
own and refers the Court to the argument in the amicus brief 
of Utah Self-Insurers' Association without further 
elaboration. 
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION OF "PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT" FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 35-1-66 U.C.A. 
(PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY) CREATES A CONFLICT WITH THE 
USE OF THE SAME TERM FOR PURPOSES OF THE TEST FOR 
COMPENSABLE ACCIDENTAL INJURIES (SECTION 35-1-45 U.C.A.) AS 
ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF ALLEN V. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND HOLLOWAY V. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
The Crosland. supra, definition of "preexisting 
impairment" as excluding actual preexisting physical 
conditions which have not previously been rated because they 
were undiagnosed and asymptomatic prior to an industrial 
event, conflicts with prior decisions by this Court. The 
test for a compensable accidental injury is pronounced in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and 
clarified in Holloway v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 31 
(Utah 1986). The compensability test places a heavier 
burden which is called "legal causation" on one who brings a 
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preexisting impairment to the work place. In the Holloway 
concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman made it clear that 
latent, undiagnosed preexisting impairments which are 
lighted up by an industrial event invoke the heavier "legal 
causation" burden of proof on the claimant. WCF defers to 
and adopts as its own Utah Self-Insurers' Association's more 
detailed argument of this point in its amicus brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has improvidently awarded benefits 
to an injured worker for a preexisting physical impairment. 
Contrary to Sections 63-46b-16, U.C.A., Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act and Morton International, supra., the Court 
of Appeals failed to give deference to the Industrial 
Commission's interpretation of the statutorily undefined 
term of medical art, "permanent impairment." 
The opinion in Crosland is in conflict with the result 
in Nyrehn in which another panel of the Court of Appeals 
remanded a case with similar facts to the Industrial 
Commission for further findings of fact. 
The Court of Appeals decision creates an intolerable 
inconsistency in the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah. 
Preexisting "permanent impairment" will mean that 
asymptomatic and undiagnosed, though retrospectively 
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ratable, will be compensable for purposes of Section 35-1-66 
U.C.A. However, for purposes of determining whether there 
is an underlying compensable industrial accident, an 
undiagnosed and asymptomatic condition will invoke the 
higher "legal causation" standard of the Allen and Holloway 
cases. 
Alternatively, Crosland could be viewed as authority 
paving the way for a totally new standard of legal causation 
to determine compensability of alleged industrial accidents. 
For example, an asymptomatic preexisting condition might be 
viewed to not invoke the higher causation standard of Allen, 
in direct contradiction to the explanation of the standard 
provided in Holloway. This Court should review Crosland so 
that such a mixed message as to the important Allen tests 
for industrial accident compensability is put to rest. 
Absent such action by this Court, a tide of additional 
Industrial Commission litigation is likely. 
The Crosland decision further goes contrary to a long 
line of Utah decisions which emphasize the controlling 
public policy to encourage the hiring and continued 
employment of those who bring physical and mental impairment 
to the work place. The Crosland decision to the contrary 
dissuades employers from hiring the impaired individual. 
Contrary to the strong public policy, Crosland encourages 
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the release of those already employed once the previously 
undiagnosed and asymptomatic condition is discovered through 
an industrial accident. 
The Court of Appeals also did not examine any 
legislative history in divining its concept of legislative 
intent. The intent of the drafters of House Bill 218 did 
not intend the result of the Crosland opinion. To the 
contrary House Bill 218 was designed to insure the fiscal 
integrity of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and not to 
place additional responsibility for compensation benefits on 
employers. 
This Court should grant certiorari to review these 
issues which have a far reaching direct and indirect effects 
on nearly every Utah citizen. 
DATED this ^7fi day of May, 1992. 
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
FUND OF UTAH 
By: O ^ ^ ^ ^ X J ZTL^yA By:. 
Dennis V. Lloyd (J J^mes R. BlacJ 
General Counsel Xttorney for Amicus Curiae 
feprkers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah 
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GARY E. CROSLAND, * 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RODNEY C. SMITH 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE * Court of Appeals 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH; * No. 910291CA 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY; * 
and SMITH ADMINISTRATORS, * 
Defendants/Petitioners. * 
Comes now the affiant, Rodney C. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. Affiant has been employed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
hereafter WCF, for over ten years and currently serves as Executive Vice President. 
2. Affiant by reason of his capacity as Executive Vice President and in the 
normal course of his duties has personal knowledge of the WCF's operations, as well as 
statistical data related to such operations, and WCF's legislative interactions. 
3. WCF provides workers compensation insurance coverage for approximately 
24,000 Utah employers or about 80 % of the total number of employers in Utah. 
* Applicant/Respondent, 
* 
4. WCF covers some 260,000 workers employed by the Fund's 24,000 insured 
policyholders. 
5. Affiant has personal knowledge that the payment of benefits not 
contemplated within the statutory framework of Chapters One and Two of Title 35 will 
increase the insurance rates and premiums paid by WCF's insured employers. 
6. WCF did not view House Bill 218, as passed by the Utah State Legislature 
in 1988, as increasing employer liability for an injured worker's permanent partial 
disability compensation related to asymptomatic permanent partial impairment caused by 
pre-existing medical conditions. Rather, WCF understood workers would no longer be 
compensated for any permanent partial disability related to pre-existing medical problems. 
The primary fiscal impact of House Bill 218 foreseen to affect employers was the increase 
in premium tax allowed by the new law which was intended to infuse the Second Injury 
Fund with over $5,000,000 in operating capital. 
7. WCF received no feedback from the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst 
describing House Bill 218 as making employers or their insurers liable for permanent 
partial disability compensation related to permanent impairment caused by pre-existing 
medical conditions. The Analyst's February 1, 1988 Fiscal Note regarding House Bill 218 
merely states, "In addition, pre-existing injuries which are aggravated by an industrial 
accident will no longer be eligible for compensation from the Second Injury Fund." (See 
attached Exhibit A) 
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EXHIBIT A 
DATED this /<f •fU day of. AA.Q-<* _, 1992. 
KodneyC/Smith 
Vice President, 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this £ ^ d a y of May, L992 
NOTARY P O i l 
OEBRA k NELSON 
2323 East 2880 South 
Salt Lake City. Utari 84109 
My Commission Expires 2/5<9b 
STATE OF U T A H _ _ j 
My commission expires 
Notary Public 
Residing at JaM rAaJa UTUMJ^I 
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Exhibit A 
EXHIBIT A 
Februar" 
M A N A i A M l III tllllH !• I i i i h ANAI i J LS 
H . B . 2 1 8 
Th is bill increase s t he pr emium t ax 
Insurance from the current 3 3/4% to 8% as follows 
on Worke 
.o : 
FY 
ISM 
V • \J W/« 
.50% 
.257. 
r's Compensat: 
FY 
1989 
• J. \J /* 
.50% 
.25% 
FY 
7.25% 
0.00% 
.50% 
.25% 
Second 11 ij ury Fund 
Industrial Commission - Industrial Accidents 
Uninsured Employers - Fund 
General Fund 
3.75% 8.00% I, Q£Z 
Based i:>ri, a- i an niia 1 premium , $133 ,61)0 „ 000 I u I'Y 1 989 and 
$144,700,000 in FT 1990, the increases would lie .is follows: 
J: i! FY 
1989 1990 
Second Injury Fund $5,544,400 $6,149,800 
Industrial Commission - Industrial Accidents 133,600 0 
In addition, pre-existing injuries which are aggravated bj an 
industrial accident will/no longer be eligible for compensation from the 
Second Injury Fund. This will decrease expenditures from the Second 
Injury Fund for both compensation to employees and reimbursements to 
employers and carriers.' • These expenditures will decrease approximately 
$137,000 in FY 1989 and $656,000 in FY 1990. These expenditures will 
continue to decrease until FY 1996 when there will be no expenditures for 
this purpose. This will save approximately $4.0 million based on current 
disbursements. The time lag is due to the eight-year time period during 
wh i ch the in j u r ed p e r s on may f :i ] e an a pp 3 i c a t i on f o :r c omp en s a t i on. 
This bill includes hospitals, clinics, and other medical providers in 
compliance requirements. This is estimated to require one additional FTE 
at a cost of $20,000, funded from the Second Injury Fund. The net effect 
of this bill in FY 1989 "would be an increase $5,661,400 to the Second 
Injury Fund, and $133,600 to the Industrial Commission for Industrial 
Accidents. In FY 1990, the Second Injury Fund would increase by 
$6,785,800, of this amount, approximately $2,400,000 would be pai d f rom 
the Workers" Compensation Fund, wh ich is not a State budgetary fund 
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Crosland v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1992) 
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proficient in his work. General 
knowledge or expertise acquired 
through employment in a common 
calling cannot be appropriated as a 
trade secret. "The efficiency and 
skills which an employee develops 
through his work belong to him and 
not to his former employer." Hail-
mark Personnel of Texas, Inc. v. 
Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d 
933, 936 (1978). The same principles 
apply to the covenant here. We 
hold that the covenant not: to 
compete had the effect of preven-
ting the defendant from exploiting 
skills and experience which he had a 
right to exploit. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted). 
The trial court and the majority ignore the 
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If 
the trial court had correctly applied Finlay to 
the facts of this case, Kasco could not have 
made the requisite showing under Rule 
65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief 
demanded. Finlay requires that before a trial 
court can conclude that a covenant not to 
compete is enforceable, it must first determine 
that the employee was not engaged in a 
common calling and that the employer has a 
legally protectible interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at 
627. A generalized assertion that preventing 
the completion of a former employee will 
protect the employer's goodwill is not enough. 
Id, at 627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 
426. 
In this case, defendant Lari y Benson was a 
of butcher supplies. He was a route 
salesman, pure and simple. He covered a rural 
territory in Utah and Idaho. He had no trade 
secrets. He was not involved in management. 
As a result of his common calling, he necess-
arily knew both the actual and potential cus-
tomers for the goods he sold in the commun-
ities of his territory. Customers of butcher 
supplies in such areas are not hard to find; a 
scan of local telephone books would quickly 
identify them. Finally, Kasco's customers are 
not found on a secret customer list. 
The majority does not even address the issue 
of whether Benson was engaged in a common 
calling It rests solely on the specious rationale 
that in his territory, Benson was Kasco. Route 
salespersons are commonly viewed in their 
territories as representatives of their emplo-
yers. But that is no reason to hold them in 
semi-bondage to their former employers 
when they change jobs. The majority notes 
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five sal-
espersons. The law, however, does not protect 
only less able individuals. 
The consequence of the majority's ruling is 
that a noncompetition covenant may be enf-
orced against any route salesperson whenever 
it could be said that the employer may lose 
B o a r f l Qf Revjew 1 C 
ih Adv. Rep. 35 , . £ £ 
some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former 
employee is not restrained from competing. 
That, of course, can be said with respect to ail 
route salespersons, no matter how common 
their callings. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart. 
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be mod-
ified after it goes into effect. However, the law is 
that a movant must first show some change in circ-
umstances. Kasco has not alleged any changed cir-
cumstances that bear upon the issue of when the 
injunction should have commenced. 
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a pro-
fessional person solely responsible for building the 
business of a small neighborhood pharmacy. 
Cite as 
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Petitioner, 
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BOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah; Young Electric Sign 
Co.; and Smith Administrators, 
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Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City,, for 
Petitioner 
J. Angus Edwards, Salt Lake City, for 
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Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Petitioner, Gary Crosiand (Crosiand), seeks 
review of an Industrial Commission order 
awarding him compensation for one-half of 
his industrial accident injury and denying 
compensation for the remainder. Crosiand was 
denied compensation for the half of the injury 
that ensued from the accident's aggravation of 
a preexisting asymptomatic condition We 
reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 9, 1989, Crosiand injured his 
lower back as he attempted to help another 
employee move a 200-pound sign while 
working for Respondent, Young Electric Sign 
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Company. Crosland felt immediate pain when, 
moving the sign around the corner, he twisted 
his upper torso. When he could barely walk 
the next day at work, his employer sent him 
for medical treatment. Crosland's treating 
physician concluded that Crosland had a pre-
existing asymptomatic defect and that the 
industrial accident caused the defect to become 
acute and symptomatic. The insurance adju-
ster's examining physician determined that 
Crosland had preexisting, asymptomatic spo-
ndylolysis (breaking down or dissolution of 
the body of the vertebra) and spondylolisthesis 
(forward movement of the body of one of the 
lower lumbar vertebrae on the vertebra below 
it), adding that ail the present symptoms 
Crosland suffered were related to the indust-
rial injury. Crosland had never had any back 
problems or required medical treatment for his 
back prior o this accident. 
The medical panel appointed by the Admi-
nistrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that follo-
wing the accident, Crosland had a twenty 
percent permanent partial impairment of the 
whole body. The panel attributed half, or ten 
percent, permanent partial impairment, to the 
industrial accident and half to the asympto-
matic preexisting condition medically aggrav-
ated by the accident. The panel commented 
that "(i]t is entirely possible he could have 
gone on for an indefinite period had it not 
been for the event described, but it is unlikely 
he would have had the degree of difficulty had 
he not had the developmental abnormality." 
Based on this evaluation, the ALJ denied 
Crosland compensation for the ten percent 
permanent partial impairment attributable to 
the preexisting asymptomatic condition aggr-
avated by the industrial accident, thus allo-
wing compensation only for the ten percent 
whole body permanent partial impairment 
attributable to the industrial accident itself. 
The Industrial Commission affirmed. 
Crosland appeals, arguing that he should 
receive compensation for the entire twenty 
percent whole person permanent partial imp-
airment caused by the industrial accident's 
aggravation of the preexisting asymptomatic 
condition. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This proceeding is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah 
Code Ann. §§63-46b-l to-22 (1989 & 
Supp. 1991).» Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
governs the scope of our review of the Indu-
strial Commission's order, allowing relief if 
Crosland has been "substantially prejudiced" 
because "the agency has erroneously interpr-
eted or applied the law." In Morton Int'U Inc. 
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 (Utah 1991), 
the supreme court held that under this section 
we may review for correctness and need not 
defer to the agency's interpretation unless 
>ard of Review CODE^CO 
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j there is "a grant of discretion to the agency 
I concerning the language in question, either 
j expressly made in the statute or implied from 
the statutory language."2 Id. at 589. When 
j legislative intent can be discerned, however, 
| we give the agency's interpretation no defer-
ence. Id.; accord Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of 
Review, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 
I 1991). This case requires an interpretation of 
the 1988 amendment to the Workers' Comp-
ensation Act and thus presents a question of 
statutory construction and legislative intent 
which we may review for correctness. Under 
this higher standard, to afford relief we must 
find that the Commission erroneously interp-
reted the law to Crosiand's substantial prej-
udice. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties agree that Crosland suffered an 
industrial injury and that he has satisfied both 
the medical and legal cause requirements of 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986).3 The sole issue on appeal is 
whether Crosland should receive compensation 
for the ten percent asymptomatic preexisting 
condition which was aggravated by his indus-
trial accident and contributed to the injury. 
Utah courts have followed the well-
established common law rule that when an 
industrial accident lights up or aggravates a 
preexisting deficiency or disease, the resulting 
disability is compensable as long as the indu-
strial accident was the medical and legal cause 
of the injury. Nuzum v. RoosendahJ Const, 
and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 
1977); Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (modifying Nuzum 
to add the higher standard for legal 
cause when preexisting conditions are invo-
lved); Virgin v. Board of Review of the Indus. 
Comm'n, 803 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Utah App. 
1990); see also Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984) (employee received 
compensation for detached retina resulting 
from work-related accident, even though 
employee's prior cataract surgery rendered 
him somewhat predisposed to retinal detach-
ment). This rule is consistent with the stated 
policy of liberally construing and applying the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act to provide 
coverage, accomplishing the Act's purpose of 
affording financial security to injured emplo-
yees. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984) 
(citation omitted). In addition, the rule com-
ports with Professor Larson's comments: 
Nothing is better established in 
compensation law than the rule 
that, when industrial injury preci-
pitates disability from a latent prior 
condition, such as heart disease, 
cancer, back weakness and the like, 
the entire disability is compensable, 
and except in states having special 
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statutes on aggravation of disease, 
no attempt is made to weigh the 
relative contribution of the accident 
and the preexisting condition to the 
final disability or death. Apportio-
nment does not apply in such cases, 
nor in any case in which the prior 
condition was not a disability in the 
compensation sense. 
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation L JW, 
§59.22(a) (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
Juxtaposed against this strong common law 
background allowing an employee compensa-
tion for aggravation of a preexisting latent 
condition is the policy of freeing an employer 
from liability for an employee disability exis-
ting prior to the work-related accident. For 
permanent partial impairments, this policy is 
effectuated by the medical and legal causation 
requirements of Alien.4 In addition, by ame-
ndment effective July 1, 1988, the legislature 
added the following language to the Workers' 
Compensation Act: "Permanent partial disa-
bility compensation may not be paid for any-
permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
66 (1988) (emphasis added). We are now called 
upon to decide whether the asymptomatic 
weakness in Crosiand's back was a 
"permanent impairment" within the meaning 
of the statute at the time of the injury.5 The 
stated purpose of this amendment to section 
35-1-66 is to clarify "that permanent partial 
disability compensation entitlements are based 
on physical impairment caused by an indust-
rial accident." Laws of Utah ch. 116 H.B. no. 
218 preamble. Crosland urges us to interpret 
the term "permanent impairment" to exclude 
asymptomatic conditions such as his and to 
include only conditions "[connoting] some 
deterioration or diminishment in function." 
This definition comports with the use of the 
word "permanent impairment" at the begin-
ning of amended section 35-1-66, stating, 
with our emphasis, that an employee who 
receives a "permanent impairment as a result 
of an industrial accident ... may receive a 
permanent partial disability award." This 
wording implies functional "permanent imp-
airment" and does not include asymptomatic 
nonratabie conditions. 
This interpretation is also in line with deci-
sions in other states, which have allowed for 
compensation under similar statutes. Alabama 
courts, for example, have refused to require 
employees to accept reduced compensation for 
injuries resulting from aggravation of preexi-
sting conditions. See, e.g., International Paper 
Co. v. Rogers, 500 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1986) (construing term "infirmity" 
in statute similar to Utah's to allow unreduced 
compensation for employee with preexisting 
asymptomatic spondylolisthesis: "[i]t is a 
fundamental principle that an employer take[s] 
the employee subject to his physical condition 
when he starts his employment"); see also Ter-
williger v. Green Fuel Economizer. Inc., 
468 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1983) (no 
apportionment when preexisting condition was 
dormant and not disabling); Daniels v. State 
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 
S.E.2d 184, 188 (W. Va. 1982) (under state 
apportionment statute, preexisting impairment 
must be definitely ascertained and rated; 
general rule is that apportionment statutes do 
not apply when "the prior condition was not 
physically disabling"). 
Like other states, Utah has not apportioned 
between the employer and the employee liab-
ility for symptoms resulting from one indust-
rial accident.6 We find no reason to conclude 
that section 35-1-66 as amended requires 
apportionment of liability for aggravation of 
an asymptomatic condition. Nor do we find 
that the amendment does more than to clarify 
that an employer is free from liability for an 
employee's preexisting ratable functional 
impairment not caused by the industrial acci-
dent. Based on the usage of the term 
"permanent impairment" in the statute, and 
on Utah case law at the time of the injury, 
which allowed full compensation for aggrav-
ation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition, 
we believe the term "permanent impairment" 
should be interpreted to refer to a ratable 
physical condition exhibiting some diminished 
function. Because Crosiand's back was com-
pletely functional prior to the industrial acci-
dent and could have continued to be functi-
onal absent the accident, we conclude that 
apportionment was inappropriate in this case 
and that the Commission erroneously failed to 
award full compensation for Crosiand's 
twenty percent whole person permanent partial 
impairment caused by the industrial accident. 
We reverse the order of the Industrial Com-
mission 
Norman H. J ackson, I udge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, fudge 
1. The UAPA governs ail administrative proceedings 
commenced after January 1, 1988. 
2. A legislative grant of discretion might be implied 
when the terms of the statute leave the specific 
question at issue unresolved, allowing for more than 
one permissible reading of the statute. The choice 
among permissible interpretations might then be 
deemed a policy choice for the agency, and we 
would not substitute our judgment absent an abuse 
of the delegated discretion. Morton Int'h 814 P.2d 
at 587-89. 
3. To prove legal cause under the higher standard of 
Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury must show that his work-
related exertion was unusual or extraordinary, in 
excess of the normally expected level of nonemplo-
yment activity for men and women in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Allen, 729 P.2d at 25-26. 
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If the claimant has no contributory preexisting j 
condition, a usual or ordinary exenion suffices to j 
prove legal cause. Id. (cuing IB Larson, Workmen's \ 
Compensation Law §38.83(a) & (b) (1991)). That 
Crosland's exenion in lifting the sign was greater 
than normal is undisputed in this case. Conseque-
ntly, we need not evaluate the application of the Allen 
rule under the amended statute. 
4. For permanent total disabilities, the policy is I 
accomplished by providing the employer contribu- | 
tion from the Employers' Compensation Fund. See | 
note 6. 
5. A 1991 amendment to the Utah Workers' Com-
pensation Act defines the terms 'impairment" and 
"disability." "'Disability' means becoming medic-
ally impaired as to function." Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-44(4) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
""Impairment' is a purely medical condition refle-
cting any anatomical or functional abnormality or 
loss/ Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(6) (Supp. 1991) 
(emphasis added). Because these statutory definit-
ions were not in effect at the time of Crosland's 
injury, we need not decide their applicability to the 
wording of the 1988 amendment. Instead we rely on 
the law as it existed at the time of the injury. 
6. Apportionment has only occurred between the 
employer and the Employers* Compensation Fund 
under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988), which, 
with our emphasis, states in pertinent part, 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% 
whole person permanent impairment 
from any cause or origin, subsequently 
incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment, and if 
the additional impairment results in 
permanent forai disability, the employer 
or its insurance carrier and the Emplo-
yers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for 
the payment of benefits as follows:... 
This provision thus fully compensates an employee 
when an industrial accident and a preexisting imp-
airment result in permanent total disability, without 
imposing the complete burden of compensation for 
the total disability on the employer. The purpose of 
this statutory scheme appears to be to resolve the 
problems arising when the sum of two injuries is 
greater than the parts (e.g., an industrial accident 
resulting in blindness in one eye of a worker already 
blind in the other eye, thus creating permanent total 
disability), without discouraging employers from 
hiring handicapped persons. The employee is com-
pensated for the permanent total disability, but the 
employer is partially compensated from the fund so 
that the cost to the employer is not as severe. E.g., 
Hail v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 175, 178 
(Utah 1985) (under this section, a showing of causal 
connection between the preexisting impairment and | 
the industrial injury is not required; only that they 
cumulatively result in substantially greater disabi-
lity); see 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§59.31(a) (1989). In making its apportioned award, 
the Commission relied upon Nyrehn v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990), cert, 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). This reliance is 
misplaced because the Nyrehn case merely apport-
ions between the employer and the fund under this 
section and does not address the issue of apportio-
nment between the employer and the employee. 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of a 
protective order under the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, claiming the trial court erred in requiring 
her to demonstrate immediate peril. We 
reverse. 
On February 21, 1991, plaintiff filed a 
complaint pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to-11 
(1989 & Supp. 1991), and requested an ex 
pane protective order. Plaintiffs pro se 
complaint stated defendant threatened to kill 
her if she served him with divorce papers. 
On February 28, 1991, both parties appe-
ared in court without counsel. The judge 
stated that he had reviewed the complaint 
seeking a protective order. Before hearing any 
testimony, the judge stated he was going to 
dismiss the complaint. Explaining his decision, 
the judge continued: 
I understand that you may be in 
fear, but this is an improper use of 
the protective order. The protective 
order is intended to cover those 
circumstances where one is in, what 
we call imminent fear. An imminent 
fear doesn't mean that you may 
anticipate some future problem. It 
means that you are in fear of some 
present problem. That is if there is 
an immediate threat. This threat is 
based upon your fear that if you 
file divorce papers that you may be 
in jeopardy. You have every right 
to file divorce papers. You have 
every right in that proceeding to 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
Tab 3 
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Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of the Utah State Tax Comm'n 
814P.2d581 (Utah 1991) 
MORTON INTERN D 
Cite as 814 P.2d 
reverse his conviction under section 76 -8 -
305 because, as the State concedes, Gard-
iner was not knowingly interfering with a 
peace officer "seeking to effect a lawful 
ar res t ." Since the State fails to establish a 
prima facie case under either s ta tute , I see 
no need to consider defenses that could 
apply. 
Finally, and with hindsight, I agree with 
the majority's comment that the Court of 
Appeals should have published its opinion 
in this case. In my view, publication of 
appellate opinions serves essentially two 
important purposes: It records and dissem-
inates the development of the common 
law,3 and it enables the public to monitor 
the quality of appellate judicial service.4 
However, some cases coming before a 
court hearing appeals as of right do not 
present issues that could enhance the de-
velopment of the common law, and publica-
tion of the grea ter par t of an Appellate 
Court 's decisions provides an adequate 
sampling of Judicial performance. If a 
particular case has negligible value as 
precedent, the parties are bet ter served by 
dispensing with publication and the greater 
delay it necessitates. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., does not 
participate herein. 
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
"in ill TON INTERN ATI ON AI 
INC., Pet i t ioner , 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent . 
No. 900325, 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
June 24, 1991. 
Taxpayer sought review of determina 
tion of Tax Commission that expenditures 
JC. v , AUDITING DIV. Utah 581 
581 (Utah 1991) 
made in construction of facilities used in 
production of sodium azide pellets and ig-
niter material were not exempt from sales 
and use tax. The Supreme Court, Hail, 
C.J., held that: (1) materials used in con-
struction of production facilities did not 
qualify for exemption from sales and use 
tax, and (2) shells of production facilities 
were not "equipment" exempt from sales 
and use tax. 
\ f firmed. 
Stewart, J,t concurred in the result. 
I \ d in i n i s t r a t i v e 1 a/m a n cl P r o c eel u re 
<3=>764 
Same standard used for determining 
harmfulness of error in appeals from, judi-
cial proceedings applies to review of agen-
cy action and under that standard, error 
will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconse-
quential that there is no reasonable likeli-
hood that error affected outcome of pro-
ceedings, U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4). 
2 4. d m i n i s t ra t i > e I <a m a n, cl I '' roc e cl i i re 
<s=>781 
It is not characterization of issue as 
mixed question of fact and law or charac-
terization of issue as question of general 
law that is dispositive of determination of 
appropriate level of judicial review of agen-
cy action; rather, dispositive factor is 
whether agency, by virtue of its experience 
or expertise, is in a bet ter position than 
courts to give effect to regulatory objective 
to be achieved. 
3 S ta tu tes <3=*219(2) 
When legislative intent concerning spe-
cific question at issue can be derived 
through traditional methods of s ta tutory 
construction, agency's interpretation will 
be granted no deference and s ta tute will be 
interpreted in accord with its legislative 
intent. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
4 S ta tu tes <s=>219(l) 
Agency's s ta tutory construction should 
only be given deference when there is 
3. M. Eisenberg, The Nature of (he Common Law 4. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 81 (rev, ed. 
4-5 (1988). 1950). 
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grant of discretion to agency concerning 
language in question, either expressly 
made in statute or implied from statutory 
language. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>800 
Taxation <s=>1222 
Tax Commission's interpretation of 
statute exempting from sales and use tax 
sales and leases of materials, machinery, 
equipment, and services in excess of $500,-
000 used in new construction, expansion, or 
modernization of synthetic fuel processing 
and upgrading plant did not grant the Com-
mission any discretion; therefore, Commis-
sion's decision would be reviewed under 
correction of error standard. U.C.A.1953, 
59-12-104(15), 63-46b-16(4). 
6. Taxation e=>1245 
Statute exempting from sales and use 
tax sales and leases of materials, machin-
ery, equipment, and services of any person 
in excess of $500,000 used in new construc-
tion, expansion or modernization of syn-
thetic fuel processing and upgrading plants 
was intended to grant exemption for mate-
rials used in construction of plant which 
removes impurities from natural resources 
and did not apply to expenditures made in 
construction of facilities used in production 
of sodium azide pellets and igniter materi-
al. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-104(15). 
7. Statutes <®=>193 
Under rule of noscitur a sociis, mean-
ing of questionable words and phrases in 
statute are to be ascertained by reference 
to words or phrases associated with them. 
8. Taxation <3=>204(1) 
Tax exemption statutes are to be 
strictly construed against party claiming 
exemption and all ambiguities are to be 
resolved in favor of taxation. 
9. Taxation «=>1245 
Tax Commission's determination that 
shells of taxpayer's facilities used in pro-
duction of sodium azide pellets and igniter 
material did not constitute "equipment" un-
der statute exempting from sales and use 
tax sales or leases of machinery and equip-
ment purchased or leased by manufacturer 
for use in new or expanding operations was 
not unreasonable. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-
104(16). 
10. Taxation <3>1245 
Taxpayer failed to establish that prior 
agency practice was contrary to Tax Com-
mission's refusing to grant taxpayer ex-
emption from sales and use tax for expend-
itures made in construction of facilities 
used in production of sodium azide pellets 
and igniter material and, therefore, statute 
providing for judicial relief from agency 
action as contrary to agency's prior prac-
tice did not apply. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-
104(15, 16), 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
11. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=701 
Taxation e»1319 
In the absence of official guideline or 
well-established policy, decisions of audi-
tors for Tax Commission do not constitute 
"agency practice" for purposes of statute 
providing for judicial relief when agency 
action is contrary to agency's prior prac-
tice. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Taxation <s=>1245 
Record supported Tax Commission's 
determination that shells of manufacturer's 
facilities used in production of sodium azide 
pellets and igniter material did not consti-
tute "equipment" exempt from sales and 
use tax. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-104(16). 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
Randy M. Grimshaw, Maxwell A. Miller, 
Richard M. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Mor-
ton Intern. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Brian Tarbet. Salt 
Lake City, for State Tax Com'n. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Petitioner Morton International. Inc. 
("Morton"), seeks review of the determina-
tion of the Utah State Tax Commission 
("the Commission") that certain expendi-
tures made in the construction of facilities 
used in the production of sodium azide pel 
MUKTON INTERN., INC", v. AUDITING DIV I Itah 583 
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the action would be treated as a request 
for refund and formal hearing. A hearing 
was held on March 7, 1990. At the hear-
ing, Morton represented that since 1987, it 
had paid an excess of $325,000 in sales and 
use taxes with respect to the construction 
of its sodium azide pellet production facili-
ties. Morton contended that it was entitled 
to a refund of sales and use taxes pursuant 
to section 59-12-104(15) on the ground that 
the production facilities were a "synthetic 
fuel processing and upgrading plant'' and, 
alternatively, pursuant to section 59-12-
104(16), on the ground that the production 
facilities function as, and essentially are, 
"equipment." On June 7, 1990, the Com-
mission issued its findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and final decision determining 
that the fuel pellets were not a synthetic 
fuel and thus the production facilities did 
not qualify for an exemption under section 
59-12-104(15). The Commission also deter-
mined that Morton's production facilities 
were real property and thus the sale of 
materials used in construction of the pro-
duction facilities did not constitute the sale 
of equipment under section 59-12-104(16). 
On July 27, 1990, Morton filed this peti-
tion for review. The general issue before 
this court is whether the Commission erred 
in concluding that the sale of certain mate-
rials used in the construction of Morton's 
production facilities is not exempt from 
sales and use tax under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 59-12-104(15) or (16). 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. A d m in is i m t ive Procedu re A ct 
The instant case was initiated after Janu-
ary 1, 1988, and the Commission's decision 
w as reached following a formal, hearing. 
Therefore, the applicable standard of re-
view of the Commission's action is set out 
in the Utah Administrative Procedure Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b~16t:I which pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
(1) As provided by statute, the Su-
preme Court or the Court, of Appeals has 
chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency 
on and after January I, 1988," 
ets and igniter material ("production facili-
;ies") are not exempt from sales and use 
ax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) 
)r (16) (Supp.1987). 
The facts underlying Morton's claims are 
lot in dispute. In 1987, Morton began 
construction of facilities used in the pro-
iuction of sodium azide pellets and igniter 
naterial, which are components of the 
:rash protection airbag system used in mo-
Dor vehicles. The pellets and igniter mate-
rial are inserted into small pressure vessels 
to form airbag inflaters. When the pellet 
is ignited, it generates nitrogen gas, which 
rapidly inflates the airbag. Morton has 
manufactured sodium azide pellets for over 
a decade. The new facilities, however, con-
stitute a significant expansion of this busi-
ness. 
The process of manufacturing sodium 
azide pellets and igniter material is unique 
and highly specialized. The chemicals used 
in the process are extremely energetic, ex-
plosive, and toxic. Accordingly, the facili-
ties were specifically designed to incorpo-
rate safety and environmental features and 
support specialized and massive equipment, 
some of which is suspended above the 
floor. For example, separate facilities 
were built for each stage of production. 
This was done to minimize the risk to per-
sonnel, machinery, and equipment in case 
of fire, explosion, or chemical contaminant 
reactions. There are also many environ-
mental features that are incorporated into 
the buildings themselves, such as, heavy 
metal free areas, special conductive floor-
ing, protective blast and blowout walls and 
ceilings, chemical dust collection filters, 
and protected double-walled piping and 
sumps. Many of the production areas are 
operated by remote control. Personnel 
only enter for maintenance and quality con-
trol. Due to the toxic nature of the materi-
als, personnel are not allowed in these ar-
eas without protective clothing, including 
respirators. 
On June 26, 1989, Morton, initiated this 
action By stipulation, it was agreed that 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1987) provides: 
"(1) The procedures for agency action, agency 
review, and judicial review contained in this 
584 Utah 814 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
jurisdiction to review all final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant re-
lief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seek-
ing judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied the law; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion del-
egated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies 
the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capri-
cious. 
[1] The Commission maintains that sec-
tion 63-46b-16(4) grants agencies greater 
discretion than they had under prior case 
law. This argument is based on the lan-
guage in section 63-46b-16(4) stating that 
appellate relief can only be granted if "on 
the basis of the agency's record" the appel-
late court determines that a person has 
2. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of Em-
ployment Sec, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); 
see also Comments of the Utah Administrative 
Law Advisory Committee, Utah A.P.A. at 15 
(Code Co Law Publishers, April 25, 1988) [here-
inafter Advisory Comrr itee]. 
3. The comments of the Utah Administrative 
Law Advisory Committee state that section 63-
46b-16(4) is patterned after comparable provi-
sions of the Model State Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("MSAPA"). See Model State Admin. 
Procedure Act § 5-116, 15 U.L.A. 127-30 (1981). 
Section 5-116 of the MSAPA requires the show-
ing of substantial prejudice for an appellate 
court to grant relief. It is clear from reading 
the comments to section 5-116 that the require-
ment of substantial prejudice does not require 
appellate courts to grant administrative agencies 
deference. Indeed, the comments state that ap-
pellate courts "may decide that the agency has 
erroneously interpreted the law if the court 
merely disagrees with the agency's interpreta-
tion." 
been "substantially prejudiced." We have 
always based our decisions on the agency's 
record. Therefore, this requirement does 
not disturb prior case law.2 Furthermore, 
section 63-46b-16(4) deals with judicial re-
lief, not judicial review. It is clear from 
this language that this section does not 
affect the degree of deference an appellate 
court grants to an agency's decision.3 
Rather, section 63-46b-16(4) ensures that 
relief should not be granted when, al-
though the agency committed error, the 
error was harmless. Indeed, the language 
of section 63-46b-16(4) is similar to lan-
guage in rules of procedure and evidence 
dealing with harmless error.4 Given this 
similarity in language, we conclude that 
the legislature in enacting section 63-46b-
16(4) intended that the same standard used 
for determining the harmfulness of error in 
appeals from judicial proceedings should 
apply to reviews of agency actions. Under 
this standard, an error will be harmless if it 
is "sufficiently inconsequential that . . . 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceed-
ings." 5 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h), how-
ever, incoirporates standards that appellate 
courts are to employ when reviewing alle-
gations of agency error.6 Morton's claims 
4. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a); 
Utah R.Evid. 103(a). 
5. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
In a case such as the instant case, where we 
reject the argument that an agency has erred, 
this provision has no application. 
6. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted 
section 63-46b-16(4)(a) through (h) as establish-
ing standards of review that differ, in some 
cases, from our prior case law. See Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 66-68 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (different standard for re-
viewing agency action based on determination 
of fact); see also Advisory Committee at 15; 
MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 127-
30. But see Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of 
Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441^2 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989) (same standard for applying the law). 
We note that the analysis used in Pro-Benefit is 
inconsistent with the analysis expressed in this 
opinion. 
MORTON INTERN., INC. v. AUDIT! 
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Hal, ,-1,85 
e based on subsections 63-46b-16(4)(d), 
l(h)(iii), and (4)(h)(iv). The question 
esented, therefore, is whether the stan-
ird of review incorporated into these sub-
ctions differs from the standard of re 
ew developed in our prior case law. 
B. Prior Case Law 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Admin-
trative Procedure Act, the Utah courts 
eveloped three levels of review in connec-
on with agency action. First, agencies' 
ndings of fact were granted considerable 
eference and would not be disturbed on 
ppeal if supported by substantial evi-
ence.7 Second, a correction-of-error stan-
ard, giving no deference to agencies' deci-
ions, was used to review agencies' rulings 
n issues the court characterized as con-
erning general law.8 Examples of issues 
haracterized as questions of general law 
nclude rulings concerning constitutional 
[uestions,9 rulings concerning the agency's 
urisdiction or statutory authority,10 rulings 
f. See, e.g., Savage Indus. Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1991); Hurley 
v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526 (Utah 
1988); Bennett v. Indus. Comm'n, 726 P.2d 427, 
429 (Utah 1986); Big K Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Utah 1984). See 
also section 63^6b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, which provides that a 
party who is substantially prejudiced by an 
agency action can seek judicial relief on the 
ground that "the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evi-
dence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." 
8. See Savage Indus,, 811 P.2d at 666; Utah Dep't 
of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). 
9. See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Utah Dep't 
of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 608; R. W. Jones 
Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm n, 649 P.2d 628, 
629 (Utah 1982). See also Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(a), which 
provides that a party who is substantially preju-
diced by an agency action may seek judicial 
relief on the ground that "the agency action, or 
the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as ap-
plied." 
10. See, e.g.t Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d 
at 608; Utah Cable Television Operator Ass'n v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398, 402-0' 
concerning common lawr principles such as 
the interpretation of contracts and certifi-
cates,11 and rulings concerning interpreta-
tion of statutes unrelated to the agency.12 
The correction-of-error standard was also 
used to review an agency's construction of, 
or application of the findings of fact to, the 
statutes which the agency is empowered to 
administer—when the agency's experience 
or expertise is not helpful in resolving the 
issue.13 One example of such a situation is 
when a question of statutory interpretation 
turns on basic legislative intent.14 Other 
examples include situations where the 
agency is construing ordinary statutory 
terms within the statutes which they ad-
minister, such as, application of limitation 
period under the workers' compensation 
act,15 and the proper construction of the 
term "deficiency of service." l6 In fact, in 
any situation involving the application of 
the legal rules to the findings of fact, a 
correction-of-error standard is used if the 
court is as well-suited to determine the 
(Utah 1982). See also Utah Administrative Pro-
cedure Act section 63-46b-16(4)(b), which pro-
- that a party who is substantially preju-
diced by an agency action can seek judicial 
relief on the ground that "the agency has acted 
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute." 
11. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 
608; W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 
Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1954). But 
see Savage Bros. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
723 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (interpretation 
of certificate of public convenience granted def-
erence when agency's expertise is helpful in 
interpreting ambiguous and technical terms). 
12. See generally Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Ben-
nett, 726 P.2d at 429. Both cases state that no 
deference is granted to an agency's interpreta-
tion of statutes or application of statutory terms 
to factual situations unless the agency, by virtue 
of its expertise, is in a better position to give 
effect to the regulatory objective. 
13. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 
726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. 
14. See Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Big K Corp., 689 
P.2d at 1353. 
15. Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 
P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1984). 
-• Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. 
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issue as the agency.17 
Finally, an intermediate standard of re-
view, granting some deference to the agen-
cy's decisions, has been used when the 
agency's experience or expertise puts the 
agency in a better position to resolve issues 
concerning the application of findings of 
fact to the legal rules governing the case 
and the interpretations of the operative 
provisions of the statutes the agency is 
empowered to administer.18 This standard 
was also used when it was alleged that the 
agency abused the discretion granted to it 
by statute.19 Under the intermediate stan-
dard of review, appellate courts did not 
disturb an agency's decision if the decision 
was within the bounds of reasonableness.20 
In cases not involving discretion, it has 
not always been clear when the interme-
diate standard of review should be used.21 
In some early cases, we characterized the 
issues that are appropriate for the interme-
diate standard of review as questions of 
mixed fact and law22 or, alternatively, as 
questions concerning the application of the 
law.23 However, issues that are appropri-
ate for the intermediate standard have also 
17. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 
lit P.2d at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353. 
18. See, e.g„ Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Hur-
ley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional Hosp. v. 
Board of Review, 723 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 
1986); Savage Bros. Inc., 723 P.2d at 1087; Bar-
ney v. Department of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 
1273, 1275 (Utah 1984). 
19. See, e.g., Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment 
Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982). 
20. See, e.g., Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Hur-
ley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Regional Hosp., 723 
P.2d at 428-29; Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 
P.2d at 610. 
21. See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666. Compare 
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429 (correction-of-error 
standard used to review Industrial Commis-
sion's interpretation of "employee") with Pinter 
Constr. Corp. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 
1984) (intermediate standard used to review In-
dustrial Commission's interpretation of "em-
ployee"). 
22. See, e.g., Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527; Logan Re-
gional Hosp., 723 P.2d at 429; Gray v. Depart-
ment of Employment Sec, 681 P.2d 807, 810 
(Utah 1984); Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 
P.2d at 610. 
been described as questions of statutory 
construction,24 questions of special law,25 
and questions of law.26 Indeed, we have 
stated, "An agency's interpretation of key 
provisions of the statute that it is empow-
ered to administer is often inseparable 
from its application of the rules of law to 
the basic facts." 27 
[2] A review of our recent cases, how-
ever, makes it clear that it is not the char-
acterization of an issue as a mixed question 
of fact and law or the characterization of 
the issue as a question of general law that 
is dispositive of the determination of the 
appropriate level of judicial review. Rath-
er, what has developed as the dispositive 
factor is whether the agency, by virtue of 
its experience or expertise, is in a better 
position than the courts to give effect to 
the regulatory objective to be achieved.28 
We have stated: 
We do not defer to the Commission when 
construing statutory terms or when ap-
plying statutory terms to the facts un-
less the construction of the statutory lan-
23. Mixed questions of fact and law have been 
defined as "'the "application" of the findings of 
basic fact (e.g., what happened) to the legal 
rules governing the case.'" Gray, 681 P.2d at 
811 n. 7 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 
658 P.2d at 610). This court has used the terms 
mixed question of fact and law and application 
of the law interchangeably. See Hurley, 767 
P.2d at 527-28; Logan Regional Hosp., 723 P.2d 
at 429; Barney, 681 P.2d at 1275; Clearfield City 
v. Department of Employment Sec, 663 P.2d 
440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). 
24. See Chris & Dick's v. State Tax Comm'n, 791 
P.2d 511, 513-14 (Utah 1990); Bennett, 726 P.2d 
at 429; Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Utah 
Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610. 
25. See Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 
610. 
26. See Chris & Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hur 
ley, 767 P.2d at 527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 42Q; 
Big K Corp., 689 P.2d at 1353; Utah Dep i of 
Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610. 
27. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610 
28. Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666; Chris <£ 
Dick's, 791 P.2d at 513-14; Hurley, 767 P 2d at 
527; Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429; Big K Corp.. 68Q 
P.2d at 1353. 
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guage or the application of the law to the 
facts should be subject to the Commis-
sion's expertise gleaned from its accumu-
lated practical, first-hand experience with 
the subject matter.29 
A clear example of this principle can be 
seen in Savage Brothers Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission.20 There, we noted 
that questions involving interpretations of 
certificates of public convenience and ne-
cessity ordinarily involve questions of gen-
eral law. However, we held that when an 
agency has specialized knowledge that is 
helpful in interpreting ambiguous and tech-
nical terms of a certificate, an intermediate 
standard of review is appropriate.31 
In determining whether the standards of 
review incorporated in subsections 63-46b-
16(4)(d), (4)(h)(iii), and (4)(h)(iv) differ from 
the standards established in our prior case 
law, we will address each section separate-
ly in the context of the claim raised under 
that section. 
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
Morton's claim that it is entitled to judi-
cial relief under section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is 
based on the allegation that the Commis-
sion erred in its construction of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) and (16) or in its ap-
plication of these subsections to the find-
ings of fact. Under our prior case law, the 
standard used to review the Commission's 
determinations would be a correction-of-er-
29. Bennett, 726 P.2d at 429. 
JO. 723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
51. Id. at 1087. 
52. 811 P.2d 664, 668-671 (Utah 1991). 
53. Id. at 668. 
54. Id. at 670. 
55. Id at 670 (citing MSAPA § 5-116, comments , 
15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981)). 
56. The legislative history of section 6 3 - 4 6 b -
16(4)(d) also supports this position. The com-
ments of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
state that section 63-46b-16(4)(d) is patterned 
after comparable provisions in the MSAPA. 
The comments to the relevant section of the 
MSAPA state that "the enabling statute normally 
ror standard unless the Commission was 
granted some discretion in dealing with the 
issue or, by virtue of its expertise or expe-
rience, was in a superior position to decide 
the issue. The first question presented, 
therefore, is whether section 63-46b-16(4) 
departs from this standard. 
It has already been established that in 
some situations, the standard of review 
provided in section 63—46b—16(4)(d) is identi-
cal to the standard of review in our prior 
case law. In Savage Industries Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission*2 we held 
that under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a cor-
rection-of-error standard, giving no defer-
ence to the agency decisions, is to be used 
in cases involving statutory construction 
where the court is in as good a position as 
the agency to interpret the statute.33 This 
holding was based on the term "errone-
ous," which connotes a correction-of-error 
standard,34 and the legislative history of 
section 63-46b-16(4)(d), which implies that 
" 'a court may decide that the agency has 
erroneously interpreted the law if the court 
merely disagrees with the agency's inter-
pretation.' " 3 5 Similarly, section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(i) provides for judicial relief in 
cases where the agency has abused the 
"discretion delegated to the agency by stat-
ute." 36 In past cases, we have held that 
an agency has abused its discretion when 
the agency's action, viewed in the context 
of the language and purpose of the govern-
ing statute, is unreasonable.37 
confers some discretion upon the agency. Ac-
cordingly, a court should find reversible error 
in the agency's application of the law only if the 
agency has improperly exercised its discretion." 
See MSAPA § 5-116, comments , 15 U.L.A. at 
128. 
37. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 
1982); West Jordan v. Department of Employ-
ment Sec, 656 P.2d 411, 414 (Utah 1982); cf. 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611-12 (Utah 1983). Fo-
cusing on the legislative grant of authority is 
important in determining whether an agency 
has abused its discretion. The court should be 
careful not to substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the agency when considering the 
wisdom of the agency's policies. See Advisory 
Committee at 15; see also MSAPA § 5-116, com-
ments, 15 U.L.A. at 128 (1981). 
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Therefore, in cases dealing with statu-
tory construction, the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act does not change the stan-
dard of review when the court is in as good 
a position as the agency to determine the 
issue or when the agency has been granted 
discretion in interpreting the statute. 
However, nothing in the language of sec-
tion 63-46b-16 or its legislative history 
suggests that an agency's decision is enti-
tled to deference solely on the basis of 
agency expertise or experience. Indeed, 
there is no reference to agency expertise or 
experience in the statute or the statute's 
legislative history. Rather, in granting ju-
dicial relief when an "agency has errone-
ously interpreted or applied the law," the 
language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly 
indicates that absent a grant of discretion, 
a correction-of-error standard is used in 
reviewing an agency's interpretation or ap-
plication of a statutory term.38 Therefore, 
to the extent that our cases can be read as 
granting deference to an agency's decisions 
based solely on the agency's expertise and 
not on a statutory delegation of authority, 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) constitutes a 
break from prior law.39 
This, however, may not have a signifi-
cant effect on the standard used to review 
agencies' statutory interpretations and ap-
plications of their own statutes. In many 
cases where we would summarily grant an 
agency deference on the basis of its exper-
38. As noted supra in notes 21-27 and accompa-
nying text, in some of our earlier cases, in 
determining that an intermediate standard of 
review is appropriate, we have relied upon the 
characterization of an issue as an application of 
the law as opposed to an interpretation of the 
law. Although in our more recent cases the 
focus has turned to agency expertise, the fact 
that the Administrative Procedure Act incorpo-
rates the terms "application of the law" and 
"interpretation of the law" under a single stan-
dard supports the contention that absent a grant 
of discretion, an agency's interpretation or ap-
plication of statutory terms should be reviewed 
for error. 
39. In fact, the legislative history of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act suggests that the legisla-
ture intended to alter the approach the courts 
developed to review agency action. See Sulli-
van, Overview of the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act, Utah A.P.A. at 4-5 (Code Co Publish-
ers July 8, 1988). 
tise, it is also appropriate to grant the 
agency deference on the basis of an explicit 
or implicit grant of discretion contained in 
the governing statute. 
The legislature, in many instances, has 
explicitly granted agencies discretion in 
dealing with specific statutory terms.40 
Apart from such explicit grants of authori-
ty, courts have also recognized that grants 
of discretion may be implied from the stat-
utory language. For example, we have 
held that when the operative terms of a 
statute are broad and generalized, these 
terms "bespeak a legislative intent to del-
egate their interpretation to the responsible 
agency." 4]l We have also granted an agen-
cy's statutory interpretation deference 
when the statutory language suggested 
that the legislature had left the specific 
question at issue unresolved. In Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Confer,*2 we held that an 
agency's interpretation of statutory provi-
sions is entitled to deference when there is 
more than one permissible reading of the 
statute and no basis in the statutory lan-
guage or the legislative history to prefer 
one interpretation over another.43 
[3] The approach used in Salt Lake 
City Corp. is consistent with section 63-
46b-16. Questions of legislative intent are 
considered questions of law, which are re-
viewed for correctness under our prior case 
40. For example, section 59-12-104(16) provides 
for "sales or leases of machinery and equipment 
purchased or leased by a manufacturer for use 
in new or expanding operations (excluding nor-
mal operating replacements . . . as determined 
by the commission )." (Emphasis added.) 
41. Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 610; 
see also Salt Lake City Corp., 657 P.2d at 1316-
17 (term "equity and good conscience" confers 
broad discretion). 
42. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983). 
43. Id. at 636. The United States Supreme Court 
has recently adopted a similar approach. See 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 
26, , 110 S.Ct. 929, 938, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 
(1990); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 
2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 
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tw44 and section 63-46b-16(4)(d). There-
)re, when a legislative intent concerning 
le specific question at issue can be derived 
irough traditional methods of statutory 
instruction, the agency's interpretation 
ill be granted no deference and the stat-
te will be interpreted in accord with its 
(gislative intent.45 However, in the ab-
>nce of a discernible legislative intent con-
*rning the specific question in issue, a 
fioice among permissible interpretations of 
statute is largely a policy determination, 
he agency that has been granted authori-
i to administer the statute is the appropri-
te body to make such a determination.46 
ideed, both the legislative history to see-
on 63-46b-16 47 and our prior cases 48 sug-
est that an appellate court should not 
ibstitute its judgment for the agency's 
idgment concerning the wisdom of the 
gency's policy. When there is no discerni-
le legislative intent concerning a specific 
sue the legislature has, in effect, left the 
sue unresolved. In such a case, it is 
ppropriate to conclude that the legislature 
as delegated authority to the agency to 
ecide the issue. Such an approach is par-
cularly appropriate when it is reasonable 
) assume that the legislature intended the 
gency to have some discretion in dealing 
ith the statutory provision at issue. 
[4] We do not mean to suggest that 
lese are the only methods of determining 
rhether the legislature has granted the 
gency discretion in dealing with an issue, 
[owever, it is clear from the wording of 
ection 63-46b-16 that an agency's statu-
ary construction should only be given def-
rence when there is a grant of discretion 
D the agency concerning the language in 
uestion, either expressly made in the stat-
te or implied from the statutory language. 
B. Section 59-12-104(15) 
Morton's first argument is that the sale 
of certain materials, machinery, and equip-
ment used in the construction of its produc-
tion facilities is exempt from sales and use 
tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15), 
which provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from taxes imposed by this chapter: 
(15) sales or leases of materials, ma-
chinery, equipment, and services of any 
person in excess of $500,000 for any tax 
year used in the new construction, expan-
sion, or modernization (excluding normal 
operating replacements as determined by 
the commission) of any mine, mill, reduc-
tion works, smelter, refinery (except oil 
and gas refineries), synthetic fuel pro-
cessing and upgrading plant, rolling 
mill, coal washing plant, or melting facili-
ty in Utah commencing after July 1, 
1984, and ending June 30, 1989.49 
Morton argues that the sodium azide pel-
lets are synthetic fuels and that, therefore, 
Morton's facilities constitute a "synthetic 
fuel processing and upgrading plant" as 
that term is used in section 59-12-104(15). 
[5] The question presented is one of 
statutory construction or application, and 
absent a grant of discretion, the Commis-
sion's decision will be reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard. The statu-
tory terms in question are of a specific 
nature and do not connote a general grant 
of discretion. Furthermore, the precise is-
sue presented, whether facilities such as 
those in question can be considered syn-
thetic fuel processing and upgrading 
plants, can be resolved through the use of 
traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion.50 It is apparent that the Commission 
has not been granted any discretion in re-
*. See Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 666, 670; Hur- 47. See Advisory Committee at 15; see also MSA-
fey v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 
1988). 
5. See Savage Indus, at 670; Hurley, 767 P.2d at 
527. 
PA § 5-116, comments, 15 U.L.A. at 128. 
48. See Salt Lake City Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611. 
49. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (emphasis 
added). 
6. See Salt Lake City Corp., 674 P.2d at 636; 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv., 658 P.2d at 611. 50. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. 
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gard to the present issue. Therefore, its 
interpretation will not be given deference. 
[6] Morton's interpretation of section 
59-12-104(15) is based on the well-estab-
lished rule of statutory construction that a 
statutory term should be interpreted and 
applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of 
the term results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, 
nor in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute.51 It is argued that 
the usual meaning of the term "synthetic," 
as defined by Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary, is "relating to or involving 
synthesis; produced artificially; man-
made." The usual meaning of the term 
"fuel," according to Webster's, is a "mate-
rial used to produce heat or power by burn-
ing." Morton then combines these defini-
tions to produce an interpretation of the 
term "synthetic fuel" as "a man-made fuel 
that could be combusted or consumed to 
produce heat or light." Under such an 
interpretation of section 59-12-104(15), the 
sodium azide pellets would qualify as a 
synthetic fuel. 
While the analysis used in reaching this 
point ignores other relevant and well-estab-
lished rules of statutory construction, it is 
not necessary to rely on other rules of 
construction to conclude that Morton's in-
terpretation is erroneous. This is because 
the rule cited for Morton's interpretation 
does not support its position. First, it is 
apparent from the record that there is no 
usual and accepted meaning of the term 
"synthetic fuel." Testimony at the hearing 
established that there is conflict within the 
scientific community concerning the accept-
ed meaning of the term. Indeed, in several 
points in its brief, Morton claims that there 
is confusion concerning the accepted mean-
ing of the term "synthetic fuel." Though 
we have relied on dictionary definitions to 
determine the usual meaning of statutory 
terms, the term "synthetic fuel" is not de-
51. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah 1982); see also Board of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Salt Lake City, 659 P.2d 1030, 
1035 (Utah 1983); Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 
Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1967). 
fined in the dictionary. When it is admit-
ted that there is no accepted meaning of 
the statutory term at issue, a method of 
construction which is based solely on one of 
many possible definitions is inappropriate. 
Second, even assuming that Morton's 
definition is appropriate, the argument nec-
essarily fails because Morton misapplies 
the rule. Morton argues that despite the 
confusion as to the meaning of "synthetic 
fuel," the term should be defined by com-
bining the strict dictionary definitions of 
"synthetic" and "fuel." Under such a defi-
nition, any man-made material capable of 
burning would qualify as a synthetic fuel. 
Taking Morton's analysis one step further, 
any facility that produces a material capa-
ble of burning would qualify as a "synthet-
ic fuel processing and upgrading plant." 
Morton attempts to avoid such a result by 
arguing that a requirement not found in 
the definition of either "synthetic" or 
"fuel"—the requirement that it must be 
economical to produce heat or energy from 
a man-made material—should be read into 
the definition of "synthetic fuel." Morton 
claims that such an interpretation is justi-
fied in order to avoid absurd results. This 
argument, however, is a misstatement of 
the very rule upon which Morton relies. 
When the use of an ordinary meaning of a 
statutory term results in a statute that is 
"confused beyond reason,"52 the court 
does not resolve the confusion by modify-
ing the ordinary meaning of the term. 
Rather, in such cases the method of con-
struction urged by Morton is not em-
ployed.53 
[7] However, other methods of con-
struction can be used to determine the ap-
plication of the phrase "synthetic fuel pro-
cessing and upgrading plant" when the 
meaning of the phrase cannot be arrived at 
through use of the usual meaning of the 
term. One such method of statutory con-
struction is the rule of noscitur a sociis, 
which provides that the meaning of ques-
52. Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. 
53. See Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist., 
659 P.2d at 1035; Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446; 
Gord, 434 P.2d at 451. 
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ionable words and phrases in a statute be 
iseertained by reference to words or phras-
s associated with them.54 The terms sur-
ounding "synthetic fuel processing and 
ipgrading plant" all relate to different as-
pects of the mining or material reclamation 
perations. This suggests that the term 
synthetic fuel processing and upgrading 
lant" should be interpreted in accordance 
rith the term's relationship to the mining 
ldustry. Such an approach is also consist-
nt with the legislative history of section 
9-12-104(15). Both Morton and the Com-
lission assert that the legislative history 
?veals that section 59-12-104(15) was en-
:ted to aid Utah's ailing mining industry. 
At the hearing, Dr. Wiser, a professor of 
lei engineering at the University of Utah, 
rfered a definition of "synthetic fuel pro-
issing and upgrading plant" that is con-
stent with the language and legislative 
story of section 59-12-104(15). Dr. Wis-
stated that in the synthetic fuel indus-
yf the term "synthetic fuel processing 
id upgrading plant" refers to a plant 
lich produces a liquid material that can 
further refined into a synthetic fuel by 
moving the impurities from raw materi-
> other than petroleum and natural gas, 
ch as coal, tar sands, oil shale, and or-
nic waste. Dr. Wiser further testified 
it a synthetic fuel is a liquid or gaseous 
iterial produced from such raw materials 
3d in combustion primarily for the pro-
ction of energy. The requirement that a 
ithetic fuel be gaseous or liquid is linked 
the purpose of developing synthetic fu-
, which is to take the pressure off of 
.roleum and natural gas and to reduce 
)endence on foreign oil. 
8] This definition, to the extent that it 
uses on mined materials such as coal, 
sands, and oil shale, is consistent with 
language and legislative history of sec-
See Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368. 374 
2d 839, 840 (1962); W.S. Hatch Co. v. Public 
irv. Comm'n, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, 812 
954); Perris v. Perris, 115 Utah 128, 202 P.2d 
H, 733 (1949); see also Dole, 494 U.S. at , 
10 S.Ct. at 935. 
Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 
Jtah 1991); Peay v. Board of Educ. of Provo 
tion 59-12-104(15). Because the definition 
offered by Dr. Wiser focuses on "process-
ing and upgrading plant" as well as "syn-
thetic fuel," it is also consistent with the 
rule of statutory construction which pro-
vides that terms of a statute are to be 
interpreted as a comprehensive whole and 
not in a piecemeal fashion.55 It should also 
be noted that this narrow definition limits 
the exception granted under section 59-12-
104(15). Therefore, the approach suggest-
ed by Dr. Wiser is consistent with the 
well-established principle that tax exemp-
tion statutes are to be strictly construed 
against the party claiming the exemption 
and all ambiguities are to be resolved in 
favor of taxation.56 
There is ample support from the wording 
of the statute, the statute's legislative his-
tory, and other methods of statutory con-
struction to conclude that the legislature, 
in enacting section 59-12-104(15), intended 
to grant an exemption for materials used in 
the construction of the type of plant Dr. 
Wiser described: that is, a plant which 
removes impurities from natural resources 
such as coal, oil shale, and tar sands to 
produce a liquid or gaseous material meant 
to be used in combustion for the production 
of energy. It is also clear that given this 
construction, Morton's production facilities 
do not qualify as a synthetic fuel process-
ing and upgrading plant. The Commission, 
therefore, did not err in determining that 
the materials used in the construction of 
Morton's facilities do not qualify for an 
exemption under section 59-12-104(15). 
[9] 
C. Section 59-12-10MW 
Morton argues that the shells of its 
production facilities, i.e., the foundations, 
walls, floors, and ceilings, constitute equip-
ment. Therefore, the construction of the 
facilities constitutes a purchase of equip-
ment under 59-12-104(16), which provides: 
City Schools, 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 P.2d 490, 492 
(1962). 
56. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980); Great 
Salt Lake Minerals v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 
P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake County v. 
Tax Comm'n, Utah ex rei Good Shepherd Lu-
theran Church, 548 P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976). 
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The following sales and uses are exempt 
from taxes imposed by the chapter: 
(16) sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expand-
ing operations (excluding normal operat-
ing replacements, which includes replace-
ment machinery and equipment even 
though they may increase plant produc-
tion or capacity, as determined by the 
commission) in any manufacturing facili-
ty in Utah.57 
Morton's argument is based on the asser-
tion that the shells of its production facili-
ties function as equipment by preventing, 
localizing, and directing accidental explo-
sions, preventing toxic exposure to workers 
and the environment, providing structural 
support for specialized pieces of machinery, 
and providing access to machinery. The 
Commission rejected this argument, deter-
mining that the facilities constitute real 
property not subject to an exemption under 
section 59-12-104(16). 
The specific issue presented on appeal, 
therefore, is whether the term "equip-
ment," as used in section 59-12-104(16), 
refers to structures that have characteris-
tics of improvements to real property, but 
also have characteristics of equipment in 
that they provide safety features, support 
for machinery, and access to machinery. 
This is a question of statutory construction 
or application and absent a grant of discre-
tion, the Commission's decision will be re-
viewed for correctness.58 
There is no explicit grant of authority 
regarding the question of what constitutes 
"equipment" under section 59-12-104(16). 
It is also true that the precise question at 
issue cannot be resolved using traditional 
57. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (emphasis 
added). 
58. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). 
59. See Webster's New Third International Dictio-
nary 768 (14th ed. 1961). 
60. The legislative history of section 59-12-
104(16) suggests that the section was enacted to 
provide incentives for the expansion of manu-
facturing plants. Morton claims that since the 
act was meant to provide incentives to manufac-
methods of statutory construction. The 
usual meaning of the term "equipment" is 
fixed assets of a business enterprise not 
including real property and buildings.59 
This, however, does not resolve the issue. 
Morton does not claim that buildings 
should qualify as an exemption under sec-
tion 59-12-104(16). Rather, Morton's argu-
ment is that the shells of its production 
facilities are so specialized and so intricate-
ly connected to the function of the machin-
ery that they do not constitute buildings, in 
the traditional sense, but are essentially 
equipment. The other terms of the statute 
are not helpful, and the legislative history 
is not, as in the case of section 59-12-
104(15), specific enough to provide much 
guidance,60 
Indeed, it seems that the legislature left 
unresolved the more general question of 
whether structures having characteristics 
of real property as well as characteristics 
of equipment can qualify for an exemption 
under section 59-12-104(16), let alone the 
more specific issue asserted in this appeal. 
It should also be noted that the classifica-
tion of a structure as real property or 
equipment is the type of determination the 
Commission routinely performs. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the legislature 
granted the Commission discretion in this 
area. Given these facts, we conclude that 
the Commission has been granted discre-
tion in interpreting the term "equipment." 
The decision of the Commission, therefore, 
will only be overturned if it is unreason-
able.61 
In determining whether the Commis-
sion's decision is reasonable, it must be 
noted that the Commission has promul-
gated a rule that expressly excludes real 
property and improvements to real proper-
ty from the definition of equipment, as that 
turers, the term "equipment" should be given an 
expansive interpretation; such an assertion is 
controverted by the rule that tax exemption 
statutes are to be strictly construed. See Parson 
Asphalt Prods. Inc., 617 P.2d at 398; Great Suit 
Lake Minerals, 573 P.2d at 340; Salt Lake Coun-
ty, 548 P.2d at 631. 
61. See supra notes 36-39 and accompan\ing 
text. 
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rm is used in section 59-12-104(16). statutes that are similar to rule 865-19-
uie 865-19-85S provides: 85S, that is, tax statutes granting exemp-
2. "Equipment" means any indepen- tions for machinery and equipment but not 
dent device separated from any machin- for building or building structures.66 Im-
ery but essential to an integrated or con- plicit in Morton's argument is the assertion 
tinuous manufacturing or assembling that under a functional analysis, the facili-
process or any sub unit thereof.... ties in question would qualify as equip-
ment. 
B. Application of Exemption: 
1. The machinery and equipment ex-
emption applies only to tangible personal 
property. It does not apply to real prop-
erty or to tangible personal property 
which is purchased and becomes an im-
provement to real property, 
[orton does not challenge the propriety of 
ale 865-19-85S. In fact, Morton's argu-
lent relies heavily on the language of the 
ule.62 
Morton argues that because the term 
equipment" is not defined in the tax code 
r Utah case law, this court should look to 
ther jurisdictions for guidance. Specifi-
ally, Morton cites cases from Wisconsin63 
nd the federal bench64 that have focused 
n the function that the particular struc-
ure performs in determining if the struc-
ure should be considered equipment.65 It 
3 argued that we should adopt this ap-
iroach because it was developed under 
»2. Because Morton asserts that the Commission 
erred in interpreting section 59-12-104(16), the 
Commissions determination must be reviewed 
under section 64-46b-16(4)(d) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Morton's argument, 
however, relies more on the wording of rule 
865-19-85S than on the language of section 59-
12-104(16). The instant case, therefore, may 
present a situation more appropriately reviewed 
under section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, i.e., the agency's action 
is "contrary to a rule of the agency," rather than 
under section 64-46b-16(4)(d). Morton has not 
asserted this claim. In any event, since we have 
already held that the Commission has been 
granted discretion in interpreting the term 
"equipment," as used in section 59-12-104(16), 
and rule 865-19-85S defines the term at issue, it 
is clear that in this case a reasonableness stan-
dard should be used under either section of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. See supra notes 
18-20, 36-37, and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982); Utah 
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 151 
P.2d 467, 470 (1944). 
There are, however, many difficulties 
with Morton's argument. It is rule 865-
19-85S, not section 59-12-104(16), that is 
similar to the statutes cited by Morton. 
Yet Morton has cited no cases where this 
court has looked to another jurisdiction's 
statutes to aid in the interpretation of an 
agency's rule. In situations like the in-
stant case, where the Commission has been 
granted discretion to interpret the term 
"equipment" and therefore discretion in in-
terpreting rule 865-19-85S,67 other jurisdic-
tions' rulings are not as salient as they 
may be in situations dealing with strict 
statutory construction. Furthermore, 
though there are similarities between rule 
865-19-85S and the statutes Morton cites, 
the statutes and rule 865-19-85S are not 
identical. None of the statutes upon which 
Morton relies involve sales and use tax. 
Moreover, under rule 865-19-85S, the tax 
exemption does not apply to real property 
and improvements to real property, while 
63. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125 
Wis.2d 437, 373 N.W.2d 680, 687-89 (Ct.App. 
1985); Ladish Malting Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Revenue, 98 Wis.2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56, 62 
(Ct.App. 1980). 
64. Thirup v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
508 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1974). 
65. Morton asserts that under the functional 
analysis the determination of whether property 
is equipment or real property is made using a 
three-step approach: first, annexation (how is 
the property attached?); second, adaptation 
(what is the function or purpose of the proper-
ty?); and third, intent (did the owner intend the 
property to remain tangible personal property 
permanently attached to real estate, or did the 
owner intend the property to be real property?). 
66. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing 
Co., 373 N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297 
N.W.2d at 56. 
67. See generally Concerned Parents of Stepchil-
dren, 645 P.2d at 633; Utah Hotel Co., 151 P.2d 
at 470. 
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under the statutes Morton cites the tax 
exemption does not apply to the arguably 
narrower term of buildings and building 
structures.68 
We also note that the case law from 
other jurisdictions is at best conflicting in 
this area.69 There are jurisdictions that 
have not followed a functional approach in 
interpreting similar statutes.70 Further-
more, the jurisdictions that have adopted a 
functional approach have reached conflict-
ing conclusions.71 Therefore, even if we 
held that section 59-12-104(16) contem-
plates a functional approach in determining 
whether a structure was equipment or real 
property, it would not necessarily follow 
that Morton's facilities would constitute 
equipment. It was established at the hear-
ing that the functional analysis urged by 
Morton is often "very nebulous." Indeed, 
it is entirely possible that the Commission 
agreed with Morton's approach but disa-
greed with Morton's conclusion. 
Given the language of rule 865-19-85S, 
the discrepancies between rule 865-19-85S 
and the statutes Morton cites, and the con-
flicting case law, the Commission's deter-
mination that the shells of Morton's facili-
ties do not constitute equipment is not un-
reasonable. Therefore, the Commission's 
determination will not be disturbed. 
68. See Thirup, 508 F.2d at 917; Pabst Brewing 
Co., 373 N.W.2d at 684; Ladish Malting Co., 297 
N.W.2d at 56. 
69. The Commission cites several cases which 
define the term "real property." Under these 
definitions, it is clear that Morton's facilities 
would qualify as real property. Thus, they 
would not qualify for an exemption under rule 
865-19-85S. See National Lead Co. v. Borough 
of Sayerville, 132 N.J.Super. 30, 331 A.2d 633. 
637 (1975); Strobel v. Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins., 
152 N.W.2d 794, 796 (N.D.1967); In re Inglis, 69 
Okla. 64, 169 P. 1083, 1084 (1917); Sanchez v. 
Brandt, 567 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. 1978). 
70. See Green Circle Growers Inc. v. Lorain Coun-
ty BdL of Revision, 35 Ohio St.3d 38, 517 N.E.2d 
899, 900 (1988). 
71. Compare Thirup, 508 F.2d at 920 (under 
functional approach, greenhouse constitutes 
equipment) with Busch v. County of Hennepin, 
380 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn.1986) (under func-
tional approach greenhouse does not constitute 
equipment). See also Crown Coco Inc. v. Corn-
Ill. SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) 
[10] Morton also claims that it is enti-
tled to relief under section 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(iii), which provides for judicial re-
lief when the "agency action is . . . con-
trary to the agency's prior practice, unless 
the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate 
a fair and rational basis for the inconsisten-
cy." Neither Morton nor the Commission 
has cited any case law relating to section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Indeed, it appears that 
there is no Utah case law that follows an 
approach analogous to the approach set out 
in this section. Moreover, the legislative 
history concerning this section is confused 
and therefore not helpful in interpreting 
the section.72 Given these facts, we do not 
engage in an in-depth analysis of the sec-
tion. 
Morton claims that the Commission, in 
determining that the shells of its produc-
tion facilities are real property, took action 
that was contrary to its prior practice of 
characterizing similar structures as tangi-
ble personal property. This allegation is 
based on the testimony of Mr. Anderson, 
an auditor who had formerly worked for 
the tax Commission who testified that he 
was aware of various instances where 
missioner of Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272, 274 
(Minn. 1983) (metal canopy over gasoline pumps 
does not constitute equipment). 
72. The comments of the Utah Administrative 
Law Advisory Committee state that section 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(iii) is patterned after section 5-
116(8)(iii) of the MSAPA. See Advisory Com-
mittee at 15. The comment to section 5-
116(8)(iii) provides that section 5-116(8)(iii) is 
related to section 2-103, which requires agen-
cies to make an index of their final orders and 
to make this index available for public inspec-
tion and copying. Under the MSAPA's scheme, 
a "party may invoke the indexing and public 
access requirement of Section 2-102, for the 
purpose of ascertaining the agency's prior prac-
tice, so as to reveal the inconsistency between 
the challenged agency action and prior agency 
practice." See MSAPA § 5-116, comments, 15 
U.L.A. at 129. Utah, however, has not enacted a 
provision similar to section 2-102. Due to the 
conflict between this legislative history and 
Utah's statutory scheme, legislative history can-
not be relied on to a great extent in interpreting 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
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walls, flooring, and roofs of automatic stor-
age facilities and large oil storage tanks 
were treated as tangible personal property. 
The Commission, in determining that the 
facilities in question are real property, did 
not distinguish the instant case from situa-
tions involving automatic storage facilities 
or oil storage tanks. The question present-
ed, therefore, is whether Mr. Anderson's 
testimony establishes prior inconsistent 
agency practice for the purpose of section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). If the testimony estab-
lishes prior inconsistent agency practice, 
Morton would be entitled to relief under 
this section due to the Commission's failure 
to provide a "rational basis for the incon-
sistency." 
In approaching this issue, it is important 
to note the exact nature of the evidence 
presented at the hearing. Mr. Anderson 
did not testify that the Commission, in a 
formal or informal hearing, classified oil 
storage tanks and automatic storage facili-
ties as tangible personal property. Rather, 
it is apparent from the record that Mr. 
Anderson was referring to individual au-
dits.73 Indeed, he testified that the method 
used in determining that the tanks and 
storage facilities were tangible personal 
property was "not an official guideline." 
Furthermore, the auditing division did not 
consistently classify such structures as 
equipment, but also classified such struc-
tures as real property. This inconsistency 
was due to the fact that there was no 
well-established policy regarding the classi-
fication of these structures. 
[11] Although there is limited law on 
point,74 it is clear that in the absence of an 
official guideline or a well-established poli-
cy, the decisions of auditors do not consti-
tute "agency practice" for the purpose of 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).75 To hold other-
73. Although it is not clear, it appears from the 
record that the classification of these structures 
as tangible personable property occurred in au-
dits concerning Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103, 
not Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). 
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
75. It may be important to note that we are not 
deciding whether the classification of oil storage 
tanks and walls, ceilings, and floors of automat-
wise would be to bind the Commission by 
the unappealed decisions of its subor-
dinates. It is the Commission that has 
been granted authority to administer the 
tax code.76 Morton has provided no evi-
dence that the Commission itself has acted 
contrary to the position it has taken in the 
instant case. Under Morton's approach, 
the mere fact that there is conflict within 
an agency on a particular question would 
be sufficient to justify judicial relief under 
section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). Due to the 
presence of a conflict, no matter how the 
issue is finally resolved, the decision will be 
inconsistent with some of the decisions of 
the agency's lower level employees. In 
recognizing the Commission's authority to 
administer the tax code, section 63-46b-16 
recognizes the Commission's authority over 
its own employees. Since Morton failed to 
establish prior agency practice contrary to 
the agency's action, the Commission's de-
termination cannot be overturned on the 
basis of section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
IV. SECTION 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) 
[12] Morton's remaining contention is 
that the Commission's determination that 
the shells of its production facilities do not 
constitute equipment is not supported by 
the record and is therefore arbitrary and 
capricious. It is argued that for this rea-
son Morton is entitled to relief under sec-
tion 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv).77 However, an 
analysis of the section is unnecessary be-
cause it is clear that the record supports 
the Commission's determination. 
It is argued that because Morton produc-
ed a witness who testified that in his opin-
ion the shells of the facilities in question 
constituted equipment and no other witness 
contradicted this testimony, the Commis-
sion is not free to disagree with this opin-
ic storage facilities as tangible personal property 
is inconsistent with the classification of shells of 
Morton's facilities as real property. 
76. See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-201 to 
-210. 
77. Section 63-^6b-16(4)(h)(iv) provides for judi-
cial relief when an agency's actions are "other-
wise arbitrary or capricious." 
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ion. Morton's witness formed his opinion 
by applying his interpretation of rule 865-
19-85S and section 59-12-104(16) to the 
undisputed facts. Since the facts are in-
deed undisputed, his opinion is simply a 
legal conclusion. While the Commission is 
not free to make findings of fact outside 
the scope of the evidence presented at the 
hearing,78 the Commission is free to dis-
agree with the legal conclusions offered by 
witnesses, even when those conclusions are 
uncontroverted. It is undisputed that suf-
ficient factual evidence was presented at 
the hearing, and it has been established 
that the Commission did not abuse its dis-
cretion in dealing with section 59-12-
104(16). The Commission's decision, there-
fore, is supported by the record. 
For the reasons stated above, we hold 
that the Commission did not err in deter-
mining that expenditures made in the con-
struction of Morton's sodium azide pellets 
facilities do not qualify for an exemption 
under section 59-12-104(15) and (16). 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Josafat TRUJILLO-MARTINEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900464-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 7, 1991. 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
mer F. Wilkinson, J., denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of 
Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1) guilty 
plea colloquy as well as defendant's affida-
vit regarding plea bargain were required to 
be considered in concert in determining 
whether defendant knowingly and volun-
tarily consented to plea; (2) defendant's 
testimony at guilty plea colloquy, together 
with testimony of his attorney at hearing 
to withdraw the plea, established that de-
fendant understood plea bargain affidavit 
when he signed it; and (3) trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to ques-
tion defendant at guilty plea colloquy about 
defendant's understanding of nature and 
elements of his charge, or whether he un-
derstood minimum and maximum sentences 
which could be imposed. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=»1149 
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial 
court's determination that defendant has 
failed to show good cause for withdrawal 
of guilty plea unless it clearly appears that 
trial court abused its discretion. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>274(2, 3) 
It is abuse of discretion to refuse to 
allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea 
which was not made in strict compliance 
with rule governing acceptance of guilty 
pleas. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed). 
3. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(5) 
Guilty plea colloquy as well as defen-
dant's affidavit regarding plea bargain 
were required to be considered in concert in 
determining whether defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily consented to plea. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-35-11 (Repealed). 
4. Criminal Law <3=>273.1(5) 
Defendant's testimony at guilty plea 
colloquy, together with testimony of his 
attorney at hearing to withdraw the plea, 
established that defendant understood plea 
bargain affidavit when he signed it; defen-
dant testified that he understood he was 
pleading guilty by signing affidavit and 
that he wished to sign it, and attorney 
78. First Natl Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Utah 19Q0) 
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Appendix 4 
Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
dated September 4, 1990 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 0TA5 
Case Ho* 89000824 
©HOWHl?s\l 
AUG r T 1990 
m 
^Aiyy CEOSLAED, 
Applicant* 
vs. 
YODHG KU2CT2IC SIGH COMPANY 
and/or SMITH AOMTHTSTEATOKS, 
Defendants * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAM 
AST) ORDER 
5: * * 
HEAEING: 
BEFORE: 
APEKAT?ANCES: 
Hearing Sooa 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
Sast 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 28, 
1990 at 10:00 o* clock a.m- Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission, 
Barbara.Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Vir&inius Dabney, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by J. Angus Edwards, 
Attorney, 
The. .applicant, in. fcfclg matte.r is claiming additional compensation 
benefits ***«* -n****-^! expenses in relation to a February 9T 1989" industrial 
back injury. The defendants have contested the relatedness and necessity of 
*•>><* fusion surgery that has been recommended by the applicant's treating 
physician, Dr- N- Home. Due to conflicting TnediraT opinions with respect to 
fr/h* treatment recommended for the applicant's industrial injury, the matter 
was referred to a Tragical panel cm April 17, 1990. The medical panel report 
was received at the Industrial Commission on June 8, 1990 and was distributed 
to the parties on June 21, 1990. On July 9, 1990, counsel for the applicant 
submitted a letter commenting on how he interpreted the medical panel, report. 
Counsel for the defendants filed a response on July 17, 1990 • On July 20, 
1990 counsel for the applicant replied and requested clarification be obtained 
from the medical panel regarding whether the applicant's pre-etfisting 
condition was symptomatic or not* It has been determined that there is no 
need to obtain mf^l^*1 panel clarification and as the fflpriiral panel report Is 
well supported, it is adopted by the Administrative Law Judge. 
G 
ORDER 
SB: GAST CSOSLASD 
PAGE two 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 28 years old on the date of injury 
and was then* and is now, single with no dependents. At the time of his 
injury, the applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning a wage of 
$10*17 per hour. The applicants position was that of a sheet metal 
fabricator and welder. On the morning of the date of injury, February 9, 
1989, - the applicant and another employee, James Brown, were moving a sign 
weighing approximately 200 pounds over to the. paint booth so that it could be 
painted. The applicant estimated the dimensions of the sign to he twelve feet 
by thcee feet. The sign was made of sheet metal and angle iron. The angle 
iron stuck out from the end of the sign and fh* applicant was holding onto 
this angle iron to carry the sign. He had his hgnd? palm up and about 
shoulder width apart as he carried the sign. He was walking forward with the 
sign when he came to a corner which required some maneuvering. It was 
rtseassary for him. ta taist his upper bacso ta the left ta get eraund the 
corner. As he went around the corner, he f^lt instant and sndden pain about 
two inches below his belt line and to the i>ight in his lower back. He also 
felt numbness in his buttocks and down the back of his legs. He proceeded to 
set tlie sign down on some sawhorses and rocalis complaining of the pain in his 
back 3t that time. He -HnighiM the shift that day, but could not sit or lift 
for ttte rest of the day. Ha reported to work the next day, February 10, 1989, 
but b§ could barely walk and his employer refused to allow him to work. The 
applicant was driven to 10EKHKD by another employee at the employer's 
direction. X-rays were taken there and he w^s immediately referred to Dr. R-
Horne, an orthopedist, for further evaluation. The applicant was driven back 
to his employer's and his girlfriend picked M m up there and drove him to see 
Dr. Home that same day. 
Dr. Home had a CT scan done at Fort Union Imaging on February 13, 
1989, -which -was read to show findings--at L5-S1—with, possible- problems. at 
LS-4. Aosaid, hyphen and robaxin were prescribed and the applicant was 
referred for physical therapy which began at Cottonwood Hospital approximately 
February 23, 1989. Physical therapy witlj, monthly visits to Dr. Home 
continued through June 1989. On June 22, 1989, a second CT scan was done at 
the request of Dr. Home. This revealed much the same findings except that it 
was ncjted that there was increased focal protrusion at L5-S1. 0a June 27, 
1989, or* Home wrote the adjustor, smith Adn&nistrators. in that letter, Dr. 
Home indicates that there was spondylolisthesis at the L-5 level. He notes 
that there was continued back pain, at that time in spite of the time off work, 
the physical therapy, the anti-imflammatqry medication and the aaiscle 
relaxants and pain relievers. Because there had been no clinical improvement 
with these conservative measures, Dr. Home suggests in that letter that a 
fusion, L-4 through the sacrum, might be required. As noted in. the letter, 
Dr. HOrne referred the applicant that same day to Alta View Hospital for a 
discogtaxn to determine whether a "disc was involved." 
OEDER 
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With the applicant continuing to see Dr. Eorae on a monthly basis, 
the applicant was also referred by the insurance adjuster to see Dr- J. Lily. 
Dr. Lily saw the applicant in August of 1989, and in a letter to the applicant 
dated August 24, 1989, he notes that the February 10, 1989 CT scan shows that 
there was a -non-acute* spondylolysis at L~5 that was clearly not caused by 
the injury the day before. He notes in that letter that, based cm that CT 
scan, he felt there was no compression of the £-1 nerve roots. He read the 
scan to show L3—4 facet joint merited degenerative changes bilaterally. Dr. 
Lily concluded that the applicant had pre-existing lumbar disc disease at L3-4 
and LS-S1 and that he needed to learn lumbar stabilization exercises if he 
wanted to avoid surgery, in a later letter to the applicant dated September 
19, 1989, Dr. Lily clarifies his analysis somewhat and indicates that the 
applicant had asymptomatic spondylolysis and spondylolisthesis prior to the 
industrial injury. However, Dr. Lily indicates that all the present symptoms 
suffered by the applicant were related to the industrial injury of February 9, 
1989. 
Responding to concerns expressed by the insurance adjuster regarding 
the pre-existing nature of the applicant's back condition, Dr. Home wrote the 
adjuster on September 28, 1989. In that letter, Dr. Home explains that even 
though the applicant had a pre-existing condition (spondylolisthesis), the 
injury on February 9, 1989 was an "acute- incident which caused a slip of the 
pre-existing spondylitic defect. He rated the applicant as having 20% whole 
person impairment per the A.M.A. Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment. A second independent medical examination was scheduled by the 
insurance adjuster with Dr. R- Hansen in December of 1989. xn his report 
dated December 1, 1989, Dr. Hansen notes that **X would be very cautious about <^—^ 
any surgical treatment.** This is apparently based on the fact that Dr. Han<5PTi 
sees no strong evidence of any neurological deficits or impairment. 
Nonetheless, Dr. TTfrH«rQ™ recommended future limitation of heavy lifting, 
bending, stooping and twisting-
In. January of 1990, the insurance adjuster referred the applicant to 
+y>A Utah tfork Capacity and Rehabilitation Center for a job analysis and 
functional capacity evaluation. The conclusion from, that analysis was that 
the applicant's job as a sheetmetal fabricator was a medium/heavy job 
requiring frequent bending and lifting. The applicant was rated as having a 
work capacity to perform medium/light work only and was described as not being 
feasible for competitive employment based on his workplace tolerances noted in 
frfr* evaluation. However, it was noted that the applicant demonstrated 
appropriate motivation and it was felt that he would be a good candidate for a 
structured work hardening program. 
TftA applicant testified that he never had any back problems or 
treatment prior to the February 9, 1989 industrial injury. He does recall one 
fall at work several years ago where the wind got TrnocTfpd out of him, but he 
stated he got no treatment for this and had no continuing problems as a result 
02DKS 
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of the incident. Currently, the applicant continues to hare numbness and 
shooting pains down his legs and his feet bum* The pain in his back has 
remained the same, while the numbness problems have gotten worse. The 
applicant is desirous o£ having th£ stii?gery recommended by I>r. Home* 
The medical panel report, received at the Industrial commission on 
June 8, 1990 indicates that the surgery recommended by ftr. R. Home is 
reasonably medically necessary as a result of the industrial injury. The 
panel found that the applicant was medically stable as of the date of 
examination (Hay. 8, 1990} and that the applicant had 20% whole person 
impairment related to the industrial injury, with 1/2 or i d of that rating 
attributable to the applicant's asymptomatic pre-existing spondylolisthesis 
and 10% attributable to the industrial injury- The panel found that this 
rating would most likely remain ths same even after the surgery proposed by 
Dr* Borne. 
COSCLUSTOES OF LAtf: 
As the defendants filed no objection to the medical panel report, 
that report is adopted and the defendants will be ordered to pay benefits in 
line with the findings of the medical panel. This would include additional 
temporary total compensation from January lf 1990 through Miy 8, 1990 
(benefits may have already been paid through the end of January by the 
carrier/adjustor, but this is not completely clear from the current record), 
and permanent impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person rating that 
the panel attrilnites to the February 94 198? industrial injury. Hhen and if 
the applicant is scheduled for surgery, he will be entitled to additional 
medical expenses and additional temporary total compensation for the period of 
recovery associated with that surgery* 
Counsel for the applicant has argued that the defendants should be 
liable -for the entire 20% of back impairment that the. panel has rated, 
frmm^l for the applicants argument, is as follows: 
Specifically, it is our view that an aggravated 
pre-existing asymptomatic condition must be paid by an 
employer along with that portion of permanent partial 
impairment attributable to the industrial accident. The 
Hbllowar case supports our position with regard to that 
since only two of the five Justices expressed the opinion 
that the pre-existing condition could be either symptomatic 
or asymptomatic* HGticeably, the three Judges who wrote 
the majority decision did not agree with the two concurring 
Justices on •*»*<* particular point, it is our position that 
the Holloway case requires a ruling in Mr. Crosland's favor 
requiring that the full 20% permanent impairment be paid 
for by the employer. 
ORDER 
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Counsel for the applicant also requests that the matter he referred 
back, to the panel for a finding as to whether the pre-existing condition was 
asymptomatic or not. This is not necessary. The panel clearly states that 
the pre-existing condition was asymptomatic* Also, whether the condition was 
asymptomatic or symptomatic is irrelevant. As pointed out by counsel for the 
defendant in his response to counsel for the applicant's argument set forth 
above, the case cited by counsel for the applicant, Holloway v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P,2d 31 (Utah 1986), does not conclude anything regarding 
symptomatic or asymptomatic conditions. The concurring opinion discusses 
this, concluding the exact opposite of what counsel for the applicant argues* 
but the concurring opinion presumably does not sQt precedent. Holloway does 
cite Allen v. Industrial Coirmrr salon, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) with approval. 
The focus of A1T<m is whether a pre-existing condition contributes to the 
injury sustained on the job, not whether the pre-existing condition is 
symptomatic or asymptomatic. In this case, the panel states that both the 
pre-existing condition and the job injury "are contributory* ** Thus, there is 
no justification for finding that the full impairment is the responsibility of 
the carrier- Had the panel found that the pre-existing condition was merely 
an X-ray finding, with no causal contribution to the final injury and with no 
rating associated with it, then counsel for the applicant* s argument would be 
more persuasive. As it stands, the statute CU.C.&. 35-1-69) requires that the 
carrier pay only for that impairment that is related to the industrial injury, 
and unfortunately, the Employers Reinsurance Fund no longer is required to 
contribute with respect to impairment aggravated by the industrial injury* 
There being no statutory nor case law justification for finding the carrier 
liable for the full impairment, the carrier is required to pay only the 10% 
attributable to the industrial injury. 
As not *n the permanent impairment benefits will be accrued, part of 
the impairment award will be paid out on a periodic basis. If surgery is 
scheduled during the period that the remaining permanent impairment benefits 
are being paid periodically, the benefit rate should be changed back to the 
temporary total compensation rate of $271.00 per week until the applicant 
stabilizes from the surgery. During the payment of the" additional temporary 
total compensation benefits, 20% of the benefits should be withheld to be 
finally paid over to the applicant's attorney as his fee once the applicant 
stabilizes. Any rttmRJTnng balance for permanent impairment should be paid to 
the applicant at that point without discount for attorney fees. 
ORDER: 
XT IS THKEK&OBE OEDEHED that the defendants, Young Electric Sign 
Company/Smith Administrators, pay the applicant, Gary Crosland, temporary 
total compensation at the rate of $271.00 per week for 18 • 286 weeks (January 
1, 1990 through May 8, 1990) or a total of *4,955.51, less amounts paid to 
date for this period. This amount is to be paid in a lump sum plus interest 
at 3% per annum per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded 
below. 
ORDER 
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XT IS FUEIHER ORDERED that the defendants, Young Electric Sign 
Company/Smith Administrators, pay the applicant, Gary crosland, permanent 
partial impairment benefits at the rate of $229*00 per week for 31.2 weeks or 
a total of $7,144.80. Accrued amounts are payable in a lump sum plus interest 
at 8% per annum per U*C,A- 35-1-78* 
IT IS SWI'HKK ORDERED that the defendants, Yotmg Electric Sign 
Company/ Smith Administrators, pay Virginius Dalwiey, attorney for the 
applicant, the sum of $2,420*06, as attorney's fees in this matter, said 
amount to be deducted from the accrued temporary total compensation award of 
the applicant and remitted directly to Virginius Dabney. This amount should 
be adjusted downward by an amount emiai to 20% of any benefits paid to date 
for the period of January 1, 1990 through Hay 8, 1990 • 
IT IS WJKTHBR OHDESED that the defendants, Young. Electric Sign 
Company/Smith Administrators, pay all medica7 expenses incurred as the result 
o£ the February 9, 1989 industrial injury, said expenses to he paid in 
accordance with the ?fAd1cal and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission, 
H is FURTHKK ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying- in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
jdk*~~— <%C *. * 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the1 industrial Commission. 
of trtah, Salt Lake". Cityf Utah, this 
Patricia, o. Ashfey V ^ d-
Commission Secretary 
CE2TIFICAXE OF MATLTSG 
T certify tliat on August /-^7l990. a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of Gary Crosiand* 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addrossos, postage paid: 
Gary Crosiand, 540 East 374S South, SLC, UT 84106 
Tirsinitus Dahney, Atty., 350 South 400 East, Suite 202, SLC, UT 
84111 
sj+ Angus Edwards, Atty., 39 Post Office Place, 3rd Floor, SLC, 
UT *4101 
Administrative Services, V. 0- Box 526411, SLC, UT 84152-6411 
THE IHDUSTHX&L COMMISSION OF UTAH 
WJJLma Burrows 
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Section 63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated 
(Standard of Review) 
63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25. 63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection il)ia> 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161. 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- § 3x5
 m akes the act effective on January 1, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as in-
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
<h) the agency action is: 
<i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
< iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(ivi otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25. 1988. substituted "As cedure" in Subsections i2)(a) and (2Mb). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals"' for The Supreme Court or $
 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by statute" in 1988 
Subsection <1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection d) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme $ 63-46b-15(lKa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- 'Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
lb) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
Historv: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch! 161, § 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987. ch. 161, 
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-4€b-15, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, 
ch. 132, § 1. 
NOTES TO 
Function of district court. 
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
delegated to the district court is to review in-
63-46b-16. Judicial review 
ceedings. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Conflicting evidence. 
Factual findings. 
Standard of review. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Conflicting evidence. 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Factual findings. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court 
tfill not disturb the board's application of its 
'actual findings to the law unless its determi-
lation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
ind rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. 
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
.989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec, 801 P.2d 
.58 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Standard of review. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for 
court to review an agency's interpretation of 
Is statutorily granted powers and authority as 
question of law, with no deference to the 
gency's view of the law. The correction-of-
rror standard will be applied to such an issue 
nd the agency's statutory interpretation will 
e upheld only if it is concluded to be not erro-
apply injudicial proceedings under this 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the excep-
tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
DECISIONS 
formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
— Formal adjudicative pro-
DECISIONS 
neous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 99 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Substantial evidence test. 
In applying the "substantial evidence test," 
the appellate court reviews the "whole record" 
before the court, and this review is distinguish-
able from both a de novo review and the "any 
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection 
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude 
in reviewing the record than was previously 
granted under the Utah Employment Security 
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere 
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. It is such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a con-
clusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
The party challenging the findings must 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, the agency's findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 
(Utah 1990). 
Substantial prejudice. 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li-
cense was reversed and his case was remanded 
for a new hearing, where the failure to afford 
63-46b-17 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Whole record test. 
The "whole record test" necessarily requires 
that a party challenging the board's findings of 
fact must marshall all of the evidence support-
ing the findings and show that despite the sup-
porting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Under the "whole record test," a court must 
consider not only the evidence supporting the 
board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
that fairly detracts from the weight of the 
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White & 
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Scope of review. 
The agency's factual findings will be upheld 
if they are supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court. Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec., 
782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The agency's application of law to its factual 
findings will not be disturbed unless its deter-
mination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. Johnson v. Department of 
Emp. Sec., 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review 
contained in this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial 
review that are in effect on December 31,1987, govern all agency adjudicative 
proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31, 
1987, even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-22, enacted by L. 
1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 5, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 69. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted 
"or" for "and" before "after January 1, 1988" in 
Subsection (1), 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 
(Permanent Partial Disability) 
35-1-66 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for 
work at any time prior to eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally 
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor con-
tinue more than eight years after the date of the injury. Payments shall 
terminate when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-65.1, enacted by L. Paragraphs (a) and (b), substituted "hearing 
1981, ch.. 287, § 2; 1988, ch. 116, § 2. under § 35-1-99" for "such purpose prior to the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- expiration of such eight-year period" in Para-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the graph (b) and. in Paragraph (a), substituted 
previously undesignated first two paragraphs "the injury" for "such injury" and made a 
as Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection ll), minor punctuation change; deleted the former 
divided the formerly undivided language into
 l a s t undesignated paragraph, which read "In 
an introductory paragraph and Paragraphs (a)
 n o c a s e shM t h e w e e k l y p a y m e n t s c o n t l n ue 
and (b). rewriting the contents thereof; in Sub-
 a f t e r t h e d i s a b i l i t e n d s o r t h e d e a t h o f t h e 
section (2 . divided the formerly undivided Ian-
 d j „ a n d a d d e d S u b s e c t l 0 n (3). 
guage into an introductory paragraph and J r 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of pay-
ments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an 
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section 
35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial disability award from the commis-
sion. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or 
the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid 
weekly for the number of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and 
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for temporary total disabil-
ity and temporary partial disability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, 
or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon .. 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
202 
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For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of 
carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of is-
chium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-
Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump (three 
inches or less below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
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For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of 
the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the 
complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not 
apply to the items listed [in] (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as 
follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in deci-
bels with frequencies of 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) 
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ANSI 1969) ap-
proved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of 
hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 
cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable disabil-
ity. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second 
is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical 
professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear 
at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second which 
shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average decibel 
loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average 
decibel loss for each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 
ll/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hear-
ing loss in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in 
the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of 
binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial disability for bin-
aural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of bin-
aural hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this 
chapter. Where an employee files one or more claims for hearing loss the 
percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall be deducted from 
any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall compensation 
benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks 
of compensation benefits. 
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not 
otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent 
partial disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission based on 
the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as closely 
as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in 
this section. Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case 
exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the period of compensation for 
permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial disability compen-
sation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to 
the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no 
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event shall more than a maximum of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required 
to be paid. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 77; C.L. 1917, 
$ 3138; L. 1919, ch. 63, $ 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-62; L. 1937, ch. 41, $ 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943, 42-1-62; L. 1945, ch. 65, * 1; 1949, ch. 
52, $ 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957. ch. 62, $ 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
71. § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967. ch. 65, $ 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 4; 1971, ch. 
76, § 5; 1973, ch. 67, § 3; 1977, ch. 151, § 2; 
1977. ch. 156, $ 5; 1981, ch. 287, § 3; 1983, 
ch. 357, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1. 1988, rewrote the first 
Back injuries. 
The words "in proportion as near as may be 
to compensation for specific loss as set forth in 
the schedule," which are authorized for disfig-
urements or losses of bodily function which are 
not scheduled in the act. does not relate to an 
injured back because there are no scheduled 
injuries in the statute that have any relation-
ship to an injured back. What the legislature 
apparently had in mind when it used the 
quoted words was losses of bodily function of 
similar nature to those scheduled, such as an 
injury to an arm, short of amputation, the im-
pairment of eyesight, short of blindness, and 
paragraph, substituted "Weekly payments 
may not in any case" for "In no case shall the 
weekly payments" in the second paragraph, de-
leted the former sixth paragraph, which de-
fined "presbycusis," and substituted the 
present next-to-last paragraph for the former 
next-to-iast paragraph, relating to other disfig-
urements or losses of bodily function not other-
wise provided for. 
Cross-References. — Change of award for 
willful misconduct of employer or employee, 
§§ 35-1-12, 35-1-14. 
the like. Markus v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Utah 
2d 347, 301 P 2 d 1084 (1956). 
Industrial Commission did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to award miner with back 
injury full compensation from the time he left 
his job until rehired since compensation during 
total disability does not necessarily mean until 
the employee is able to do his former work. 
Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 
214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965). 
Blindness of one eye. 
Award of Industrial Commission of 100 
weeks' compensation for total blindness of one 
eye, a substantial function of which was re-
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stored by use of optical lens, was not capri-
cious, arbitrary, or unreasonable where the 
commission determined, within its preroga-
tive, that the injury resulted in the blindness 
to the eye. Western Contracting Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 15 Utah 2d 208, 390 P.2d 125 
(1964). 
Common-law measure of damages. 
Since proceeding before Industrial Commis-
sion is not an action for damages, rules respect-
ing measure of damages must be disregarded 
and statutory regulations applied in computing 
compensation. Broderick v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 63 Utah 210, 224 P. 876 (1924). 
Payment of compensation for an accidental 
injury arising out of or in course of industrial 
employment is in no sense a payment for dam-
ages, and rules respecting the measure of dam-
ages in law actions do not apply. Spencer v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188, 
affd, 87 Utah 358, 48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
Disfigurement. 
Injury to vision of employee from electric 
flash was not case of "any other disfigurement, 
or loss of bodily function not otherwise pro-
vided for herein," within this provision. Moray 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 
1023 (1921) (decided prior to 1988 amend-
ment). 
First part of this section, providing that 
"Where injury causes partial disability for 
work," referred to injuries specifically enumer-
ated in this section, so compensation for injury 
consisting of the crushing together of three 
vertebrae interfering with motion of spine was 
properly computed under provision dealing 
with "any other disfigurement or loss of bodily 
function not otherwise provided for herein." 
Vukelich v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Utah 486, 
220 P. 1073 (1923) (decided prior to 1988 
amendment). 
Words, "other disfigurement" do not seem to 
have any practical significance. Denver & 
R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utah 86, 
272 P. 239 (1928) (decided prior to 1988 
amendment). 
Loss sustained by the employee because of 
the extraction of his teeth is a "disfigurement" 
within the meaning of this section. Gunnison 
Sugar Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utah 535, 
275 P. 777 (1929) (decided prior to 1988 
amendment). 
The words "any other disfigurement" in this 
section warrant an award for loss of one front 
tooth and fracturing of another, for "loss of 
bodily function" need not impair present earn-
ing capacity. Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 75 Utah 556, 286 P. 959 (1930) 
(decided prior to 1988 amendment). 
Effect of voluntary payments. 
Award was not prejudicial to employer in al-
legedly failing to take into account payments 
voluntarily made by employer prior to entry of 
award where employee was entitled to 200 
weeks' compensation for loss of arm under this 
section, as well as compensation for temporary 
total disability under § 35-1-65, and award 
was for 200 weeks' compensation; commission 
considered payments as compensation due for 
temporary disability under § 35-1-65. Buck-
ingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Eye injuries. 
Commission's award to claimant for loss of 
vision due to injury to eye muscles causing 
double vision was affirmed despite contention 
that claimant did not suffer "total blindness of 
one eye" within meaning of statute since each 
of claimant's eyes considered alone had sub-
stantial vision and only when they worked to-
gether as visual system was effect of injury 
manifest, and despite further contention that 
because commission had previously ordered 
award for only one-half amount subsequently 
awarded, subsequent award was arbitrary and 
capricious. Goodyear Serv. Store v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1968). 
In proceeding for compensation, wherein it 
appeared that employee suffered injury to vi-
sion of eye from electric flash equal to 10% in 
one and 5% in other eye, an allowance of $16 a 
week for fifteen weeks, or an amount equal to 
15% of allowance of 100 weeks for total perma-
nent loss of vision in one eye, was sufficient. 
Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 
P. 1023 (1921). 
Hand injury. 
Injury to employee's hand, disabling him 
from working, is a compensable injury. 
Katsanos v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 479, 
267 P. 781 (1928). 
If employee lost by amputation the third, 
fourth, and fifth digits of hand and part of palm 
or surface thereof, he should receive compensa-
tion as if hand were entirely lost. The words 
"other disfigurement" appearing in this section 
do not seem to have any practical significance. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
73 Utah 86, 279 P. 239 (1928) (decided prior to 
1988 amendment). 
Hearing loss. 
This section does not make any provision for 
compensation for loss of hearing associated 
with advanced age, presbycusis. Wayman v 
Western Coal Carrier Corp., 665 P.2d 1294 
(Utah 1983) (decided prior to 1988 amend-
ment). 
Jurisdiction of federal courts. 
Where state Industrial Commission mistak-
enly awarded injured employee award of total 
disability for only partial loss of vision, equity 
powers of federal court could not be invoked to 
206 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-66 
enjoin enforcement of award since commission 
acted mistakenly, yet legally, and within, but 
not beyond, its jurisdiction. United States 
Smelting. Ref. & Mining Co. v. Evans, 35 F.2d 
459 <8th Cir. 1929*. cert, denied, 281 U.S. 744, 
74 L. Ed. 1157. 50 S. Ct. 350 (1930). 
Limitations on supplemental claims. 
This section rather than $ 35-1-78 governs 
filing of supplemental claims for recurrence of 
an injury; $ 35-1-78 does not abrogate or cre-
ate an exception to the limitation imposed by 
this section. Claimant who requested and ac-
cepted lump-sum settlement for his injury was 
not entitled to supplemental compensation 
when partial paralysis resulted from surgery 
thirteen years later. United States Smelting, 
Ref. & Mining Co. v. Nielson, 19 Utah 2d 239, 
430 P.2d 162 (1967), affd, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 
P.2d 199 (1968). 
Loss of bodily function. 
Where injury to miner resulted in amputa-
tion of first three fingers of right hand at proxi-
mal joint, removal of chip from head of meta-
carpal bone of index finger, and amputation of 
little finger at junction of second and third 
phalanges, award made on basis of 507c loss of 
use of right hand on theory that where several 
fingers are lost it is the loss of a "bodily func-
tion not otherwise provided for'' in schedule of 
this section, was proper, as against contention 
that it was intended by statute to compensate 
for loss of all fingers by adding scheduled bene-
fits for loss of each finger. North Beck Mining 
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 58 Utah 486, 200 P. 
I l l (1921) (decided prior to 1988 amendment). 
Where ult imate question is not one of loss of 
bodily function but actual partial or total dis-
ability economically and industrially, the loss 
of bodily function is only an aid to such ulti-
mate question, and doctors should testify only 
as to such loss and not to the ultimate question 
of industrial and economic disability; except 
where the doctor qualified in addition to his 
medical knowledge that he has sufficient 
knowledge of what physical of mental abilities 
a certain occupation or vocation calls for, or 
where such testimony is as to certain common 
industrial, economic, or household functions, 
such as climbing ladders, sweeping or digging, 
in which case the doctor may testify. Silver 
King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 92 Utah 511, 69 P.2d 608 (1937). 
Contention of corporation, seeking reduction 
in award, that compensation awards were cre-
ated only as a compensation for loss of bodily 
functions which reduce earning capacity, is not 
correct. Under this section the scheduled 
awards for loss of bodily parts and functions 
are in addition to the compensation provided 
for temporary total disability. Western Con-
tracting Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Utah 
2d 208, 390 P.2d 125 (1964). 
Maximum benefits. 
Plaintiff, who received temporary total dis-
ability compensation commencing with the 
date of his injury and later was paid perma-
nent total disability benefits prior to his return 
to work, was not entitled to maximum compen-
sation for both temporary total and permanent 
partial disability but was entitled only to per-
manent partial disability benefits subject to 
the limitations set forth in the last paragraph 
of § 35-1-67. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett, 737 
P.2d 986 (Utah 1987). 
Medical expenses . 
The period of limitations in this section also 
applied to claim under § 35-1-81 for medical 
expenses arising from injury compensated by 
this section. United States Steel Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 145. 493 P.2d 986 
(1972). 
Medical and hospital care benefits are not 
subject to same limitations as compensation for 
wages lost or disability rating; claimant was 
entitled to continued medical expenses where 
the orders for payment of original medical ex-
penses were not definitely limited, were mter-
pretable as being "open end" and employer had 
been aware that the claimant's injuries were 
such that he would never fully and perma-
nently recover but would need future medical 
care. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson. 30 
Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973). 
Mental impairment. 
Regardless of whether loss of ability to earn 
such wages as applicant was receiving at time 
of accident is by reason of either a physical or 
mental impairment, he is entitled to compen-
sation. Utah-Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 71 Utah 490, 267 P. 785 U928). 
Offsetting amount because of overpay-
ment for temporary total disability. 
Industrial commission did not act contrary to 
law or unreasonably in ordering that amount 
owed employee for permanent partial disabil-
ity be offset by a prior overpayment of amount 
paid to employee for temporary total disability 
pertaining to the same injury, with the balance 
of the overpayment being credited against any 
future compensation the employer might owe 
the employee because of the industrial acci-
dent. Hudson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 662 P.2d 
29 (Utah 1983'. 
Operation and effect. 
There is no conflict between this section and 
$ 35-1-67. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n. 74 Utah"l03, 277 P. 206 (1929). 
Other or additional compensation. 
In proceeding by employee for additional 
compensation, whether disability from which 
applicant was suffering at time of application 
arose from accident or from old hernia of long 
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standing was a question which industrial com-
mission had power to determine without judi-
cial review. Littsos v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 
Utah 259. 194 P. 338 <1920>. 
Award of compensation for temporary total 
disability in addition to compensation for loss 
of limb cannot be allowed generally, but such 
award was properly allowed where unexpected 
complications arose making it impossible for 
injured employee to use artificial limb until 
another amputation could be performed. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611 (1922). 
Other or additional compensation for a tem-
porary disability to which an applicant may be 
entitled by reason of an industrial accident is 
not to be considered in reduction of the definite 
amount provided for the loss of an arm. 
Katsanos v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 479, 
267 P. 781 (1928). 
Whether condition of permanent partial dis-
ability resulted from accident in question or 
resulted from aggravation of pre-existing con-
dition, applicant is entitled to compensation. If 
a latent disease or trouble is accelerated or 
lighted up by an industrial accident and a 
more serious injury results by reason of the 
existence of such latent ailment than other-
wise would have resulted, the injured em-
ployee is entitled to additional compensation. 
Utah-Idaho Cent. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
71 Utah 490, 267 P. 785 (1928). 
If the insurance carrier acquiesces in an ad-
ditional award of compensation and pays it, it 
thereby waives its right to set up the original 
settlement as a bar against that award. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Utah 
366, 274 P. 139 (1929). 
Permanent total disability claims. 
This section does not impose any limitation 
on the time within which application for per-
manent total disability benefits must be filed. 
Buxton v. Industrial Comm'n, 587 P.2d 121 
(Utah 1978). 
Review of findings. 
If there is any evidence to sustain commis-
sion's finding of permanent partial disability, 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 302. 
n- it will not be disturbed on appeal. Utah-Idaho 
li- Cent. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 490. 
>7 267 P. 785 (1928). 
i Scope of judicial review. 
When factual findings of commission as to 
i source and extent of applicant's injuries are 
i based upon substantial and competent evi-
' dence, they will not be disturbed by court. 
• i Goodyear Serv. Store v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 
 Utah 2d 249, 444 P.2d 119 (1900). 
^ Statute of limitations. 
Where claim arose when section had a six-
i- year statute of limitations, and the claim was 
>e still alive under that statute of limitations 
is when the 1973 amendment increased the stat-
ue ute of limitations from six to eight years, 
i- claimant had eight years from the time of the 
5» injury in which to file a supplemental claim. 
Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224 (Utah 
3- 1978). 
>r Where employee suffered an injury in No-
i- vember of 1975 and notice of injury and claim 
tf was properly given and filed in accordance 
»r with requirements of S§ 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, 
a and employee was paid temporary total dis-
e ability benefits through August of 1978, em-
ployee's claim for permanent partial disability 
i- based on 1975 injury and filed in January of 
i- 1983 was not barred by three-year statute of 
i» limitations in § 35-1-99, but was subject to 
eight-year statute of limitations in this section, 
I- and was therefore filed within applicable stat-
t ute of limitations period. Dean Evans Chrysler 
il Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984) 
a (decided prior to 1988 amendment). 
h 
Test of total disability. 
Employee who had only partial loss of vision 
which was subject to correction by use of 
n glasses did not sustain total disability; the test 
of such disability being whether it prevents 
I. employee from doing work for which he is 
1 adapted, and not that in which he was injured. 
United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v. 
Evans, 35 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1929). 
Cited in Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720 
, P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
«=» 1641. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of pay-
ments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an 
industrial accident and who files an application for hearing under Section 
35-1-98 may receive a permanent partial disability award from the commis-
sion. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or 
the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 662/3% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 662/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent children, but not to exceed 662/3% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid in 
routine pay periods not to exceed four weeks for the number of weeks stated 
against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensa-
tion provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow 
joint, or below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps 
tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps ten-
don 168 
(2) Hand 
(2)(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(2Kb) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joint .. 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of 
carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacar-
pal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacar-
pal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At interphalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal 
bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
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(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacar-
pal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
<o At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy <leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
<b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of 
ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or 
Gritti-Stokes amputation or below knee with short stump (three 
inches or less below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation tChopart's) 66 
<c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joint 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 109 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to 
loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage 
}f the complete loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, how-
ever, shall not apply to the items listed in (B)(4). 
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is 
lot otherwise provided for in the schedule of losses in this section, perma-
lent partial disability compensation shall be awarded by the commission 
:>ased on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment 
>hall, as closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the 
schedule set forth in this section. Permanent partial disability compensa-
ion may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the 
)eriod of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Perma-
lent partial disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent 
mpairment that existed prior to an industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations 
is to the maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, 
md in no event shall more than a maximum of 662/.3% of the state average 
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weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compe 
sation be required to be paid. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 77; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3138; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-62; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943, 42-1-62; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 4; 1971, ch. 
76, § 5; 1973, ch. 67, § 3; 1977, ch. 151, § 2; 
1977, ch. 156, § 5; 1981, ch. 287, § 3; 1983, 
ch. 357, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 3; 1990, ch. 69, 
§ 3; 1990, ch. 109, § 2; 1991, ch. 136, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 69, effective April 23, 1990, substi-
tuted "Section 35-1-98" for "Section 35-1-99" in 
35-1-66.1, Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss 
due to noise to be compensated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise 
or by direct head injury shall be compensated according to the terms and 
conditions of this chapter. 
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful industrial noise 
shall be paid under this chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a profession-
ally controlled sound test that the employee has been exposed to harmful 
industrial noise as defined in Section 35-1-66.2 while employed by the em-
ployer against whom the claim is made. 
History: C. 1953, 35-2-58, enacted by L. § 35-2-58; added the Subsection (1) designa-
1969, ch. 87, § 5; 1991, ch. 136, § 5. tion, inserted "or by direct head injury,'' and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- substituted "chapter" for "act" in that Subsec-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, renumbered tion; and added Subsection (2). 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined. 
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the sound emanating from equip-
ment and machines during employment exceeding the following permissible 
sound levels, dBA slow response, and corresponding durations per day, in 
hours: 
Sound Level Duration 
90 
2 
95 
97 
100 
102 
105 
110 
115 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1.4 
1.0 
0.5 
0.25 ( 
the first undesignated paragraph and "in ro 
tine pay periods not to exceed four weeks' f 
"weekly" in the third undesignated paragrap 
and inserted "in" in the last sentence in Su 
section (C). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 109, effectn 
April 23, 1990, substituted f,in routine pay p< 
riods not to exceed four weeks" for "weekh 
near the end of the third paragraph and mac 
three minor stylistic changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 2S 
1991, substituted "109" for "100" at iter 
(B)(4)(c) and deleted several undesignate 
paragraphs relating to hearing loss. 
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Appendix 7 
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 
(Apportionment with Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
in Cases of Permanent Total Disability) 
35-1-69 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Procedure. 
The statutes do not require the Second In-
jury Fund (now the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund) to be a participant or even a party in 
every proceeding before the commission, but 
once the prospect of fund liability appears, the 
fund is an "interested party" or a "party in in-
terest" under the statutes and is entitled to 
receive, in its own right and through its own 
authorized representative rather than through 
the commission generally, a notice of the hear-
ing, a copy of the administrative law judge's 
findings, notice of entry of the commission's 
order, and it is entitled to file a motion for re-
view with the commission. Paoli v. Cottonwood 
Hosp., 656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982). 
Where the Second Injury Fund (now the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund) has elected not to 
participate and its presence has not been di-
rected in a hearing before an administrative 
law judge and an order against the fund has 
been entered, the fund should be allowed to 
reopen the case upon motion for review under 
§ 35-1-82.53 in order to submit further evi-
dence bearing on the special interest and lia-
bility of the fund. Paoli v. Cottonwood Hosp 
656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982). 
Reimbursement. 
The payment made under former Subsection 
(2)(a), providing for the payment of death bene-
fits to the uninsured employers fund when a 
decedent leaves no dependents, was not "com-
pensation" within the meaning of § 35-1-62, 
which provides for reimbursement for compen-
sation payments in wrongful death recoveries, 
and where the decedent's parents sued the tort-
feasor and its insurer, the insurance fund could 
neither invade the parents' recovery nor pur-
sue a separate claim against the insurer in or-
der to recover the amount paid into the Second 
Injury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 
1330 (Utah 1986). 
Rights of administrator. 
Where employee without dependents was in-
jured, and industrial commission had decided 
he was entitled to compensation for certain 
number of weeks, but employee subsequently 
died from other causes prior to award, adminis-
trator was not entitled to compensation. 
Heiselt Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 
Utah 59, 197 P. 589, 15 A.L.R. 799 (1921). 
I i!Liu\ I h l i A I . ItLHhulHlhlNCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Labor, 
1987 Utah L. Rev. 227. 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 321 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation: posthu-
mous children and children born after accident 
as dependents, 18 A.L.R.3d 900. 
Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation 
«=» 1673. 
35-1-69, Payments from Employers* Kcmsiiraiu.'t1 Luml. 
If an employee, who has at least a 10%' whole person permanent impairment 
from any cause or origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and if 
the additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer 
or its insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for 
the payment of benefits as follows: 
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the first $20,000 
of medical benefits and the initial three years of permanent total disabil-
ity compensation as provided in this title. 
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the first $20,000 shall be 
paid in the first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Then, 
as provided in Subsection (5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall 
reimburse the employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those expenses. 
(3) After the initial three-year period under Subsection (1) permanent 
total disability compensation payable to an employee under this title 
becomes the liability of and shall be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
(4) If it Is determined that the employee is permanently and totally 
disabled,, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be gi\ en credit for all 
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prior payments of temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent 
partial disability compensation made as a result of the industrial acci-
dent. Any overpayment by the employer or its insurance carrier shall be 
reimbursed by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6). 
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund shall reimburse the employer or its insurance carrier for the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and compensation 
paid to or on behalf of an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund reimbursements shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of 
payment of the medical or disability compensation for which the reim-
bursement is requested. Each request is subject to review as to reason-
ableness by the commission. The commission may determine the manner 
of reimbursement. 
<6) If. at the time an employee is determined to be permanently and 
totally disabled, the employee has other actionable workers' compensa-
tion claims, the employer or insurance carrier that is liable for the last 
industrial accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be liable 
for the benefits payable by the employer as provided in this section. The 
employee's entitlement to benefits for prior actionable claims shall then 
be determined separately on the facts of those claims. Any previous per-
manent partial disability arising out of those claims shall then be consid-
ered to be impairments that give rise to Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
liability under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-69, enacted by L. amended by Laws 1984. ch. 79. a 1, relating to 
1988, ch. 116, ^ 6. combined ir.june.- resulting in permanent inca-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Law? 1988. pacity. effective July I, 1988. and enacts the 
ch. 118, ^ 6 repeal* former $ 35-1-69. as last present section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amount of award. 
—Liability of second employer. 
—Percentage of impairment. 
Application. 
Apportionment of liability. 
Definitions. 
Employee completely compensated. 
Findings of commission. 
Liability for benefits attributable to nonphvsical unemployability factors. 
Medical panel determination. 
Medical testimony. 
No apportionment of insurer's liability. 
Preexisting condition previously compensated. 
Preexisting contributing condition. 
—Substantially greater incapacity following industrial injury. 
Presbycusis. 
Prior tnjury in military service. 
Purposes. 
Recovery from fund denied. 
Remainder paid out of fund. 
Serial consideration of separate accidents. 
Special Fund. 
Strict application. 
Temporary disability benefits. 
221 
35-1-69 LABOR — INIHISTRIAI I OMM1SMUN 
Amount of award. 
—Liability of second employer. 
This section makes the second employer lia-
ble only for the medical expenses and tempo-
rary total disability benefits in proportion to 
the disability sustained by the worker in the 
second accident. Day's Mkt., Inc. v. Muir, 719 
P.2d 528 (Utah 1986). 
—Percentage of impairment. 
An injured employee is entitled to an award 
of compensation from his employer based upon 
the percentage of impairment to the whole 
man, and is not restricted to partial man rat-
ings, although the employer's proportion of lia-
bility for compensation is equal to the percent-
age of total impairment attributable to the in-
dustrial injury. Kerans v Industrial Comm'n, 
713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985) 
Application. 
This section neither expressly nor impliedly 
limits its application to only multiple-employer 
circumstances, nor to cases where the previous 
incapacitating injury was nonindustrial. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983). 
In order to determine if Second Injury Fund 
had application, the commission was required 
to determine if the current impairment was 
substantially greater than it would have been 
in the absence of preexisting incapacity. Day's 
Mkt., Inc. v Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) 
(based on statute prior to 1981 amendment). 
Apportionment of liability. 
Where injured employee had one preexisting 
whole man impairment of 25%, and a second 
preexisting whole man impairment of 10%, the 
injury caused by the present industrial acci-
dent was equal to a whole man impairment of 
50%, and these impairments combined equaled 
a total physical impairment of 67%, this 67% 
total impairment figure was a combined par-
tial man figure, and in apportioning liability 
between the employer and the fund the whole 
man impairment ratings had to be reduced to 
their partial man equivalents; in this case, the 
combined preexisting whole man impairment 
ratings, 25% and 10%, had an equivalent of a 
33% partial man impairment, making the cor-
rect assessment of liability to the fund of 
^ ^ t h s or 49%, and the 50% whole man impair-
ment rating had an equivalent of a 34% partial 
man impairment, making the employer liable 
for ^Antlis or 51%. Jacobsen Constr v Hair, 
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983). 
In apportioning total disability award be-
tween employer and his insurer and the fund, 
the commission correctly held fund liable for 
the proportion that the preexisting impairment 
bore to the total combined impairment. Second 
Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet Shop, 
684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1983). 
An employer and its insurer should be al-
lowed to recover from the fund, for their pay-
ment of medical expenses and disability pay-
ments, an amount equal to the proportion of 
the employee's disability that is attributable to 
his preexisting impairments, even though no 
portion of the medical expenses or the time off 
from work that resulted in the disability award 
is caused by the employee's preexisting impair-
ments. Veyo Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 710 P.2d 172 (Utah 1985). 
All that is needed to bring about fund liabil-
ity for those portions of a worker's incapacity 
attributable to prior degenerative diseases and 
other preexisting conditions is a showing that 
the preexisting impairment and the industrial 
injury cumulatively result in a substantially 
greater degree of disability than there would 
have been without the preexisting impairment, 
and it is not necessary that a causal connection 
be shown between the preexisting impairment 
and the industrial injury. Hall v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 710 P 2d 175 <ITtah 1985). 
Definitions. 
Word "employer" is used in this section to 
encompass an employer in a situation where 
the employment status is localized in Utah. 
United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 (1946). 
Employee completely compensated. 
Employee was not entitled to additional com-
pensation from the second injury fund where 
he had been completely compensated for both 
his prior incapacities and impairments result-
ing from a prior industrial accident and for his 
current incapacities and impairments result-
ing from the present industrial accident. David 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 649 P.2d 82 (Utah 1982). 
Findings of commission 
The finding of the commission upon suffi-
cient evidence that the employee would be 
totally and permanently disabled will not be 
disturbed where he had previously lost vision 
in one eye and subsequently lost one-half vi-
sion in remaining eye, together with other in-
juries. Brown, Terry & Woodruff Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm n, 78 Utah 15, 300 P. 945 (1931). 
liability for benefits attributable to non-
physical unemployability factors. 
The fund should bear the cost of disability 
payments to the extent that the preexisting 
impairment, acting in combination with fac-
tors such as age, mental abilities and lack of 
rehabilitative prospects, contributed to the em-
ployee's total disability; thus, a proper assess-
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ment of responsibility for nonphysical factors 
should be determined by the proportion which 
the preexisting physical impairment bears to 
the additional physical impairment resulting 
from the instant industrial accident North-
west Carriers Inc v Industrial Comm n 639 
P2d 138 i t tah 1981) 
Medical panel determination. 
This section is explicit in its requirement 
that the commission ^hall appoint a medical 
panel to review all medical aspects of the case 
and to determine the percentage of impairment 
attributable to the various accidents United 
States Fid & Guar Co v Industrial Comm n, 
657 P2d 764 (Utah 1983) 
Where the commission without the assis-
tance of a medical panel determined that the 
total percentage of partial impairment was 
15r/r, 109c from the prior injurv and D°> from 
the combined subsequent injurv the 10rr dis-
ability measurement was correctly utilized bv 
the commission since it had been determined 
by a medical panel in a prior proceeding re-
garding the establishment of habihtv for the 
initial injury, however, the 5^ determination 
representing the effects of the subsequent in-
jury was made by a lone doctor and therefore 
did not satisfy the requirement of a medical 
panel determination United States Fid & 
Guar Co v Industrial Comm n, 657 P 2d 764 
(Utah 1983) 
Medical testimony. 
Where the ultimate question is not one of 
loss of bodily function but actual partial or 
total disability economically and industrially, 
as provided in this section, the loss of bodily 
function is only an aid to such ultimate ques-
tion and doctors should testify only as to such 
loss and not to the ultimate question of indus-
trial and economic disability, except where the 
doctor qualified, in addition to his medical 
knowledge, has sufficient knowledge of what 
physical or mental abilities a certain occupa-
tion or vocation calls for or where such testi-
mony is as to certain common industrial, eco-
nomic, or household functions such as climbing 
ladders, sweeping or digging, in which case the 
doctor may testify Silver King Coalition 
Mines Co v Industrial Comm n, 92 Utah 511, 
69 P2d 608 U937) 
No apportionment of insurer's liability. 
Where employee suffered aggravation of 
back injuries when involved in three separate 
accidents while working for two different em-
plovprs insured by three different insurance 
carriers, commission properly required last 
carrier to pay compensation for all permanent 
disability, medical expenses and temporary 
disability, in absence of statutory authority for 
apportionment Mountain States Steel Co v 
Industrial Comm n, 535 P 2d 1249 (Utah 
1975) 
Preexisting condition previously compen-
sated. 
To the extent that his preexisting condition 
was attributable to a prior railroad accident, 
for which claimant had been rated and com-
pensated in Arkansas, claimant was not enti-
tled to recover additional compensation from 
the fund order denving compensation from 
fund was s>et aside where there was no eviden-
tiary support in the record that the preexisting 
condition was entirely attributable to the pre-
viously compensated injury Paoh v 
Cottonwood Hosp 656 P 2d 420 (Utah 1982) 
Preexisting contributing condition. 
Industrial Commission s finding that claim-
ant was totaliv and permanently disabled was 
justified despite fact that claimant had previ-
ously existing heart and lung trouble which 
contributed to his present condition 
Halvorson Inc v Williams. 19 Utah 2d 113, 
426 P2d 1019 (1967) 
Although the claimant may have had a pre-
existing disability, the commission findings, 
which are based on reasonable evidence that 
the injury complained of is the sole cause of the 
disability for which the award is made, do not 
exceed its authority or indicate a capricious, 
arbitrary or unreasonable act Hafers, Inc v 
Industrial Comm n, 526 P 2d 1188 (Utah 
1974) 
Where preexisting condition required no 
treatment prior to accident, but increased the 
resultant disability by one-third, employer was 
obligated to pay only two-thirds of claimant's 
medical bills while the special fund would pay 
the remaining third, the fact that the preexist-
ing condition was quiescent prior to the injury 
did not render it "insubstantial" so as to make 
the employer liable for all costs incurred Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc v Ortega, 562 P 2d 
617 (Utah 1977) 
Where preexisting condition increased the 
disability resulting from an industrial injury, 
the employer was obligated only to pay the por-
tion of expense and disability attributable to 
the industrial injury and the fund was obli-
gated to pav the portion attributable to the 
preexisting condition Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc v Ortega, 562 P 2d 617 (Utah 1977), 
White v Industrial Comm n, 604 P 2d 478 
(Utah 1979) Intermountain Smelting Corp v 
Capitano 610 P 2d 334 (Utah 1980) 
Employer is responsible only for the percent-
age of compensation and medical care equal to 
the percentage of applicant's total disability at-
tributable to the industrial injury and the re-
mainder shall be paid out of the fund Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp v Capitano, 610 
P2d 334 (Utah 1980) 
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—Substantially greater incapacity follow 
ing industrial injury. 
When a worker's total incapacity following a 
second injury is "substantially greater" than it 
would have been but for the preexisting inca-
pacity, fund liability is imposed, and it is not 
necessary that the second injury itself causes 
"substantially greater" incapacity. Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 709 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1985) (decided under prior law). 
Under this section, preexisting impairments 
which are not aggravated by an industrial in-
jury are to be compensated for when the indus-
trial injury produces an impairment "substan-
tially greater" than it would have been absent 
the preexisting condition, regardless of any 
causal or functional relationship between the 
industrial injury and the preexisting condition. 
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). 
For determining the 10 and 20 percent 
threshold degrees of impairment, a whole-man 
(percentage impaired) basis is used, not a par-
tial-man (percentage unimpaired) basis. Sec-
ond Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). 
The degree of increased incapacity statutor 
ily required by the words "substantially 
greater" is satisfied if the contribution of the 
preexisting impairment to the total combined 
impairments is definite and measurable. It is 
enough if the two impairments cumulatively 
result in a greater degree of disability. Kerans 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985). 
To meet the "substantially greater" test of 
this section, a claimant need not prove a physi-
cal or causal relationship between the pre-ex-
isting incapacity and the industrial injury. 
Rather, it is sufficient if the claimant's inca-
pacity resulting from the industrial injury is 
"substantially greater than he would have in-
curred if he had not had the pre-existing inca-
pacity." Resulting incapacity is "substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity" if the re-
sulting incapacity from all causes combined is 
substantially greater than that resulting solely 
from the industrial injury. Rex E. Lantham Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 717 P.2d 255 (Utah 
1986). 
Presbycusis 
Loss of hearing associated with advanced 
age, presbycusis, is not compensable by the 
fund. Wayman v. Western Coal Carrier Corp , 
665 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1983). 
Prior injury in military service. 
The commission erred in denying
 c i a imant 
compensation from the fund for part of his 
prior disability resulting from injuries sus-
tained while he was in the military service for 
which the military continued to compensate 
him. Shepherd v. Diversa-Cvcle Prods., Inc.. 
725 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1986)." 
Purposes. 
This section had two purposes: first, to en-
courage the employment of handicapped 
workers by requiring the special fund to as-
sume responsibility should the employee re-
ceive industrial injuries rendering him totally 
disabled, and second, to establish a broader 
base of responsibility for preexisting condi-
tions. McPhie v. United States Steel Corp, 551 
P.2d 504 (Utah 1976). 
This section has several purposes; one of 
them is to make it easier for persons who have 
previous injuries or disabilities to obtain em-
ployment; another is that the objective just 
stated is served by conferring a benefit upon 
employers by minimizing the risks to them in 
hiring such persons. Intermountain Smelting 
Corp v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
Recovery from fund denied. 
Where law judge found that assessment of 
permanent incapacity in the medical evalua-
tion was merely a restatement of the disability 
rating given after a 1974 Nebraska accident 
from which plaintiff had satisfactorily recov-
ered, and was not an independent, impartial 
review of plaintiffs condition at the time, it 
was reasonable for law judge to conclude that 
plaintiff did not sustain permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater than he would 
have incurred if he had not had the preexisting 
incapacity; therefore, the fund had no applica-
tion. Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 656 
P.2d 440 (Utah 1982). 
Remainder paid out of fund. 
"Remainder" means whatever remains to be 
paid after the employer has discharged its lia-
bility, and where employee has in fact been 
rendered permanently and totally disabled, 
lifetime benefits would become the "remain-
der" and payable out of the fund. McPhie v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
Serial consideration of separate accidents. 
The commission must consider separate acci-
dents serially in order to determine the per-
centage of impairment attributable to each ac-
cident and the proportion the preexisting im-
pairment bears to the total combined impair-
ment. Richfield Care Center v. Torgerson, 733 
P.2d 178 (Utah 1987). 
Special Fund. 
Employer is liable for permanent total dis-
ability resulting from last of a series of inju-
ries, and no resort can be had to special fund 
(now Employers' Reinsurance Fund) under pro-
visions of § 35-1-68(1). Standard Coal Co v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 69 Utah 83, 252 P. 292 
(1926). 
Coal miner who lost sight in eye before 
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Workmen's Compensation Act was effective 
and who thereafter lost use of leg was entitled 
to compensation from special fund (now Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund) as provided by this 
section notwithstanding that first injury was 
incurred before act became effective. Marker v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 34 Utah 587, 37 P.2d 785, 
98 A.L.R. 722 «1934). 
This chapter does not evidence legislative in-
tent to require an employer whose employee is 
killed while temporarily engaged in employ-
ment in Utah, although hired and regularly 
employed elsewhere, to pay into the Special 
Fund (now Employers' Reinsurance Fund), pro-
vided by this section and $ 35-1-70, the 
amount provided by $ 35-1-68, if she leaves no 
dependents. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 
752 (1946). 
Strict application. 
Since Workmen's Compensation Act imposes 
liability upon employer regardless of fault, em-
ployer is entitled to rely on a strict application 
of the statute as to the extent of his responsi-
bility. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
Temporary disability benefits. 
Employer and its insurance carrier are re-
sponsible for paying all medical expenses and 
temporary disability benefits up until period of 
that disability ends; however, fund must reim-
burse carrier for that percentage of temporary 
disability expenses attributable to preexisting 
disability once determination of combined dis-
ability is made. American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative 
Survey — 1981. 1982 Utah L. Rev. 125, 212. 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 304. 
Key Numbers. 
e=> 867. 
Workers' Compensation 
35-1-70. Additional benefits in special cases. 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of 
this title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, 
and under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional bene-
fits, the industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such 
benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall 
not be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the 
special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 79; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3140, subsec. 7; L. 1921, ch. 67, $ 1; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-66. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Definitions. 
Duty to pay into fund. 
Definitions. 
Word "employer" is used in this section to 
encompass an employer in a situation where 
the employment status is localized in Utah. 
United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 (1946). 
Duty to pay into fund. 
This chapter does not evidence legislative in-
tent to require an employer whose employee is 
killed while temporarily engaged in employ-
ment in Utah, although hired and regularly 
employed elsewhere, to pay into the fund, pro-
vided by $ 35-1-69 and by this section, the 
amount provided by § 35-1-68, if she leaves no 
dependents. United Airlines Transp. Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 
752 (1946). 
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'oayment" near the beginning of Subsection 
•j"aMii); substituted "an amount" for "a 
.weekly amount" and "persons" for "person" in 
Subsection t2)ib)(ii); and deleted former Sub-
jection <2)<d> providing that if the total award 
to dependents did not exceed $30,000, the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier was to pay the 
difference between the award and $30,000 into 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
\pportionment of liability. 
— Prerequisite. 
[mpairment not meeting 10^ minimum. 
Zited. 
apportionment of liability. 
The purpose of this section is to apportion 
iability only where an industrial injury mea-
surably contributes to a permanent disability 
:aused in part by a pre-existing condition, not 
iimply to impose liability on the Employers 
leinsurance Fund any time a workers disabil-
ty is caused by a pre-existing condition. Virgin 
\ Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 'Utah Ct. 
Vpp. 1990). 
-Prerequisite. 
Entitlement to benefits is a prerequisite to 
onsideration of apportionment. Where the dis-
ability is the result of preexisting conditions 
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is 
not entitled to disability benefits. Large v. In-
dustrial Comm'n. 758 P 2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Impairment not meeting 10% minimum. 
Where claimant's industrially-caused 5% im-
pairment of the back did not meet the 10% 
threshold minimum requirement, he could not 
combine the permanent impairment resulting 
from separate industrial injuries with the 
same employer in order to reach the threshold 
necessary for compensation of preexisting con-
iitions. neither caused nor aggravated by any 
of the industrial injuries. Otvos v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 751 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in American Roofing Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 
1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
15-1-75. Average weekly wage • liasis of computation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
lourly employees. 
-Minimum hours. 
The fact that an employee voluntarily lim-
:ed his work hours to 13 per week did not 
lake it unfair to award him compensation 
enefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had 
itended to limit an hourly employee to the 
actual number of hours he or she worked per 
week in calculating the compensation rate, the 
Legislature would not have included a statu-
tory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection < l)(e). 
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
S5-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con 
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses, 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
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Rule 4o, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari) 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDI IRE k u l e '( i 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah, 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
Rule I certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties, 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in all respects with 
Rule 49. The case then will be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the 
petitioner shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party 
separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket 
number of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a respondent wishing to file 
a cross-petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certio-
rari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
which shall comply in all respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then 
be placed on the certiorari docket. Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve 
four copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all 
parties in the case of the date of the filing and of the certiorari docket number 
of the case. Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21 A cross-
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Definition of "Permanent Impairment" 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
American Medical Association 
Chapter 1 
Concepts 
of ImDairment 
Eval* uun 
1 i traduction 
T he AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment {the Guided provides a reference framework within which physicians may evalu-
ate and report medical impairment and within which 
lonmedical recipients of information about impairment 
nay understand and make appropriate use of the medi-
:al information they receive. 
The unique value of the Guides as tfte technical 
eference of choice for evaluation of medical impair-
nent, which goes well beyond its broad scope of cover-
ige (all body parts and systems), arises from the precise 
ipplication of fundamental medical and scientific 
oncepts; the systematic analysis that introduces each 
>f the clinical chapters; the detail of the medical evalua-
ion protocols; and the thorough state-of-the-art analy-
es that underlie the rating tables. In addition, a format 
3r reports is described in Chapter 2 and summarized 
t the beginning of each clinical chapter to provide 
traightforward and well-structured guidelines so that 
sports about the same individual from different observ 
rs are likely to be of comparable content and com-
leteness and may, therefore, be more easily analyzed 
ad compared 
As is true of any other technical process, knowing 
le "rules," which in the case of the Guides ait the 
)ecific procedures described in the clinical chapters, 
not enough. The user of the Guides, both physicians 
id nonphysicians alike, must understand the concepts 
rider which the "rules" have been developed and the 
tended approach for using them to achieve objective, 
accurate, fair, and reproducible evaluations of individu-
als with medical impairment. This chapter and Chapter 
2 will enable the user to become familiar with the 
techniques and approach to evaluation of impairment 
embodied in the Guides. 
I11! MU i < HLsic ie ra t ions 
Impairment-Disability-Handicap 
Various terms used in the Guides, such as "impairment," 
"disability" and "handicap," appear in laws, regulations 
and policies of diverse origin without prior coordina-
tion of the ways in which they are used. It is no wonder, 
then, that there is uncertainty, if not controversy, about 
their meaning. The definitions used in the Guides seek 
to remedy this confusion through detailed description 
and delineation of the domain in which each term is 
applied, for it is the characteristics of the domain that 
are important, not the word used .as the label Accord-
ingly even when the terminology of the Guides may 
differ from or appear to be in conflict with that of a 
particular law, regulation or administrative system, anal-
ysis of the context in accordance with the following 
discussion should reveal how the principles embodied 
in the Guides may be interpreted and applied within 
the provisions of a particular disability system 
The accurate and proper use of medical informa-
tion to assess impairment in connection with disability 
determinations depends on the recognition that, whereas 
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impairment is a medical matter; disability arises out 
of the interaction between impairment and external 
demands Consequently as used in the Guides, 
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's 
health status that is assessed by medical means- "dis-
ability" which is assessed by nonmedical means, 
means an alteration of an individual's capacity to meet 
personal, social, or occupational demands or to meet 
statutory or regulatory requirements Simply stated, 
"impairment" is what is wrong with the health of an 
individual, "disability" is the gap between what the 
individual can do and what the individual needs or 
wants to do 
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessar-
ily "disabled" Impairment gives rise to disability only 
when the medical condition limits the individual's capac-
ity to meet demands that pertain to nonmedical fields 
and activities x On the other hand, if the individual is 
able to meet a particular set of demands, the individual 
is not "disabled" with respect to those demands, even 
though a medical evaluation may reveal impairment 
The concept of "handicap" is related to, yet inde-
pendent of, both "impairment" and "disability" although 
it is sometimes used interchangeably with either of 
these terms Under the provisions of Federal law,2 an 
individual is identified as "handicapped" if that indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits one 
or more life activities, including work, has a record of 
such impairment, or is regarded as ha\mg such an 
impairment3 The terms of this definition are so indefi-
nite and broad that, technically; almost any person who 
desires to do so might be included in the class of the 
handicapped under the law 
As a matter of practicality; however, a "handicap" 
may be operationally understood as being manifest in 
association with a "barrier" or obstacle to functional 
activity An individual with limited functional capacity 
is handicapped if there are barriers to accomplishment 
of tasks or life activities that can be overcome only by 
compensating in some way for the effects of an impair-
ment Such compensation, or; more technically, 
"accommodation" normally entails the use of assistive 
devices (such as crutches, wheel chairs, hearing aids, 
optical magnifiers, prostheses, special tools or equip-
ment), modification of the environment, and/or modifi-
cation of tasks or activities (such as increased time for 
task completion, or special segmentation of tasks) Any 
1 The commonly used example of the impact of the loss of the fifth 
finger of the left hand illustrates the point If the individual is a bank 
president, the occupational impact is likely to be negligible On the other 
hand a concert pianist is likely to be totally disabled 
2 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
one these modalities, or all in combination, may be 
invoked to enable a handicapped person to overcome 
a barrier to an objective If the individual is not able 
to accomplish a task or activity despite accommodation 
or if there is no accommodauon that will enable the 
accomplishment, then, in addition to being handi-
capped, the individual is also disabled On the other 
hand, an impaired individual who is able to accomplish 
a task or activity without accommodation is with 
respect to that task or activity, neither handicapped 
nor disabled 
For these reasons, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance of examining the context in which the term* 
"impairment," "disability" or "handicap" appear to avoid 
being misled by imprecise usage For example, refer-
ence to a physician's evaluation of "disability" must be 
understood as a reference to a medical evaluation of an 
individual's health status, or, in the terms of the Guides, 
an evaluation of impairment The physician does not 
determine industrial loss of use or economic loss for the 
purpose of paying a disability benefit 
Employability-Management/ 
Administrative Considerations 
The concept of "employabihty" deserves special atten-
tion, for m an occupational setting, if an individual, 
within the boundaries of the medical condition, has the 
capacity with or without accommodation to meet the 
job demands and conditions of employment as defined 
by the employer, the individual is employable, and, 
consequendy not disabled As an operational matter, 
employabihtj) is critically related to an individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties for which the 
employer is willing to pay wages If the individual has 
those capacities, even in the presence of impairment, 
then the individual is not disabled for that job When 
these capacities are called into question, for whatever 
reason, the employer must carry out an "employabihty 
determination" 
As in determination of disability, there are both 
administrative and medical components to the employ 
ability determination, the process by which an employer 
initially assesses an individual's qualifications and suit 
ability for employment On the administrative side, 
management will specifically assess performance capa-
bility to estimate the likelihood of a performance failun 
3 The law does n3t make clear by whom the individual must be 
regarded" as being handicapped There are cases on record in which ar 
employer 'accommodated" the individual even though there was no 
clear evidence or record of medical impairment In these cases it was 
determined that the individual was protected as handicapped under the 
law because the employer, by offering accommodauon had regarded th 
individual as handicapped 
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as well as the likelihood of incurring a future liability m 
case of human failure If neither likelihood of failure is 
too great, then the individual is considered to be employ-
able in a particular job This represents a fundamental 
"go" or 'no go" determination that there is or is not a 
sufficient match between an individual and the job 
requirements to give further consideration to employ-
ment It is different from a "desirability" determination, 
which would rank and compare the individuals who 
are employable 
During the course of employment, there is 
on-going reassessment of an individual's employability 
through monitoring of performance, conduct, and atten-
dance Employment continues until the employee leaves 
voluntarily or until a change gives nse to a deficiency 
in performance, conduct, or attendance so that reten-
tion in the job can no longer be justified When an 
individual claims to be no longer employable, or disa-
bled, because of a change in health, or alleges that a 
medical condition has caused a service deficiency, the 
employer has little choice but to conduct an employ-
ability determination and to assess the individual's 
capacity to travel to and from work, to be at work and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties Disability, then, is 
the default result when it is determined that the indi-
vidual lacks employability 
Employability—Medical Considerations 
As noted above, an employable individual has the capac-
ity to travel to and from work, to be at work, and to 
perform assigned tasks and duties On the other hand, 
an individual who does not have the capacity, or who is 
unwilling, to travel to and from work, to be at work, and 
to perform assigned tasks and duties is not employable 
The issue of disability arises from the critical questions 
of whether or not the service deficiency can be explained 
by a medical condition and whether or not the medical 
condition precludes, or warrants restriction from, trav-
eling to and from work, being at work, or performing 
assigned tasks and duties The answer is found in a 
"medical determination related to employability" 
The first critical task in carrying out a medical 
determination related to employability is to learn about 
the job, specifically the expectations of the incumbent 
with respect to performance, physical activity, reliabil-
ity, availability, productivity, expected duration of use-
ful service life and any other criteria associated with 
qualification and suitability Sufficiently detailed infor-
mation from a job analysis will provide a basis upon 
which a physician determines exactly what lands of 
medical information are needed, and to what degree of 
detail, to assess an individual's health with respect to 
demand criteria Once the medical information needs 
are known, it is possible to develop a medical evalua-
tion protocol, a set of instructions for performance of a 
medical evaluation designed to acquire that information 
However, a special medical evaluation may not be 
necessary, foi; presumably, an individual who alleges 
disability would already be under the care of a personal 
physician, and if not, should be if the medical condition 
is interfering with life activities on or off the job And, 
since a claimant bears the initial burden of proof the 
place to start, then, is with review of medical informa-
tion already available m the form of medical office and 
hospital records Through this medium, the physician 
making the determination of employability may com-
municate with the personal physician to learn whatever 
is known about that individual's health so that, in accor-
dance with established medical diagnostic criteria and 
generally accepted medical principles and practice, the 
two physicians may come to agreement about what is 
and is not known medically about the patient and deter-
mine what other information is necessary to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty This is nothing more or 
less than physicians do in the course of cooperative 
management of their patients The practice of medicine 
is not an adversary process, and, consequendy, by 
relying on communications and decisionmaking proce-
dures ordinarily used by physicians, evaluations of 
impairment and medical determinations related to 
employability may be managed without confrontation 
between them With respect to employability, then, the 
medical questions to be answered are whether or not 
medical documentation supports a conclusion that the 
individual's medical condition precludes travel to and 
from work, being at work, or performing assigned tasks 
and duties,4 and, in the case of a service deficiency, 
whether or not the documentation provides reason to 
believe that the medical condition has either caused or 
contributed to the deficiency 
If review of the documentation does not show 
that the individual has met the required burden of 
proof, the employer or insurance company must decide 
whether or not acquisition of additional medical infor-
mation is likely to enable the individual to do so Oi; 
there may be a need to verify clinical findings con-
tamed in the documentation provided If so, the medi-
cal evaluation protocol will serve as a basis for a medi-
cal evaluation by any physician, foi; in general, two 
4 If the medical condition does not, for example preclude daily travel to 
and from a physical therapy clinic, then it would be unlikely for the 
medical condition to preclude travel to and from place of work Or, if an 
individual has not been restricted from shopping for and carrying gro-
ceries from doing chores around the house or from going to the movies 
then there is little defense for a conclusion that the medical condiuon 
would warrant restriction from a similar level of activities in the workplace 
physicians examining the same patient under the same 
protocol will have approximately the same set of 
findings Taken with the prior information, the results 
of this evaluation may be reviewed to reach conclu-
sions that can then be compared with the demand 
criteria for the job This can always be done with credi-
bility and confidence, since the specifications for the 
medical evaluation are based on the demand criteria to 
begin with 
When approached in this way, the medical input 
into the employabihty determination will be quite inde-
pendent of the individual's motivation to work, or lack 
of it Moreover, because this process provides medical 
justification for the decision, a dispute over conflicting 
opinions of physicians about nonmedical matters need 
never occur 
1.2 Structure and Use of the Guides 
Since any person has only one health status and only 
one life situation, given enough information about each, 
it is possible to understand the relationship and interac-
tion between them Moreover, because the evaluation 
of permanent impairment is not an isolated event but 
culminates the evolution of changes m health that result 
from injury or disease, the design of the Guides requires 
integration of already existing medical and nonmedical 
information with the results of a current cluneal evalua-
tion, earned out in accordance with the protocols of the 
Guides, to charactenze fully and assess medical impair-
ment Accomplishment of this objective is based on 
utilization of three powerful tools that make up the 
fundamental components of the Guides 
First, Chapter 2 details with great precision the 
kinds of information needed to document the nature of 
an impairment and its consequences, specifies proce-
dures for acquinng the information, and defines a struc-
tured format for analyzing, recording, and reporting 
the information A summary of these requirements and 
procedures appears at the beginning of each clinical 
chapter 
Second, the clinical chapters contain definitive 
medical evaluation protocols, descriptions of specific 
procedures for evaluating a particular body part, func-
tion, or system, each developed by recognized medical 
specialty consultants These protocols are defined in 
specific detail to ensure the acquisition of sufficient 
information to desenbe fully and charactenze the cur-
rent clinical status of a medical impairment 
Third, the clinical chapters contain reference 
tables specifically keyed to the evaluation protocols If 
the protocols and tables have been followed, the clini-
cal findings may be compared directly to the cntena 
and related to a percentage of impairment with 
confidence in the validity and acceptability of the 
determination 
Operationally the key to effective and reliable 
evaluation of impairment is initially a review of clinical 
medical office and hospital records maintained by the 
physicians who have provided care and treatment smce 
the onset of the medical condition Such records com-
pnse clinical notes of office visits, medical specialty 
consultation reports, hospital admission and discharge 
summanes, operative notes, pathology reports, labora-
tory test reports and the results of special tests and 
diagnostic procedures Before formal evaluation is ear-
ned out under the Guides, analysis of the history and 
course of the medical condition, beginning with the 
circumstances of onset, and including findings on pre-
vious examinations, the course of treatment, responses 
to treatment, and the impact of the medical condition 
on life activities, must support a conclusion that an 
impairment is permanent and well stabilized 
This lnfomiation gathenng and analysis serves as 
the foundation upon which the evaluation of a perma-
nent impairment is earned out It is most important that 
the evaluator obtain all clinical information necessary 
to characterize fully the medical condition in accor-
dance with requirements of the Guides', an incomplete 
or partial evaluation is not acceptable Once this task is 
accomplished, the clinical findings may be compared 
to the clinical lniormation already contained in the 
records about the individual If the current findings 
are found to be consistent with the results of previous 
clinical evaluations performed by other observers, then, 
with complete confidence, they may be compared, as 
appropnate or required, with the reference tables to 
determine the percentage rating of the impairment 
However, if the findings are not m substantial accor-
dance with the information of record, then, until fur-
ther clinical evaluation resolves the dispanties, the 
rating step is meaningless and cannot be earned out 
This approach takes advantage of the fact that 
physicians normally communicate cooperatively with 
each other orally and in wnting to determine what they 
do and do not know about a patient, and to determine 
further what additional information they need to resolve 
areas of medical uncertainty It does not make sense, 
therefore, to manage cases in which there are diffenng 
"opinions" among physicians about the nature and 
degree of medical impairment by asking a nonmedical 
third party to adj udicate an issue of medical fact' Such 
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differences are best handled through the ordinary pro-
cess of everyday patient management Then, with refer-
ence to the past medical documentation, the medical 
evaluation protocols contained in the clinical chapters 
and the reporting specifications of Chapter 2, the physi-
cian and nonphysician users of the Guides may venfy 
that sufficient medical information has been assembled 
and reported to permit an assessment of an impairment, 
to justify any conclusions that are drawn, and to sup-
port a rating in accordance with the tables At that 
point, it is a straightforward matter to venfy whether or 
not a numencal rating of impairment is substantiated 
in accordance with the cntena contained in the Guides 
1.3 Medical Impairment and 
Workers' Compensation 
In general, state and Federal workers' compensation 
laws are based on the concept that a worker who either 
sustains an injury or incurs an illness ansing in the 
course of and out of employment is entitled to protec-
tion against financial loss without being required to 
sue the employer In exchange for their having lost the 
nght to sue, the workers' compensation system guaran-
tees benefits to all workers who are covered under the 
law and who meet the cntena for award of benefits 
The types of payments that may be made when a 
claim is approved fall into three categones 
• payments to the claimant to compensate for lost wages 
due to temporary total disability, 
• payment of medical bills, and 
• payment to the claimant of an award for permanent 
disability, partial or total 
Up to this point, we have looked at disability as 
being related to functional capability or the lack of it 
However, in the arena of disability benefits, disability, 
whether temporary or permanent, partial or total, is 
equivalent to economic loss for which the individual is 
to be compensated monetarily 
Payments are made for temporary total disability 
when the individual is unable to earn wages, return to 
work is expeaed, and the medical condition has not 
stabilized5 Temporary disability is partial when the indi-
vidual returns to work but is not earning at the pnor 
level 
5 In accordance with the earlier discussion temporary total disability" 
occurs when the medical condition precludes the individual from travel-
ing to and from work, being at work and performing assigned tasks and 
duties 
A permanent disability award is normally inde-
pendent of the individual's capacity to work and is 
formulated in terms of expeaed or presumed long-term 
or permanent economic loss associated with a perma-
nent medical impairment, such as an amputation Such 
an award may be paid according to a schedule that 
specifically associates impairment with certain body 
parts, functions, or systems, examples are amputations, 
loss of sight, and loss of heanng, and a schedule is 
defined in the workers' compensation law to equate the 
disability with a maximum number of weeks for which 
benefits are to be paid at a rate based on average 
weekly wages 
Rating of partial disability is necessary when a 
law, in recognition that the "loss of" or "loss of use of" 
the body part, function, or system may be less than 
total, requires determination of the proportion or per-
centage of loss For example, in Maryland, the law says 
In all cases where there has been an amputation 
of a part of any member of the body herem speci-
fied, or the loss of use of (emphasis added) any 
part thereof the Commission shall allow com-
pensation for such proportion of the total num-
ber of weeks allowed for the amputation or loss 
of use of the entire member as the afifeaed or 
amputated portion bears to the whole6 
Moreover, because not all conditions that can arise 
out of an injury are accounted for m a schedule, back 
injunes, for example, there is likely to be a provision of 
the law similar to the following 
In all other cases of disability other than those 
specifically enumerated disabilities7 which dis-
ability is partial in charaaer, but permanent in 
quality, the Commission shall determine the por-
tion or percentage by which the industrial use of 
the employee's body was impaired as a result of 
the injury and in determining such portion or 
percentage of impairment8 resulting in industnal 
loss, the Commission shall take into consider-
ation, among other things, the nature of the 
physical injury, the occupation, expenence, 
training, and age of the injured employee, and 
shall award compensation in such proportion 
as the determined loss bears to 500 weeks 9 
(emphasis added) 
6 Workmen s Compensation Law of Maryland Annotated 1983 Art 
101 §36(3) 
7 Note the context with which "disability" and "disabilies" are used 
Clearly the terms should be read as 'impairment" and 'impairments' 
8 Should this read 'disability"? 
9 IbtdAn 101 36(4)(a) 
While medical infonnation is necessary for the decision 
process, a critical problem arises in the use of that 
information. Neither in this example nor in general is 
there a formula under which knowledge of the medical 
condition may be combined with knowledge of the 
other factors to calculate the percentage by which 
the industrial use of the employee's body is impaired. 
Accordingly each commissioner or hearing official must 
come to a conclusion based on his or her own assess-
ment of the available medical and nonmedical 
information. 
It is evident that the Guides does not offer a 
solution for this problem, nor is it the intention that it 
do so. Each administrative or legal system that uses 
permanent impairment as a basis for disability rating 
needs to define its own process for translating knowl-
edge of a medical condition into an estimate of the 
degree to which the individual's capacity to meet per-
sonal, social, or occupational demands, or to meet stat-
utory or regulatory requirements, is limited by the 
impairment. We encourage each system not to make 
a "one-to-one" translation of impairment to disability, 
in essence creating a use of the Guides which is not 
intended. 
Chapter 2 will emphasize that it is essential for 
the physician to provide the recipient of the medical 
information with more than a number that represents a 
percentage of impairment To the extent that the physi-
cian provides a comprehensive medical picture in the 
form of a report formulated in accordance with (Figure 
1), the user of the information will be able to determine 
how the medical information fits with all the other 
nonmedical information, thereby to reach a true under-
standing of the impact of the medical impairment on 
the claimant's future employability. 
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GARY E. CROSLAND, * 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STUART L. POELMAN 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE * Court of Appeals 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH; * No. 910291CA 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY; * 
and SMITH ADMINISTRATORS, * 
Defendants/Petitioners. * 
Comes now the affiant, Stuart L. Poelman, being first duly sworn and deposes as 
follows: 
1. That he is an attorney practicing law in the State of Utah and specializing 
in workers' compensation cases. 
2. That in 1988 and in years prior thereto he was a member of the Industrial 
Commission's Advisory Council and actively participated in the consideration of legislative 
changes to be proposed by said Council. 
* Applicant/Respondent, 
3. That in 1987 and 1988, management and labor factions serving on the 
Advisory Council were unable to agree on legislation regarding the Second Injury Fund. 
As a result, an ad hoc committee was formed by certain members of the Council, including 
the affiant, as well as attorneys practicing workers' compensation law and industry 
representatives. This committee proposed, drafted, sponsored and lobbied through passage 
by the legislature House Bill No. 218, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. The main problem which House Bill No. 218 addressed was maintenance of 
the fiscal integrity of the Second Injury Fund which bore the responsibility for the 
payment of certain benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Of concern was 
the fact that the Second Injury Fund was predicted by consulting actuaries to become 
insolvent unless remedial measures were taken. 
5. The intended purpose of House Bill No. 218 was to enhance the funding of 
the Second Injury Fund through an employer's premium tax increase and to reduce the 
liability of the Second Injury Fund for workers' compensation benefits. The bill eliminated 
benefits which were then being paid to injured employees for permanent partial disability 
compensation resulting from permanent partial impairment caused by preexisting 
conditions. The bill also served to reduce certain reimbursements made to employers by 
the Second Injury Fund. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the Second Injury 
Fund had been held liable for permanent partial impairment which had been caused by 
preexisting conditions. It was the intent of House Bill No. 218 to eliminate that liability. 
6. Prior to the passage of House Bill No. 218, the employer responsible for a 
particular industrial accident was shielded from liability for that portion of permanent 
partial impairment caused by preexisting conditions. It was never the intent of House Bill 
-2-
No. 218 to transfer the liability for impairment caused by preexisting conditions from the 
Second Injury Fund to the employer. Rather, it was the intent of said legislation to 
eliminate permanent partial disability benefits payable to the injured employee to the 
extent that permanent partial disability compensation related to permanent partial 
impairment resulting from preexisting conditions. 
7. It was never the intent of House Bill 218 to make an employer liable for 
compensation relating to asymptomatic preexisting conditions. All preexisting conditions 
related to asymptomatic or symptomatic preexisting permanent partial impairment were 
to go uncompensated. 
DATED this \<t 
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(g) Nephi, Juab County; 
(h) Fillmore, Millard County; 
(i) Beaver, Beaver County; 
(j) Manti, Sanpete County; 
(k) Junction, Piute County; 
(1) Loa, Wayne County; 
(m) Panguitch, Garfield County; 
(n) Kanab, Kane County; 
(o) Castle Dale, Emery County; and 
(p) Monticello, San Juan County. 
KM (3) Existing courtrooms and auxiliary space 
in secondary locations shall be made available to the 
circuit court by counties on a shared basis with the 
district court and juvenile court. 
Section 8. Sections Repealed. 
Section 78-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 21, Laws of Utah 1982, 
Section 78-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapter 21, Laws of Utah 1982, Section 
78-3a-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapter 11, Laws of Utah 1986, Second 
Special Session, Section 78-3a-5, Utah Code Anno* 
tated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 47, Laws of 
Utah 1986, and Section 78-4-10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 47, Laws of 
Utah 1986, are repealed. 
CHAPTER 116 
BLB.No.218 
Passed February 24,1988 
Approved March 14,1988 
Effective July 1,1988 
SECOND INJURY FUND ELIGIBILITY 
AMENDMENTS 
By Franklin W. Knowlton 
AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS'COMPEN-
SATION; CHANGING THE NAME OF THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND; CLARIFYING 
THAT PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY 
COMPENSATION ENTITLEMENTS ARE 
BASED ON PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT 
CAUSED BY AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT; 
ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS ON PERMANENT TOTAL DISABIL-
ITY CLAIMS AND PROVIDING AN OFFSET 
BASED ON CERTAIN OTHER INCOME; 
MODIFYING PROVISIONS REGARDING 
AWARDS FROM THE SECOND INJURY 
FUND; MODIFYING PROVISIONS RE-
GARDING THE CONTINUING JURISDIC-
TION OF THE COMMISSION AS IT RE-
LATES TO STATUTES OF LIMITATION; 
CLARIFYING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION'S AUTHORITY TO CONTROL MEDI-
CAL CARE OF INJURED EMPLOYEES; 
AMENDING THE PREMIUM TAX IN SUP-
PORT OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND; 
PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD 
FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL ASPECTS OF 
ACCIDENTS; AMENDING STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS; MAKING TECHNICAL COR-
RECTIONS; AND PROVIDING AN EFFEC-
TTVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
35-1-45, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1984 
35-1-65.1, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 287, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1981 
35-1-66, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 357, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
35-1-68, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 126, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
35-1-77, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 41, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1982 
35-1-78, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 287, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1981 
35-1-99, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1986 
35-2-56, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 161, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987 
59-9-101, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 12, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1987, FIRST SPECIAL SES-
SION 
REPEALS AND REENACTS: 
35-1-67, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 160, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1985 
35-1-69, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 79, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1984 
REPEALS: 
35-1-100, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
287, LAWS OF UTAH 1981 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1984, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial acci-
dents to be paid. 
[Every] Each employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured!;] and the dependents of 
[every! each such employee who is killed, by acci-
dent arising out of [OF] and in the course of his em-
ployment, wherever suchlnjury occurred, if the ac-
cident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in 
case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as 
provided in this chapter. The responsibility for com-
pensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral ex-
penses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
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employer and its insurance earner and not on the 
employee. 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-65.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 287, Laws of Utah 1981, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-46.1. Temporary partial disability — 
Amount of payments. 
[Where] (1) If the injury causes temporary partial 
disability for work, the employee shall receive(rd«r-
ing ouch dioability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a 
period of not to exceed eight years from the date of 
the injury,] weekly compensation equal to: 
(a) 66-2/3% of the difference between [that] the 
employee's average weekly wages before the acci-
dent and the weekly wages [that] the employee is 
able to earn (thereafter j after the accident, but not 
more than [a maximum-efl 100% of the state aver-
age weekly wage at the time of injury [per week and 
in addition thereto); plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each de-
pendent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but only 
up to a total weekly compensation that does not (tej 
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury [per week]. 
(2) The commission may make an award for tem-
porary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from 
fatten] the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for [aueh purpose 
prior to the expiration of aueh eight year period] 
hearing under Section 35-1-99. 
[In no ease shall the weekly payments continue 
after the disability ends or the death of the injured 
employee.] 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not ex-
ceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years 
after the date of the injury. Payments shall termi-
nate when the disability ends or the injured em-
ployee dies. 
Section 3, Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 357, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-46. Permanent partial disability — 
Scale of payments. 
[The commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight years of 
ter the date of injury to an employee whose physical 
condition resulting from aueh injury io not finally 
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury] 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
ment as a result of an industrial accident and who 
files an application for [such purpose prior to the ex • 
piration of aueh eight year period] hearing under 
Section 35-1-99 may receive a permanent partial 
disability award from the commission. 
[In no caoc ohnil the weekly] Weekly payments 
may not in any case continue after the disability 
ends, or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensa-
tion shall be 66-2/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 66—2/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years,, up to a maximum of four 
such dependent children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number of 
weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and 
shall be in addition to the compensation provided for 
temporary total disability and temporary partial 
disability, to wit: 
For the loss of:: Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(l)Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder 
(forequarter amputation) 218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, 
or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and 
elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint 
distal to insertion of 
biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or 
midmetacarpal amputation . . . . 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at 
metacarpophalangeal joints . . . 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint 
or with resection of 
carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint 
or with resection of 
metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal 
interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint 
or with resection of 
metacarpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal 
joint or with resection 
of metacarpal bone 17 
(b) At proximal 
interphalangeal joint 13 
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(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal 
joint or with resection 
of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal 
interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(l)Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy 
(leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or 
three inches or less below 
tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional 
stump, at knee joint or 
Gritti-Stokes amputation or 
below knee with short stump 
(three inches or less below 
intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with 
functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation 
(Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation . 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of 
metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal 
joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint . . . 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of 
metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint. 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal 
joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal 
joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing .. 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be 
deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial 
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the 
complete loss or loss of use of the member. This para-
graph, however, shall not apply to the items listed 
(B)(4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall 
be determined and paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hear-
ing loss measured in decibels with frequencies of 
500,1000,2000, and 3000 cycles per second (cps) us-
ing pure tone air conduction audiometric instru-
ments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recog-
nized authorities in the field of measurement of 
hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in 
frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall not 
be considered in determining compensable disabil-
ity. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 2000, 
and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usu-
ally no hearing impairment exists. 
[^P^e^byc^ai8,, is defined as hearing lose common 
to persona of advanced age and is considered to be 
due to general environment rather than industrial 
conditions.) 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of 
medical and paramedical professionals appointed 
by the commission shall measure the loss in each 
ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 
3000 cycles per second which shall be added to-
gether and divided by four to determine the average 
decibel loss, lb determine the percentage of hearing 
loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for each 
decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multi-
plied by 1-1/2% up to the maximum of 100% which is 
reached at 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiply-
ing the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear 
by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss 
in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The resulting 
figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. 
Compensation for permanent partial disability for 
binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multi-
plying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 
100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in 
this chapter. Where an employee files one or more 
claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing 
loss previously found to exist shall be deducted from 
any subsequent award by the commission. In no 
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total 
or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks 
of compensation benefits. 
[For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily 
function not otherwise provided for herein, such pc 
nod of compensation as the commission shall deem 
equitable and in proportion no near ao may be to 
compensation for specific looo as act forth in the 
schedule in this section but not exceeding in any 
case 312 weeks, which shall be considered the pe 
nod of compensation for permanent total looo of bod 
ily function.] 
For any permanent impairment caused by an in-
dustrial accident that is not otherwise provided for 
in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent 
partial disability compensation shall be awarded by 
the commission baaed on the medical evidence. 
Compensation for any such impairment shall, as 
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific 
losses in the schedule set forth in this section. Per-
manent partial disability compensation may not in 
any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be consid-
ered the period of compensation for permanent total 
loss of bodily function. Permanent partial disability 
compensation may not be paid for any permanent 
impairment that existed prior to an industrial acci-
dent. 
The amounts specified in this section are all sub-
ject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and in 
no event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
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jury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be re-
quired to be paid. 
Section 4. Section Repealed and Reenacted. 
Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 160, Laws of Utah 1985, is 
repealed and reenacted to read: 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability— 
Amount of payments, 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused 
by an industrial accident, the employee 3hall re-
ceive compensation as outlined in this section. Per-
manent total disability for purposes of this chapter 
requires a finding by the commission of total disabil-
ity, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Ad-
ministration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt 
rules that conform to the substance of the sequen-
tial decision-making process of the Social Security 
Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 
404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as re-
vised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation 
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensa-
tion shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as fol-
lows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury^ 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than 
the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the 
age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such de-
pendent minor children, but not exceeding the 
maximum established in Subsection i a) nor exceed-
ing the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum 
weekly compensation rate under Subsection lb) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly 
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable 
for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disabTF 
ity compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may 
not be required to pay compensation for any combi-
nation of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this 
section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 
35-1-66, in excess of the amount of compensation 
payable over 312 weeks at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate under Sub-
section (2). Any overpayment of this compensation 
shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance 
carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation 
from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensa-
tion at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total dis-
ability compensation. Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund payments shall commence immediately after 
the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied 
its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in 
Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to 
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 
50% of the Social Security retirement benefits re-
ceived by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent to-
tal disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until all of the following proceedings have oc-
curred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an em-
ployee is permanently and totally disabled, the com-
mission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the par-
ties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilita-
tion agency under the State Board of Education for 
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order 
that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Rein-
surance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 
(1), for use in the rehabilitation and training of the 
employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under 
the State Board of Education certifies to the com-
mission in writing that the employee has fully coop-
erated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate 
the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the 
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commis-
sion shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing 
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evi-
dence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may 
waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of 
the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is 
not possible, the commission shall order that the 
employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. The period of benefits com-
mences on the date the employee became perma-
nently totally disabled, as determined by the com-
mi88ion based on the facts and evidence, and ends 
with the death of the employee or when the em-
ployee is capable of returning to regular, steady 
work. In any case where an employee has been re-
habilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possi-
ble, but where the employee has some loss of bodily 
function, the awarcfshall be for permanent partial 
disability. An employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion, unless the employee fully cooperates with any 
rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the 
use of both hands, bolii arms, both feet, both legs', 
both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members, constitutes total and permanent disabil-
ity, to be compensated according to this section. No 
tentative finding of permanent total disability is re-
quired in any such instance. 
Section 5. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
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36-1-68. Employers1 Reinsurance Fund— 
Injury causing death — Burial expenses — 
Payments to dependents. 
(1) There is created [a Second Injury Fund] an 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of 
making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 
and 2, Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all monies 
[heretofore] previously held in [that fund dcoig 
natedas] the "Special Fund," [er] the "Combined In-
jury Fund," [and whenever reference is made cloc 
where in] or the "Second Injury Fund." Whenever 
this code refers to the "Special Fund," [er] the "Com-
bined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" 
that reference [shall be deemed] is considered to be 
[to] the [Second Injury Fund] Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custo-
dian of the (Second Injury Fund] Employers' Rein-
surance Fund, and the commission shall direct its 
distribution. Reasonable administration assistance 
may be paid from the proceeds of [that] the fund. 
The attorney general shall appoint a member of his 
staff to represent the [Second Injury Fund] Employ-
ers' Reinsurance Fund in all proceedings brought to 
enforce claims against it. 
(2) If injury causes death within [the] a period of 
six years from the date of the accident, the employer 
or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of 
the deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and 
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons 
as follows: 
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment by the employer 
or its insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the dece-
dent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state av-
erage weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse [and], plus $5 for each de-
pendent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to 
a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not [to exceed] exceeding the average weekly 
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, [but] 
and not [to execcd] exceeding 85% of the state aver-
age weekly wage at the time of the injury per week!; 
to]. Compensation shall continue during depend-
ency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of the death and [net te exceed] the expiration 
of six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent per-
sons during dependency following the expiration of 
the first six-year period described in Subsection (2) 
(a) (i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly bene-
fits paid to those wholly dependent persons during 
that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any 
weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid 
to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to 
review by the commission at the end of the initial 
six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any 
such review it is determined that, under the facts 
and circumstances existing at that time, the appli-
cant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the ap-
plicant may be considered a partly dependent or 
nondependent person and shall be paid such bene-
fits as the commission may determine under Sub-
section (2) (b) (ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determina-
tion, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee 
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly depend-
ent for a six-year period from the date of death of the 
employee. This presumption shall not apply after 
the initial six-year period and, in determining the 
then existing annual income of the surviving 
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any 
federal Social Security death benefits received by 
that surviving spouse. 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the 
time of the death, the payment shall be 66-2/3% of 
the decedent's average weekly [wages] wage at the 
time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per weekfr-fce]. Compensation shall continue 
during dependency for the remainder of the period 
between the date of death and [not to execcd] the ex-
piration of six years or 312 weeks after the date of 
injury as the commission in each case may deter-
mine [and shall]. Compensation may not amount to 
more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits pro-
vided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with 
the circumstances and conditions of dependency ex-
isting at the date of injury, and any amount awarded 
by the commission under this subsection [must] 
shall be consistent with the general provisions of 
this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly 
dependent under Subsection (2) (a) (iii) shall be de-
termined by the commission in keeping with the cir-
cumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the time of the dependency review and may be 
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maxi-
mum weekly rate that partly dependent person 
would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to 
such persons during their dependency by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also 
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the 
commission may apportion the benefits as it 
[deems] considers just and equitable; provided, that 
the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned 
[shell] do not exceed the maximum provided for by 
law. 
(d) If there are wholly or partly dependent per-
sons at the time of death and the total amount of the 
awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier 
to said dependents, prior to the termination of de-
pendency, including any remarriage settlement, 
does not exceed $30,000, the employer or its insur-
ance carrier shall pay the difference between the 
amount paid and $30,000 into the [Second Injury 
F*»d] Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for 
in Subsection (1). 
Section 6. Section Repealed and Reenacted. 
Section 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 79, Laws of Utah 1984, is 
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repealed and reenacted to read. 
35-1-69. Payments from Employers— 
Reinsurance Fund. 
(1) If an employee who has at least a 10% whole 
person permanent impairment from any cause or 
origin, subsequently incurs an additional impair-
ment by an accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee s employment, and if the additional 
impairment results in permanent total disability, 
the employer or its insurance carrier and the Em-
ployers Reinsurance Fund are liable for the pay-
ment of benefits as follows-
(2) The employer or its insurance earner is liable 
for the first $20,000 of medical benefits and the in-
itial three years of permanent total disability com-
pensation as provided in this title. 
(3) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the 
first $20,000 shall be paid in the first instance by the 
employer or its insurance earner. Then, as provided 
in Subsection (6), the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
shall reimburse the employer or its insurance ear-
ner for 50% of those expenses. 
(4) After the initial three-year penod under Sub-
section (1), permanent total disability compensa-
tion payable to an employee under this title becomes 
the liability of and shall be paid by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If it is determined that the employee is perma-
nently and totally disabled, the employer or its in-
surance earner shall be given credit for all pnor 
payments of temporary total, temporary partial, 
and permanent partial disability compensation 
made as a result of the industnal accident. Any 
overpayment by the employer or its insurance ear-
ner shall be reimbursed by the Employers Reinsur-
ance Fund under Subsection (6). 
(6) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the 
employer or its insurance earner for the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and 
compensation paid to or on behalf of an employee. A 
request for Employers Reinsurance Fund reim-
bursements shall be accompanied by satisfactory 
evidence of payment of the medical or disability 
compensation for which the reimbursement is re-
quested. Each request is subject to review as to rea-
sonableness by the commission. The commission 
may determine the manner of reimbursement. 
(7) If, at the time an employee is determined to be 
permanently and totally disabled, the employee has 
other actionable workers' compensation claims, the 
employer or insurance earner that is liable for the 
last industnal accident resulting in permanent to-
tal disability shall be Liable for the benefits payable 
by the employer as provided in this section. The em-
ployee's entitlement to benefits for pnor actionable 
claims shall then be determined separately on the 
facts of those claims Any previous permanent par-
tial disability arising out of those claims 3hall then 
be considered to be impairments that give nse to 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liability under this 
section. 
Section 7. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as 
last amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1982, is 
amended to read: 
3S-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director 
or medical consultants — Discretionary 
authority of commission to refer case — 
Findings and reports — Objections to re-
port — Hearing — Expenses. 
(l)(a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, ansing out of or 
in the course of employment, and [where] if the em-
ployer or its insurance earner denies liability, the 
commission may refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the commis-
sion (and having]. The panel shall have the qualifi-
cations generally applicable to the medical panel 
[oet forth-ta] under Section 35-2-56 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an im-
partial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of 
a controverted case, the commission in its sole dis-
cretion may employ a medical director or medical 
consultants on a full-time or part-time basis for the 
purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and ad-
vising the commission with respect to its ultimate 
fact-finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the 
use of a medical director or medical consultants, 
they shall be allowed to function in the same man-
ner and under the same procedures as required of a 
medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall [thea] make such study 
take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations [where] if authonzed 
by the commission, as it may determine [and there-
after] to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medi-
cal consultants shall make a report in wnting to the 
commission in a form presenbed by the commission, 
and also make such additional findings as the com-
mission may require. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distnbute full 
copies of the report [of the panel] to the applicant, 
the employer, and [the] its insurance earner by reg-
istered mail with return receipt requested. Within 
[fifteen] 15 days after [sweh] the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the 
employer, or [the] its insurance earner may file with 
the commission wntten objections [in wnting 
thereto] to the report. If no wntten objections are 
[so] filed within [sueh] that penod, the report [shaM 
be deemed] is considered admitted in evidence (ami 
the]. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and deci-
sion on the report of the panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants, but [shall] is not [be] bound by 
[9«eh] the report if [there is] other substantial con-
flicting evidence in the case [wh*eh] supports a con-
trary finding [by the commission]. 
(e) If objections to [sraeh] the report are filed, the 
commission may set the case for hearing to deter-
mine the facts and issues involved[,andatouch] At 
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the hearing, any party so desiring may request the 
commission to have the chairman of the medical 
panel, the medical director or the medical consult-
ants present at the hearing for examination and 
cross-examination For good cause shown, the com-
mission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or 
medical consultants, to be present at the hearing for 
examination and cross-examination [Upon ouch 
hearing the] 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical direc-
tor, or medical consultants may be received as an ex-
hibit at the hearing, but [shell] may not be consid-
ered as evidence m the case except as far as it is sus-
tained by the testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of [sueh] the study and report 
[by] of the medical panel, medical director, or medi-
cal consultants and the expenses of their appear-
ance before the commission shall be paid out of the 
[fund provided for by section 35 1 68] Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
Section 8. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-78, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 287, Laws of Utah 1981, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commis-
sion to modify award — Authority to de-
stroy records — Interest on award — No 
authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing!, and it]. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from 
tune to time [make ouch modification] modify or 
change [with respect to] its former findingsfror] and 
orders [with respect thereto, as in lto opinion may be 
justified, provided, however, that records]. Records 
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inac-
tive for ten years, other than [these] cases of total 
permanent disability or [where] cases in which a 
claim has been filed as m Section 35-l-99(rwfeieh 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 
years], may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shalT include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would 
have otherwise become due and payable. 
m 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as 
odifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chap-
ter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Dis-
ability Compensation Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the 
statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (a) in 
any respect 
Section 9. Section Amended. 
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-89. Notice of injury and claim for com-
pensation — Limitations of action. 
[When] (1) If an employee claiming to have suf-
fered an [injuryj industrial accident in the service of 
his employer fails to give written notice within 180 
calendar days to his employer or the commission of 
the time and place where the accident and injury oc-
curred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, 
[within 48 hours, when possible, or fails to report for 
medical treatment within that time, the compensa-
tion provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; pro-
vided, that knowledge of the injury obtained from 
any source on the part of the employer, his manag 
ing agent, superintendent, foreman, or other person 
in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the in 
jured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the cm 
ploycr to make an investigation into the facto and to 
provide medical treatment is equivalent to this no 
ticc; and no defect or inaccuracy in the notice oub 
jceta the claimant to this reduction, if there was no 
intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in 
making his defense, and the employer was not, in 
fact, so misled or prejudiced If no notice of the aeei 
dent and injury is given to the employer within one 
year after the date of the accident, the right to com 
pensataon is wholly barred. Ifnoelaimforcompcn 
aation is filed with the Industrial Commisoior* 
within three years after the date of the accident or 
the date of the last payment of compensation, the 
right to compensation is wholly barred. However, 
the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury 
with the Industrial Commission, the employer, or 
lto insurance earner, together with the payment of 
any compensation benefit or the furnishing of medi-
cal treatment by the employer or an insurance ear-
ner, tolls the period for filing the claim until the cm 
player or its earner notifies the employee, in writ 
ing, of lto denial of liability or further liability for the 
industnal accident or injury, with instructions upon 
the notification of denial to the employee to contact 
the Industnal Commission for further advice or as 
oistance to preserve or protect the employees 
nghto. The claim for compensation in any event 
shall be filed within 8 years after the date of the aeei 
dent-) the employee's claim for benefits under this 
chapteFia wholly barred. If, for any reason, an em-
ployee is himself unable to provide this written no-
tice, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may file 
it within the required 180-day penod. Receipt of 
written notice is presumed if the employer complies 
with the terms of Section 35-1-97 by filing with the 
commission an accident report, or if the employer of 
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical 
benefits to or on behalf of the injured employee. 
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an 
employee's medical benefit entitlement, except with 
respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee 
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insur-
ance earner for payment, for a penod of three con-
secutive years, medical expenses reasonably re-
lated to the industrial accident "* 
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, 
unless an application for hearing is filed with the In-
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dustrial Commission within six years after the date 
of the accident. 
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, 
unless an application for hearing is filed within one 
year of the date of death of the employee. 
Section 10. Section Amended. 
Section 35-2-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
35-2-66. Partial permanent disability from 
occupational disease or industrial injury 
— Imposition of liability — Determination 
of disability — Medical panel — Rehabili-
tation — Benefits. 
(1) There is imposed upon the employer a liability 
for the payment of benefits, as hereinafter provided, 
to every employee who becomes partially and per-
manently disabled and such disability is primarily 
caused or contributed to by a disease or injury to 
health arising out of or in the course of employment, 
subject, however, to the following conditions: 
(a) No compensation shall be paid when the last 
day of injurious exposure of the employee to the haz-
ards of the occupational disease shall have occurred 
prior to July 1, 1941. 
(b) No compensation shall be paid unless such 
partial disability results within two years prior to 
the day upon which claim for such compensation 
was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
(c) No compensation shall be paid unless the par-
tial disability results within two years of the last 
day in which the employee was exposed to the occu-
pational disease. 
(d) The time limit prescribed by Subsections (1) 
(b) and (c) shall not apply in the case of an employee 
whose disablement was due to occupational expo-
sure to ionizing radiation; provided, that a claim for 
such compensation shall be filed within one year af-
ter the date upon which the employee first suffered 
incapacity from the exposure to radiation and either 
knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have known that the occupational disease 
was caused by his present or prior employment. 
(2) It is recognized that the measurement of par-
tial permanent disability is a highly technical and 
difficult task and should be placed in the hands of 
physicians specially trained for the care and treat-
ment of the occupational disease involved, and that, 
particularly in cases of silicosis, such determination 
should be by physicians limiting largely their prac-
tice to diseases of the chest; that the measurement 
of the extent of such disability should not be deter-
mined by physicians in general practice nor by lay-
men. Where a claim for compensation based upon 
partial permanent disability due to an occupational 
disease or industrial injury is filed with the commis-
sion, the commission shall appoint an impartial 
medical panel to consist of one or more physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or condi-
tion involved in the claim, and such medical panel 
shall make such study, take such X-rays and per-
form such tests as the panel may determine and cer-
tify to the commission the extent, if any, of the per-
manent disability of the claimant from performing 
work for remuneration or profit, and whether the 
sole cause of such partial permanent disability, in 
the opinion of the panel, results from the occupa-
tional disease and whether any other cause or 
causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or 
in anywise contributed to the disability, and if so, 
the extent (in percentage) to which such other cause 
or causes has so contributed to the disability. The 
report of the panel shall be made to the commission 
in writing and shall be in substantially the following 
form: 
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL 
Partial Permanent Disability Cases 
lb the Industrial Commission of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: , Claimant 
Claim No. 
The medical panel, composed of the undersigned 
physicians, has completed its study and examina-
tion of the above named claimant with respect to the 
measurement of the ability of the claimant to per-
form physical labor* (but without regard to the edu-
cation, experience or training of the claimant) and 
on the assumption that the normal person functions 
at 100%, finds as follows: 
Percentage Percentage 
1. Extent of Permanent 
Partial Disability from, 
all causes (if any) 
**2. Specific causes of 
such disability: 
a. Occupational 
Disease (if any) 
Name of Occupational disease 
b. Other diseases 
or injuries 
Names of such diseases or injuries 
c. Other contributing 
factors 
TOTAL 
Dated , 19_ 
(Medical Panel) 
•Subsection 35-2-12 (e)t;] defines partial perma-
nent disability as: "Partial permanent disability," as 
herein used, is defined as that pathological condi-
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tion directly resulting from an occupational disease 
and causing substantial physical impairment, evi-
denced by objective medical and clinical findings 
readily demonstrable, and which has reduced the 
earning capacity of the employee, excluding, 
however, total disability cases. 
••The sum of the percentages under (S«beee-
****) Paragraphs ft]2[)] a, b, and c should equal the 
percentage of [Subsections] Paragraph 1 and the 
commission shall promptly distribute by mail full 
copies of such report to the claimant, employer 
against whom compensation is claimed and the in-
surance carrier. Thereafter any such party shall 
have ten days to object, in writing, to such report, 
and if no objections are filed with the commission 
within such period, the percentage of partial dis-
ability caused solely by the occupational disease and 
so certified by the medical panel shall be deemed ac-
cepted. The expense of such study and certification 
shall be paid out of the fund provided for by Section 
35-1-68 (1) and such study and certification shall 
be a part of the record. If objections to such report 
are filed, then it shall be the duty of the commission 
to determine the percentage of such partial perma-
nent disability after formal hearing, and at such for-
mal hearing the party objecting must show by the 
weight of the evidence the extent of such claimed 
partial permanent disability and on appeal the evi-
dence shall be reviewed as in equity cases. 
(3) Where an employee has been found to be par-
tially and permanently disabled by reason of an oc-
cupational disease, as provided in Subsections (1), 
(2), (3), and (4) [provided], and the commission fur-
ther finds that the employee is unable to obtain em-
ployment in his usual trade or occupation, or on ap-
plication of either the employee or employer the 
commission finds that it is to the best interest of the 
employee so partially and permanently disabled by 
reason of an occupational disease that he no longer 
works at his usual trade or occupation, then it shall 
be the duty of the commission to order that there be 
paid to the division of vocational rehabilitation of 
the State Board of Education out of the [second in 
jury] Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by 
Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use 
in the rehabilitation and training of such employee, 
such rehabilitation to be directed and controlled by 
such division of rehabilitation acting in conjunction 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah and shall 
generally follow the practice applicable under Sec-
tion [3§™1 69] 3S-1-67 and relating to the rehabili-
tation of employeeslnaving combined injuries]. 
(4) The benefits imposed upon the employer and 
to which an employee found, as in this section above 
provided, to be partially permanently disabled, 
shall be entitled under this act, are limited to the fol-
lowing: 
During those weeks in which the employee is ac-
tively in training under the division of rehabilita-
tion, as in this section above referred to, the em-
ployee shall receive 66-2/3% of his average weekly 
wages at the time the disability commenced, but not 
more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state aver-
age weekly wage at the time the disability com-
menced per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week, for not to exceed twenty weeks, such 
payment to be made at four-week intervals and 
upon the filing with the commission at two-week in-
tervals of a certificate by the division of rehabilita-
tion that the employee is cooperating with such divi-
sion in his rehabilitation training. 
At the termination of such training in rehabilita-
tion, the employee shall be paid one-half of his 
weekly compensation rate as determined in this sec-
tion per week at four-week intervals until such time 
as the total payments so made, plus the weekly pay-
ments received by the employee during rehabilita-
tion training, equals a sum equivalent to that 
amount determined under the following formula: 
Multiply the percentage of partial permanent dis-
ability resulting from the occupational disease, as 
determined by the medical panel (or in case of for-
mal hearing, then by the commission), by 104 weeks 
times the employee's compensation rate per week as 
previously determined. 
For example: Assume a finding by the medical 
panel that the employee has sustained partial per-
manent disability from an occupational disease to 
the extent of 25% loss ofbodily function and his com-
pensation rate has been determined to be $80 per 
week. The total amount payable would therefore be: 
.25 x $80 x 104 weeks * $2,080 payable as follows: 
20 weeks rehabilitation $1,600 
Balance at intervals of 4 weeks 480 
TOTAL PAYABLE 2,080 
Payments made for partial permanent disability 
shall be credited to the employer and deducted from 
any award which might ultimately be made should 
the employee subsequently become totally and per-
manently disabled. 
Section 11. Section Amended. 
Section 59-9-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1987, 
First Special Session, is amended to read: 
59-0-101. Tax Basis — Rates — Exemptions. 
(1) Except for annuity considerations, insurance 
premiums paid by institutions within the state sys-
tem of higher education as specified in Section 
53B-1-102, and ocean marine insurance, every ad-
mitted insurer shall pay to the commission [for~de-
peeifc in the General Fund,] on or before March 31 in 
each year, a tax of 2-1/4% of the total premiums re-
ceived by it during the preceding calends year from 
insurance covering property or risks located in this 
state. This subsection does not apply to workers' 
compensation and title insurance premiums, which 
aretaxedunderSubsections(2)and(3). The taxable 
premium under this subsection shall be reduced by: 
(a) all premiums returned or credited to policy-
holders on direct business subject to tax in this 
state; 
(b) all premiums received for reinsurance of prop-
erty or risks located in this state; and 
(c) the dividends, including premium reduction 
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benefits maturing within the year, paid or credited 
to policyholders in this state or applied in abate-
ment or reduction of premiums due during the pre-
ceding calendar year. 
(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' 
compensation insurance in this state, including the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah under Chap-
ter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the tax commission, on or 
before March 31 in each year, alia*} premium of be-
tween (&-Wfc] 1% and [3-#4fl>] 8% of the total [pre-
miums] premium income received by [it] the insurer 
from workers' compensation insurance in this state 
during the preceding calendar year. The percentage 
of premium applicable in any given year shall be de-
termined by the Industrial Commission [at least 00 
days prior to the payment date, and any percentage 
of premium over 3 • 1/4% shall reflect the reasonable 
reserves necessary to maintain the Uninsured Em 
plovers' Fund provided for in Section 35-1-107 in 
an aetuanly sound financial condition] under Sub-
section (b). [Thio taxable] The total premium in-
come shall be reduced in the same manner as pro-
vided in Subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b), but not as 
provided in Subsection (1) (c). The tax commission 
shall remit from the [tax] premium collected under 
this subsection an amount [equal] of up to [3%] 
7.15% of the premium income to the [Second Injury) 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund created under Sub-
section 35-1-68 (1), an amount equal to 1/4% of the 
premium income to the General Fund, an amount of 
up to 1/2% and any remaining [applicable] assessed 
percentage of the premium income to the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund created under Section 35-1-107, 
and an amount equal to. 1% of the premium income 
to the Industrial Commission's Division of IndiiF 
trial Accidents. [Ne-tejt] This .1% is a one-time 
charge applicable to premiums received for calen-
dar year 1988, for the purpose of funding the devel-
opment, operation, maintenance, and improve-
ments of the Division of Industrial Accidents' com-
puter system. After 1988, this. 1% shall be added"to 
the 7.15% remitted to the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
(b) The Industrial Commission shall determine 
the amount of the premium to be assessed each year 
on or before each October 1. The Industrial Conv 
mission shall make this determination following a 
public hearing. The determination shall be based 
upon the recommendations of a qualified actuary. 
The actuary shall recommend a premium rate suffi-
cient to provide payments of benefits and expenses 
from these funds on a positive cash flow basis from 
year to year, and sufficient to provide cash reserves 
at the the beginning of each fiscal year of approxi-
mately $5,000,000 in the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund and $500,000 in the Uninsured Employers' 
FundT 
(c) A premium that is to be transferred into the 
General Fund may be collected on premiums re-
ceived-from Utah public agencies or on premiums 
collected by public agency insurance mutuals. 
(3) Every admitted insurer writing title insur-
ance in this state shall pay to the commission, on or 
before March 31 in each year, a tax of .45% of the to-
tal premium received by either the insurer or by its 
agents during the preceding calendar year from ti-
tle insurance concerning property located in this 
state. In calculating this tax, "premium" includes 
the charges made to an insured under or to an appli-
cant for a policy or contract of title insurance for 
(a) the assumption by the title insurer of the risks 
assumed by the issuance! of the policy or contract of 
title insurance; and 
(b) abstracting title, title searching, examining 
title, or determining the insurability of title, and 
every other activity, exclusive of escrow, settlement, 
or closing charges, whether denominated premium 
or otherwise, made by a title insurer, an agent of a 
title insurer, a title insurance agent, or any of them. 
(4) Beginning July 1, 1986, former county 
mutuals and former mutual benefit associations 
shall pay the premium tax due under this chapter. 
All premiums received after July 1,1986, shall be 
considered in determining this tax. 
(5) The following insurers are not subject to the 
premium tax on health aire insurance which would 
otherwise be applicable under Subsection (1): 
(a) insurers licensed under Chapter 5, Title 31A; 
(b) insurers licensed under Chapter 7, Title 31A; 
(c) insurers licensed under Chapter 8, Title 3 LA; 
(d) insurers licensed under Chapter 9, Title 31A; 
(e) insurers licensed under Chapter 11, Title 3 LA; 
(f) insurers licensed under Chapter 13, Title 3 LA; 
and 
(g) insurers licensed under Chapter 14, Title 3 LA. 
(6) No insurer issuing; multiple policies to an in-
sured may artificially allocate the premiums among 
the policies for purposes of reducing the aggregate 
premium tax applicable to the policies. 
Section 12. Section Repealed. 
Section 35-1-100, as last amended by Chapter 
287, Laws of Utah 1981, is repealed. 
Section 13. Effective Date. 
This act, except for Section 59-9-101, takes effect 
on July 1,1988. Section 5^-9-101 has retrospective 
operation to taxable years beginning on or after 
January 1,1988. 
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that the parties agreed to purchase and sell 
parcel one based on the physical bound-
aries of the parcel and decided on a price 
for that parcel without regard to the acre-
age of parcel one. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
(O | K £ Y NUMBER SYST£M> 
Kathleen NYREHN, Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Fred 
Meyer Stores and/or Liberty Mutual 
Insurance, Respondents. 
No. 900010-CA. 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Oct. 25, 1990. 
Worker sought review of denial of 
workers' compensation benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) 
worker who did not appeal from adminis-
trative law judge's order in her favor could 
raise claims of error with respect to his 
findings which were adverse to her when 
her employer appeals, and (2) worker estab-
lished legal causation with respect to back 
injury, notwithstanding her preexisting in-
jury. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s»1846 
Worker was not required to appeal 
from adverse rulings of administrative law 
judge who entered an order in her favor in 
order to assert as appellee on appeal that 
those findings were erroneous. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1939.7 
Court is not required to give deference 
to conclusions of Industrial Commission on 
grounds that Commission has expertise and 
familiarity with the work environment, al-
though there may be some complex work 
activities which require deference to the 
Commission's evaluation of whether work-
related exertion exceeds the exertion of 
nonemployment life. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=554 
Administrative law judge may not sim-
ply presume that finding of preexisting 
condition warrants application of the Allen 
test for determining whether there is a 
causal relation between work and injury. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>554 
Finding that worker's preexisting con-
dition contributed to injury may not be 
implied. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
0=763 
Failure of agency to make adequate 
findings of fact on material issues renders 
its findings arbitrary and capricious unless 
the evidence is clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of only one conclusion. 
6. Workers' Compensation <£=a552 
Legal causation test to be applied to 
workers who suffer from preexisting condi-
tion is not meant to prevent workers with 
preexisting conditions from recovering ben-
efits; higher standard of legal causation is 
intended to offset the preexisting condition 
of the employee as a likely cause of injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
7. Workers' Compensation @=>517 
When accident is climax of repeated 
exertions, the work-related exertion is, for 
purposes of proving legal causation, the 
aggregate exertion of the repetitive exer-
tions that established the accident; in de-
termining whether there is causation, court 
must consider the whole burden on the 
camel, and not just the straw that breaks 
the camel's back. 
8. Workers' Compensation <s=>1542 
Although worker suffered from preex-
isting back condition, evidence that, for two 
and one-half months, she was required to 
lift tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a 
day showed that she engaged in activity 
which was not typical of nonemployment 
activity and thus showed causation with 
respect to her back injury. 
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work. The pain worsened until she finally 
had to leave work early at approximately 
4:00 p.m. After three back operations, Ny-
rehn's pain persisted and she was still un-
able to work. She therefore sought perma-
nent disability benefits. 
After a hearing, an Administrative Law 
Judge (A.L.J.) made the following relevant 
findings of fact: (1) Nyrehn's pain of Janu-
ary 23, 1985 was not the result of a certain 
incident or activity, but rather the result of 
"two and [a] half months of lifting tubs of 
merchandise 30 to 36 times a day;" (2) 
Nyrehn had an asymptomatic preexisting 
condition, spondylolysis (disintegration or 
dissolution of a vertebra); and (3) 75% of 
Nyrehn's total permanent impairment ex-
isting at examination was "caused by the 
industrial accident of January 23, 1985," 
and 25% was due to "preexisting incapacity 
of spondylolysis." 
The A.L.J, also made the following rele-
vant conclusions of law: (1) Nyrehn injured 
her lower back "by accident" in that her 
injury was neither planned nor foreseen; 
(2) there was a direct medical causal rela-
tionship between the industrial accident 
and Nyrehn's back problems; (3) due to her 
preexisting condition, Nyrehn was required 
to prove legal causation under Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986); and (4) Nyrehn's job duties of lifting 
tubs of merchandise weighing between fif-
teen and forty pounds did not amount to 
unusual or extraordinary exertion in excess 
of the normally expected level of nonem-
ployment activity for men and women in 
the latter half of the twentieth century as 
required in Allen.2 
Despite his conclusion that Nyrehn failed 
to satisfy the Allen test, the A.L.J. award-
ed Nyrehn permanent total disability bene-
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
Fred Meyer, on the other hand, argues that the 
A.L.J, considered the total circumstances since 
at the conclusion of the hearing he referred to 
various factors besides the weight of the tubs, 
including the repetitive nature of the lifting. 
Since we base our decision on other grounds, 
we need not determine whether the A.L.J, erro-
neously applied a bright-line test rather than 
consider the totality of the circumstances as 
required by Smith & Edwards. 
William W. Downes, Jr., David Eckersley 
(argued), Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Michael E. Dyer (argued), Brad C. Bete-
benner, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, 
Salt Lake City, for Fred Meyer Stores. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for Employers Rein-
surance Fund. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
CONDER \ JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Kathleen Nyrehn petitions this court for 
review of the Industrial Commission's deni-
al of workers' compensation benefits. We 
reverse. 
Nyrehn worked as a stock room clerk for 
Fred Meyer Stores. Her duties included 
pricing and sorting merchandise contained 
in tubs which were approximately 2% feet 
wide, 2V2 feet long, and Vk to 2 feet tall. 
The tubs weighed between fifteen and for-
ty pounds each, depending on the contents, 
and were stacked upon each other. Ny-
rehn would lift and carry the tubs to and 
from a sorting area approximately thirty to 
thirty-six times a day. In addition to lift-
ing the tubs, Nyrehn was involved in con-
stant bending and stooping to sort mer-
chandise into different tubs. On January 
23, 1985, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Ny-
rehn felt a gradual onset of pain in her 
lower back while performing her duties at 
work. Despite the pain she continued to 
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990). 
2. In concluding that Nyrehn had not satisfied 
the Allen test, the A.L.J. stated that he followed 
the "legal doctrine" of Smith & Edwards v. In-
dustrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989) (lifting 47'/: pounds by itself did not 
constitute an unusual exertion). Nyrehn argues 
that this statement indicates that the A.L.J, 
based his conclusion on weight alone, which is 
inappropriate. American Roofing Co. v. Indus. 
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fits. He refused to apply Allen because he 
felt that the test was at odds with other 
Utah Supreme Court cases indicating that 
handicapped workers should not be placed 
in a hardship in receiving compensation 
benefits. He also indicated that he be-
lieved the Allen test to be unconstitutional 
because it set a different standard for such 
handicapped workers. 
Fred Meyer Stores and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance (referred to collectively as Fred 
Meyer) filed a motion with the Industrial 
Commission to review the A.LJ.'s award. 
On review, the Commission adopted the 
factual findings of the A.L.J, and his con-
clusion that Nyrehn failed to prove legal 
causation as required under Allen. The 
Commission then reversed the A.LJ.'s 
award of benefits, indicating that despite 
the A.L.J.'s concerns over the constitution-
ality of the Allen test, the Commission was 
required to apply the test. The Commis-
sion concluded that inasmuch as Nyrehn 
failed to satisfy the Allen test she was not 
entitled to benefits. Nyrehn then peti-
tioned this court to review the Industrial 
Commission's order. 
WAIVER OF APPEAL 
[1] Fred Meyer argues that Nyrehn has 
waived her right to challenge the A.LJ.'s 
finding that she did not prove legal causa-
tion because she did not file her own mo-
tion for review of that finding with the 
Commission.3 Fred Meyer erroneously re-
lies on Pease v. Industrial Commission, 
694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). In Pease, the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the fol-
lowing provision: ''(1) Any party in interest 
who is dissatisfied with the order entered 
by an administrative law judge or the com-
mission may file a motion for review of 
3. In essence, Fred Meyer urges us to adopt the 
following rule: If an A.L.J, makes a possibly 
erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law 
that is contrary to the prevailing party, but 
which did not prevent the party from prevailing, 
that party must nevertheless seek review in or-
der to preserve any challenge of the possibly 
erroneous finding/conclusion in the event the 
losing party moves for review. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(2) (Supp.1990) 
provides: 
such order." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-82.53(1) (Supp.1983) (emphasis add-
ed). The supreme court concluded that 
when an applicant files for review under 
this section, he must raise all possible is-
sues or the issues not raised would be 
considered waived. Id. at 616. There is no 
indication in Pease that a prevailing party 
has an affirmative duty to seek review 
from faulty findings. Nor do we perceive 
any such duty in the language of the stat-
ute which is clearly permissive. 
Although the conclusion of the A.L.J, 
regarding legal causation may have been 
faulty, any such error was rendered harm-
less to Nyrehn by the subsequent award of 
benefits. If Fred Meyer had not filed for 
review, she would have had her benefits. 
Nyrehn simply did not have any reason to 
appeal until the Commission denied her 
benefits. Cf Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 
643, 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ("Cross-ap-
peals are properly limited to grievances a 
party has with the judgment as it was 
entered—not grievances it might acquire 
depending on the outcome of the appeal."). 
In petitioning this court to review the deni-
al of benefits, Nyrehn is seeking review of 
the Commission's conclusion that she did 
not prove legal causation. She is not seek-
ing review of the A.LJ.'s conclusion. The 
issue of whether Nyrehn proved legal cau-
sation is therefore properly before us. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Inasmuch as these proceedings were 
commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the 
effective date of the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA), we look to the pri-
or case law to determine the proper stan-
dard of review.4 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency ac-
tion, agency review, and judicial review that 
are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern ail 
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced 
by or before an agency on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1987, even if those proceedings are 
still pending before an agency or a court on 
January 1, 1988. 
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our re-
view of agency findings of fact, see Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Bd. of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission, 776 P.2d 63, 66-68 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
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As to findings of fact, our review is 
deferential. "[T]he reviewing court's in-
quiry is whether the Commission's findings 
are 'arbitrary or capricious/ or 'wholly 
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inev-
itable] conclusion from the evidence' or 
without 'any substantial evidence' to sup-
port them. Only then should the Commis-
sion's findings be displaced." Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 
1981). 
As to the Commission's conclusion that 
Nyrehn's work-related exertion did not sat-
isfy the Allen test, our review is more 
searching: 
The question of whether the employ-
ment activities of a given employee are 
sufficient to satisfy the legal standard of 
unusual or extraordinary effort involves 
two steps. First the agency must deter-
mine as a matter of fact exactly what 
were the employment-related activities of 
the injured employee. Second, the agen-
cy must decide whether those activities 
amounted to unusual or extraordinary 
exertion. This second determination is a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 
731 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Utah 1986). 
[2] Our standard of review of mixed 
questions of law and fact is an interme-
diate review for reasonableness and ration-
ality. "The degree of deference extended 
to the decisions of the Commission on these 
intermediate types of issues has been given 
various expressions, but all are variations 
of the idea that the Commission's decisions 
must fall within the limits of reasonable-
ness or rationality." Sisco Hilte v. Indus. 
For a discussion of UAPA's effect on our review 
of mixed questions of law and fact, see Pro-Ben-
efit Staffing, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission, 775 P.2d 439, 441-42 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). 
5. Fred Meyer urges us to give considerable def-
erence to the conclusions of the Commission 
because of its "expertise in and familiarity with 
the work environment." Price River Coal, 731 
P.2d at 1084. The deference we accord an agen-
cy's disposition under intermediate review fluc-
tuates with the importance of the agency's ex-
pertise in determining the issue at hand: 
The more likely it is that agency expertise will 
assist in resolving an issue, the more defer-
ence courts should give to the agency's resolu-
Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (quoting Utah Dept. of Admin. 
Series, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 
601, 610 (Utah 1983)). 
"[Reasonableness must be determined 
with reference to the specific terms of 
the underlying legislation, interpreted in 
light of its evident purpose as revealed in 
the legislative history and in light 'of the 
public policy sought to be served." This 
standard appears to give us some flexi-
bility in reviewing the otherwise objec-
tive standard that must be applied by the 
Commission. 
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm'nf 
770 P.2d 1016, 1018 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs., 658 
P.2d at 611).5 
"Furthermore, to facilitate the purposes 
of the legislation, the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is to be liberally construed and any 
doubt as to compensation is to be resolved 
in favor of the applicant." USX Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); Kaiser Steel Corp., 631 P.2d 
at 892; McPhie v. Indus. Comm'n, 567 
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). 
Guided by these standards we must de-
termine whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to warrant application of the higher 
Allen test for legal causation and whether 
the Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn 
failed to prove legal causation was a rea-
sonable and rational conclusion. 
RECOVERY OF BENEFITS 
In order to recover workers' compensa-
tion benefits, an employee must prove that 
she was injured "by accident arising out of 
tion. The less pertinent agency insight is—or 
the more likely it is that judicial expertise will 
be most helpful—the less deference need be 
paid by reviewing courts to the agency's dis-
position. 
Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 
432, 434 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
We recognize that there may be some com-
plex work activities that require deference to 
the Commission's evaluation of whether the 
work-related exertion exceeds the exertion of 
nonemployment life, but in general the Com-
mission is no better suited to compare simple 
forms of work-related exertion than are we 
since "normal nonemployment life" is not with-
in the Commission's area of expertise. 
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: .- .n*- i-ourse of [her] employment," 
i caa Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988)" "This 
statutory language creates two prerequi 
sites for a finding of compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be 'by accident.' 
Second, the language 'arising out of or in 
the course of employment* requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment." Allen, 729 
P.2d at 18. The Utah Supreme Court held 
in Allen that a claimant must supply proof 
of both '''legal" and "medical" causation 
"Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 
'arising out of the employment' [then] 
the doctors must say whether the exertion 
(having been held legally sufficient to sup-
port compensation) in fact caused this [inju-
ry]." Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to 277 (1986) quoted in 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
To meet the legal causation requirement. 
a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contrib-
uted something substantial to increase 
the risk [she] already faced in everyday 
life because of [her] condition. This ad-
ditional element of risk in the work-place 
is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, every-
day life. This extra exertion serves to 
offset the preexisting condition of the 
employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impair 
ments resulting from a personal risk 
rather than exertions at work, 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25,6 
Therefore, the only two issues 7 before 
us are (1) whether Nyrehn was "suffering 
6. This standard is often referred to as the higher 
standard of Allen since, "(wjhere there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exer-
tion is sufficient [to prove legal causation]." 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. Compare Hone v. IF. 
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986) (exertion of 
putting on heavy pair of coveralls was sufficient 
when claimant did not have any preexisting 
back problems). 
7. Fred Meyei does not challenge the A I J "s 
finding that Nyrehn was injured "by accident." 
Nor does it challenge the conclusion, of tl le 
A.LJ. that the industrial accident was the medi 
cal cause of Nyrehn's disability. 
8. The A..L.J, did find—for purposes of ailocating 
liability between the employer and the Em,ploy 
from a preexisting condition which contrib-
uted] to the injury," Allen, 729 P.2d at 26, 
and (2) did the work-related exertion which 
caused Nyrehn's injury exceed the "usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life." Id. "If such a finding is 
made, then ' n* requirement of legal cause 
is -.-.* sfied u-'-ause "i .s presumed that the 
er, vment .r.oreas^a "he HSK of injury to 
whicr. that u.,ri\fr '-va- or her wise subject in 
[her; noneniL.'-vment hie. ' Price River 
Coal Co., Toi P.2d at iU»2. 
Preexisting Condition 
[3] An A.L.J, may not simply presume 
that the finding of a preexisting condition 
warrants application of the Allen test An 
employer must prove medically that the 
.nt "suffers from a preexisting condi-
ruch contributes to the injury." Al-
len, 729 P.2d at 26. See, e.g., Price River 
Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082 (evidence proved 
that preexisting conditions "contributed 
greatly" to heart attack); Worker's Com-
pensation Fund v. Indus. Common, 761 
P.2d 572 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (claimant suf-
fered from narcolepsy and emphysema and 
had a 36-year smoking habit, but no prior 
history of heart disease, Allen test there-
fore did not apply when claimant died of 
heart attack). 
[4, 5] The factual findings of the Com-
mission are silent as to whether Nyrehn's 
preexisting back condition contributed to 
the industrial injury.8 The A L.J. had 
merely concluded as a matter of law that 
ers* Reinsurance Fund—that. 75% of the total 
permanent impairment existing at the time of 
the examination was "caused by the industrial 
accident of January 23, 1985," and 25% was due 
to "pre-existing incapacity." Such an allocation, 
however, is not proof that the preexisting condi-
tion somehow contributed to the injury of Janu-
ary 23, 1985, it only addresses the end result, 
i.e., the total disability at the time of the exami-
nation. See, e.g., Richfield Care Center v. Tor-
gerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987) (5% im-
pairment existed prior to accident, T/i% impair-
ment existed following accident, therefore only 
2'/2% attributed to the accident); cf. Zimmer-
man v. Indus. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1130 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (permanent impairment re-
sulted solely from the preexisting conditions 
and not from the industrial accident or any 
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"[s]ince Ms. Nyrehn brought a pre-existing 
low back condition to the workplace/' the 
Allen test applied. Implicit in such a legal 
conclusion is the critical factual finding 
that Nyrehn's preexisting condition contrib-
uted to her injury. Such material findings, 
however, may not be implied. In order for 
us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be "suf-
ficiently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual is-
sue was reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker 
v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)). The 
failure of a trial court to make adequate 
findings is reversible error. Id. Likewise, 
the failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact on material issues renders 
its findings "arbitrary and capricious" un-
less the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of only one conclusion." Id. 
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 
236 (Utah 1983)). 
Since we conclude that Nyrehn's work-re-
lated exertion satisfied even the higher 
standard for proving legal causation, the 
Commission's failure to make adequate 
findings of fact was harmless. We there-
fore need not address whether there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the Commis-
sion's implied finding. 
Legal Causation 
[6] The legal causation test adopted in 
Allen is not meant to prevent workers with 
preexisting conditions from recovering ben-
efits.9 "Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation 
or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by 
an industrial accident is compensable 
. . . . ' " Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (quoting 
Powers v. Indus. Comm % 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) (footnote 
omitted)). 
combination of the accident with the preexisting 
conditions). 
9. "It is the duty of the courts and the commis-
sion to construe the Workers' Compensation Act 
The higher standard of legal causation 
adopted in Allen is intended to "offset the 
preexisting condition of the employee as a 
likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminat-
ing claims for impairments resulting from 
a personal risk rather than exertions at 
work." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis 
added). See also Price River Coal Co., 731 
P.2d at 1082 (legal causation test "is de-
signed to screen out those injuries that 
result from a personal condition . . . rather 
than from exertions required of the em-
ployee in the workplace"); Hone v. J.F. 
Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986) 
(legal causation test is to distinguish be-
tween an injury which is "more likely than 
not produced by a risk related to the em-
ployment from one that is caused by a 
personal risk" (emphasis added)); Lancas-
ter v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.-d 237 (Utah 
1987) (the fact that heart attack occurred 
at work was a mere coincidence). 
"[T]he key question in determining cau-
sation is whether, given this body and this 
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to 
the injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. In 
order to answer this inquiry, we must first 
determine what "exertion" is at issue: the 
simple lifting of one tub of merchandise, or 
the repetitive lifting of many such tubs 
over an extended period of time. 
The Commission found that Nyrehn's 
pain resulted from "two and a half months 
of lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 
times a day." The industrial accident, 
therefore, was not a single incident of lift-
ing one tub of merchandise; it was the 
climax of repetitive lifting. The Utah Su-
preme Court has broadly defined "acci-
dent" to include injuries which are the re-
sult of repetitive exertion. 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events 
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
liberally and in favor of employee coverage 
when statutory terms reasonably admit such a 
construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (1990). 
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preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such a 
manner as to properly fall within the 
definition of an accident as just stated 
above. 
Carting v. Indus. Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 
260, 261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) quot-
ed with approval in Allen, 729 P.2d at 18. 
7: W'.HH an ncviden' .s \he climax of 
v d "\»-rUfins as :r. Nyrehn's case, 
>eia>u exertion. ' for purposes of 
ng legal causation, .s "he aggregate 
exertion of the repetitive exertions that 
establish the accident. See Miera v. Indus, 
• -:mn, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986) 
*. . -nant's repetitive "jumps into an eight-
» -toie bv way of] a four-foot platform 
* intervals constitute a con 
.^er exertion than that en 
- ^< ,n non-employment life"). In 
"onsider the whole 
...i not just the straw 
that breaks the camel's back. See Smith 
& Edwards, 770 P.2d at 1018 (must consid-
er all factors related to exertion); Workers' 
Compensation Fund., 761 P.2d at 575 
(comparing cumulative effect of several 
factors, including driver's fatigue, anxiety, 
and the stress of driving through a snow 
storm, with the exertion of nonemployment 
life). 
In Allen, the supreme court listed the 
following examples of typical nonem-
ployment activities: "taking full garbage 
cans to the street, lifting and carrying bag-
gage for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to ch. t 
height, and climbing the stairs 
ings." Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. While lifting 
a tub of merchandise weighing between 15 
and 40 pounds once or twice could likewise 
fit into the list of examples above, lifting 
such a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and 
a half months is not a typical nonem 
ployment activity. The foregoing moder 
ately strenuous activities which may not be 
considered unusual when performed once 
or twice may nevertheless amount to un-
usual exertion when performed repeatedly. 
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage 
handlers, auto mechanics, childcare provid-
ers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing 
examples. 
(HI In the case before us it is unques-
tionable that two and a half months of 
lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 36 times a 
day would cause unusual and extraordinary 
wear and tear on a body when compared 
with the "usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life." Allen, 729 
P.2d at 26. The test is not whether the 
type of exertion which caused the injury is 
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather 
whether the cumulative work-related exer-
tion exceeds the normal level of exertion in 
nonemployment life. We doubt that there 
are many physical activities outside of the 
\ :« kplace where this type of effort is be-
ing repeated so often over such a signifi-
cant period of time. 
The Commission's finding that Nyrehn's 
work-related exertion was not an unusual 
exertion was comparable to a conclusion 
that the typical nonemployment activities 
of people in today's society includes lifting 
a full garbage can 30 to 36 times per day 
each working day for two and a half 
months. Merely stating the comparison 
shows the fallacy of the Commission's find-
ing", Nyrehn's back injury was not a coinci-
dental injury which appeared at work with-
out any enhancement from the workplace. 
"[Her] employment contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk [she] al-
rea<i> faced in everyday life because of 
[hen condition.'* Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
The Commission's conclusion that Nyrehn 
failed to prove legal causation was there-
fore not reasonable and rational 
CONCLUSION 
N") rehn's repetitive lifting of the tubs 
over an extended period of time was an 
unusual exertion as compared with the 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment life." Aden, 729 P.2d at 26. 
We therefore conclude that Nyrehn proved 
legal causation. The Commission's order 
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denying Nyrehn her workers' compensation lated by the A.L.J. Costs on review to 
benefits is reversed and the case is remand- petitioner, 
ed with instructions to grant Nyrehn bene-
fits for total permanent disability as calcu- GARFF and CONDER, JJ., concur. 
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